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Chapter 1
Lewis Fry Richardson – A Pioneer Not
Forgotten
Nils Petter Gleditsch
Abstract Lewis F Richardson, a physicist by training, remains a towering presence
in two academic subjects, meteorology and peace research. Prizes are named for
him in both fields. This chapter introduces a collection of articles assessing
Richardson’s legacy and his enduring influence in the social sciences. It reviews his
citations as an indication of the range of his influence and discusses his impact in
five areas of social science: the study of arms races, data collection on deadly
quarrels, the stability of the long peace, the role of geography in conflict, and the
role of mathematics in peace studies. It also includes a brief discussion of the
conscience of a scholar with regard to preparations for war.
1.1 His Life and Work
Lewis F Richardson was trained as a physicist, but gained his fame first in mete-
orology and then in the study of conflict. Although he never gained employment at
a leading university, his work in meteorology was widely respected by his con-
temporaries and has remained among the foundations of the field. His work on
conflict was seen as more unorthodox. Certainly, his formal models and quantitative
empirics were well ahead of the curve in the discipline of international relations in
his lifetime. It was not until seven years after his death that his two major volumes
on conflict found a publisher (Richardson, 1960a, b).
Since then, Richardson has been honored in various ways. In 1972, British Prime
Minister Edward Heath opened a new wing of the Headquarters Building of the
My work on this volume was supported by the Gløbius fund and by the Conflict trends project
(#402561). Most of the chapters were first presented to two sessions on Richardson at the 59th
Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, 4–7 April 2018.
I am grateful to Håvard Hegre, Gerald Schneider, and the contributors to this volume for
comments on my introduction.
© The Author(s) 2020
N. P. Gleditsch (ed.), Lewis Fry Richardson: His Intellectual Legacy
and Influence in the Social Sciences, Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science,
Engineering, Practice 27, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31589-4_1
1
Meteorological Office named the Richardson Wing.1 The Department of
Mathematics at the University of York has sponsored a Lewis F Richardson lecture
series since 2015.2 Unusually, scientific prizes are named for him in both his main
fields. In 1960, the Royal Meteorological Society established the annual LF
Richardson Prize for meritorious papers by young authors in one of the journals of
the society.3 Since 1997, The European Geosciences Union has awarded the Lewis
Fry Richardson Medal for ‘exceptional contributions to nonlinear geophysics in
general’.4 And from 2001, scholars who have spent most of their academic life in
Europe and who have made exemplary scholarly contributions to the scientific
study of militarized conflict, have been honored with the Lewis F Richardson
Lifetime Award, with Michael Nicholson as the first recipient.5 As I have experi-
enced on a couple of occasions, if a conflict researcher gets an opportunity to speak
to a group of meteorologists (say on the topic of climate change and conflict), a
favorable mood can be generated by an early reference to Richardson.
Richardson was in many ways a loner. Although he carried out an extensive
correspondence and was receptive to criticism of his own work – in fact, his two
major volumes contain a number of fictional dialogues with his critics – he gen-
erally worked without assistants, and most of his work is single-authored. He often
worked under difficult conditions. The extreme case is his work on meteorology
while serving as an ambulance driver in France in World War I. In 1917, during the
battle of Champagne, he sent his working copy of the manuscript on weather
prediction ‘to the rear, where it became lost, only to be re-discovered some months
later, under a heap of coal’ (Richardson, 1922: ix). Of course, as befitting a scholar
of his generation, he relied very heavily on his wife Dorothy not just for moral
support but in the practical work of carrying out experiments and in copy-editing.6
As is evident from the timeline in the Appendix, Richardson spent most of his
professional life in positions where he either worked on practical problems or
taught science at the basic level, notably at Paisley Technical College (1929–40).
Apparently, Richardson was not the world’s best teacher, but he is described as
‘conscientious and caring’ (Ashford, 1985: 150f). Much of his research was carried
out in his spare time. It was only after retirement, for the last 13 years of his life,
that he was able to devote himself full-time to research.
Richardson’s publications in meteorology, notably Weather Prediction by
Numerical Process (Richardson, 1922) and a later article on atmospheric diffusion
(Richardson, 1926), remain his most frequently cited items. The 1926 article is
recorded with well over 1000 citations on Web of Science, including 42 citations in
1Ashford (1985: 246ff).
2www.york.ac.uk/maths/events/lfr/.




2 N. P. Gleditsch
the first seven months of 2018!7 Among his social science writings, his two
posthumously published books top the list, with Arms and Insecurity (Richardson,
1960a) a little ahead of Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (1960b). Both of these books
continue to be cited to this day, although not at the level of his 1926 article.
Richardson (1961), another posthumous publication, is also widely cited.
For several years, Richardson maintained a strong interest in psychology, and
delved into topics like intelligence, the quantitative assessment of pain, perception,
and national hatred. He published in scholarly journals, including several articles in
British Journal of Psychology, attended professional meetings, and even went to the
trouble of acquiring an academic degree in psychology at the age of 48.8 He also
taught a psychology course in college. Several of Richardson’s articles in psy-
chology are respectably cited, particularly his work on the measurement of sen-
sations (Poulton, 1993). But on the whole he appears to have had more limited
impact in this field, although some of his methods have been widely adopted.
Richardson’s first major publication on conflict was, characteristically, titled The
Mathematical Psychology of War (Richardson, 1919). That he focused on psy-
chology rather than war when he more or less left meteorology in the 1920s, has
been explained as a result of a hope that World War I had been so devastating that
another major war seemed unlikely. When political and military developments
turned to the worse in the 1930s, Richardson devoted almost all his research time to
the question of war and peace (Nicholson, 1999: 543).
1.2 The Study of Arms Races
The notion of an arms race is an old one and extends well beyond the field of
international relations, e.g. in biological studies of adaptation and counter-adaptation
between predators and prey (Smith, 2020, in this volume: 8–9). Boulding (1962: 25)
suggested the label ‘Richardson processes’, since he had provided the most extensive
theoretical treatment. Richardson was concerned with how the acquisition of arms by
two or more hostile powers could lead to a competitive race (Richardson, 1960a). He
analyzed under what conditions such a race would become unstable and was likely to
end in war. He studied a number of arms races from this perspective, notably the arms
races preceding the two World Wars. He developed a formal model which was driven
by competition with the other side, a ‘fatigue’ factor determined by the level of one’s
own military spending, and the ‘grievance’ against the other side. A very large
number of scholars have tried to improve on this model and the empirical measures
used to test it. Two major debates have emerged out of this literature: First, whether
arms acquisitions are driven mainly by competition, or by internal processes as
7All searches on ISI Web of Science, 8 August 2018.
8Ashford (1985: 112f).
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argued, for instance, by Senghaas (1990). Secondly, to what extent arms races are
associated with the outbreak of war, as maintained by Wallace (1979) and others.
Both of these debates became quite heated and acquired ideological overtones.
Smith (2020) concludes that the lack of specificity in the Richardson model was a
strength as well as a weakness. It could be applied in a wide variety of contexts, but
at the same time it was difficult to evaluate empirically. Its simplicity also makes it a
great teaching tool. Diehl (2020, in this volume) shows how the empirical testing of
the arms-race-to-war linkage has become more sophisticated since Richardson’s
original analyses, notably in examining the no-arms race cases. No clear consensus
has emerged, but Richardson continues to provide an inspiration to study the role of
arms races in raising the risk of war.
The bulk of the work on arms races has focused on competition between two
hostile powers. However, Richardson also developed extensions of his arms race
model to three or more nations (Richardson, 1960a, Chs 15, 17). The greater
complexity of these models makes it harder to derive the conditions for stability,
and the empirical testing also becomes much more complicated. However, as
argued by Michael Ward (2020, in this volume), Richardson’s work points the way
towards a network perspective on international affairs. And recent progress in data
collection and processing makes it much more feasible to simulate complicated
systems of interdependent processes.
1.3 Identifying Deadly Quarrels
Unlike present-day scholars, Richardson could not pick a suitable dataset off the
shelf in order to test his theories of the causes of war. He had to develop his own, and
Richardson (1960b) is the final result of this effort, listing all ‘fatal quarrels’ after
1820 which had ended. He consulted a large number of historical sources as well as
police statistics and the notes on each conflict list the sources used. In parallel
endeavors, Sorokin (1937) and Wright (1942) also developed datasets on wars.
Richardson only became aware of these lists when his own was largely complete,
and in his book he comments on some similarities and differences. In his own list,
inclusion was determined strictly by the number of deaths, which he believed to ‘the
most reliable method for statistical purposes’ (Richardson, 1960b: 5). A ‘deadly
quarrel’ is defined as ‘any quarrel which caused death to humans (p. 6). This includes
not just wars, but also ‘murders, banditries, mutinies, insurrections’, but not ‘acci-
dents, and calamities such as earthquakes and tornadoes’ or indirect deaths from
famine and disease.
The two most frequently used datasets in current empirical research on armed
conflict, the Correlates of War (COW) Project9 and the Uppsala Conflict Data
9http://www.correlatesofwar.org/.
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Program (UCDP),10 draw directly or indirectly on the earlier lists, but have settled
for narrower definitions than Richardson. For instance, UCDP defines an armed
conflict as ‘a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory
where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar
year’.11
The trend in recent empirical work on armed conflict has been in the direction of
greater inclusion, although not necessarily by including everything in a master
category such as ‘deadly quarrels’. The COW project’s first dataset (Singer &
Small, 1972) included interstate wars only, while the current lists also include data
on civil wars, extra-state wars, and non-state wars. While UCDP started out with
data on three types of conflicts – interstate, intrastate, and extra-state – it has later
added data on non-state conflicts and on one-sided violence. These data are reported
in separate spreadsheets, but it is possible to merge the information, and UCDP now
reports an annual world total for deaths in all these forms of violence (Pettersson &
Eck, 2018).
There is some controversy over the issue whether or not to include deaths from
crime in the study of armed conflict. The study of violent crime is usually con-
ducted quite separately from the study of war. But the basic framework, where
actions are seen as a function of motive and opportunity, is the same, and the recent
decline in homicide rates is frequently interpreted as part of the same turn away
from violence as the decline in war casualties (Pinker, 2018). In a controversial
study, the International Institute of Strategic Studies reported in 2017 that Mexico
had the world’s second-most-lethal conflict in 2016 (after Syria) (IISS, 2017: 5).12
But this assumed that all or most of the murders in Mexico (23,000) were connected
to organized crime, whereas UCDP limits non-state conflict to the use of armed
force between two organized groups and attributed a much smaller number (1300)
of deaths in Mexico to this type of armed conflict. Since deaths from homicides
vastly exceed casualties in war or civil war in most countries and most years, it
matters a great deal how large a share is classified as armed conflict. It is essential
that the classification criteria are the same across time and space.
Richardson reported all casualties in his deadly quarrels in logarithms to the base
ten. He was wary of fictitious accuracy. He commented on three seemingly very
different estimates of the number of deaths in the Union army in the American Civil
War (359,528, 279,376 and 166,623). Reporting the logarithms (5.6, 5.4, and 5.2)
‘brings out their substantial agreement’ (Richardson, 1960b: 7). The rationale was
the same as for measuring the severity of earthquakes with the Richter scale
(Nicholson, 1999: 550) or its successor the Moment Magnitude Scale.
10http://ucdp.uu.se/.
11www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/.
12For critiques of the IISS report, see e.g. Phillips (2017) and Estévez-Soto (2017).
1 Lewis Fry Richardson – A Pioneer Not Forgotten 5
1.4 The Stability of the Long Peace
A number of scholars have argued that the world is becoming less violent if the
violence is measured by casualties in armed conflict (Lacina, Gleditsch & Russett,
2006; Pinker, 2018). Others question the stability of this trend and outline plausible
scenarios that could produce a large war (e.g. Ellsberg, 2017). Richardson (1948,
1960b: Chs 3–4) found that war sizes followed a power-law distribution where the
frequency of wars of size x is proportional to xa, where a is a constant. Bigger
wars are less common than smaller ones and the value of a determines the rate at
which war frequencies decrease as war sizes increase. Aaron Clauset (2020, in this
volume) confirms this, using more sophisticated statistical tools and better data than
were available to Richardson. His analysis is consistent with a constant hazard of
interstate war. This does not contradict the empirical fact of a decline in the lethality
of war over the last 70 years, but Clauset concludes that the pattern of relative peace
would have to last another 100 years before one can conclude that it is a statistically
significant trend rather than the result of chance. Michael Spagat & Stijn van
Weezel (2020, in this volume) do not dispute this. However, they point out that
when the fatalities are measured relative to the size of the population, measuring the
risk that a random person will suffer a battle-related death, the evidence for a real
change becomes stronger. The same is true if one moves the hypothesized
break-point forward to 1950 rather than the end of World War II. Finally, when
including civil wars, the no-change hypothesis can be rejected with confidence.
This debate will no doubt continue to inspire a host of new studies. Richardson is
frequently quoted for his statement that his ‘equations are merely a description of
what people would do if they did not stop to think’ (Richardson, 1960a: 12).
Indeed, Clauset (2020: 124–125) finds it puzzling that the hazard of war should
remain constant, given the non-stationarity of human population, the number of
recognized states, commerce, communication etc. If the straitjacket of the
power-law distribution for the size of wars can be broken, Richardson would
probably have been delighted to find that people had actually stopped to think.
1.5 The Role of Geography in Conflict
Meteorology is very much a geographical science. Weather prediction depends
crucially on estimates of how and when air pressures and sources of precipitation
move geographically. It is not surprising when Richardson took his tools from
physics and set them to work on conflict, that geographical considerations should
permeate his writings in the new field.
Richardson was one of the first to write about the importance of contiguity to
fighting. ‘The obvious reason why the murderer and his victim were usually
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subjects of a common government is their localization.’ (Richardson, 1960b: 297).
He therefore needed to develop appropriate measures for geographical opportunities
for fighting. One of these was the length of a common border between two
countries. Here, Richardson was the first to point out that this length depended on
the scale of measurement. The shorter the yardstick, the longer the boundary
(Richardson, 1961/1993: 607ff). Although ignored at the time, this would later
inspire Mandelbrot’s work on fractals (Mandelbrot, 1967).
As noted by Gleditsch & Weidmann (2020) and Scheffran (2020), both in this
volume, Richardson pioneered the use of cell-based approaches to conflict analysis,
long before the introduction of Geographic Information Systems (GIS). He noted
that the number of ‘conceivable belligerents’ in a civil war could not simply be
determined by what groups had actually fought. Such potential parties to fighting
could not be identified from works of history ‘because insurgents were often not
recognized as a group until they had declared themselves to be such by revolting.’
(Richardson, 1960b: 307). Richardson therefore estimated the number of cells of
equal numbers of people (potential conflict actors) and discussed how ‘local
pacifying influences’, such as common government, language, or religion, might
reduce the risk of civil war between them. The rapid growth of GIS and of spatial
datasets on political, demographic, socioeconomic, and environmental character-
istics of subsets of nations, has led to a major reorientation of empirical analyses of
war and peace, as noted by Gleditsch & Weidmann (2020).
Richardson also pointed out a curious fact about national boundaries: There are
no examples of four countries meeting in a single point, as in the Four Corners area
of the US. He attributed this to the role of warfare in shaping boundaries (Gleditsch
& Weidmann, 2020: 73f).
Scheffran (2020) suggests that Richardson’s conflict model offers a basis for
insights in the potential impacts of climate change on conflict and cooperation. This
is a credible extension of his model. Given Richardson’s enduring interest in the
weather and in conflict, it is a fascinating thought that he might have been a pioneer
in the now blooming research area on climate, weather, and conflict (Buhaug,
2016). However, while his Statistics of Deadly Quarrels has chapters on several
potential causes of war (such as poverty, language, religion, and contiguity), there is
no chapter on climate or the weather. Indeed, the only place I have been able to find
a link of sorts is on p. 129 where he cites an observation by Quincy Wright that
wars in the north temperate zone have ordinarily begun in spring or summer.
1.6 The Role of Mathematics in Peace Studies
The discipline of international relations in Richardson’s time, including the study of
war and peace, was case-oriented and strongly influenced by legal and normative
considerations. Attempts at generalizations were rarely based on systematic data.
Along with Pitirim Sorokin and Quincy Wright, Richardson was one of the few
pioneers in what today is a vibrant field of quantitative conflict studies.
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Richardson’s achievements in this regard is all the more remarkable in that he
seemed largely unaware of the introduction of mathematical models in other social
sciences, particularly in economics, which was taking place at the same time
(Nicholson, 1999: 556).
Much current work in international relations is cross-sectional because temporal
data are lacking. Kelly Kadera, Mark Crescenzi & Dina Zinnes (2020, in this
volume) point out that in his work on the dynamics of conflict, Richardson was a
pioneer in investigating the role of time in international relations. They argue that
studies in the Richardson tradition using differential equations model time more
explicitly than most game theory models, which focus on equilibria. As Nicholson
(1999: 547) points out, most economists of his era would probably have approached
the arms race as a problem in comparative statics, ‘where determining the equi-
librium was the main problem and the paths along which the system moved to
achieve it was a subsidiary issue if considered at all.’
While early empirical analyses of the conditions of war and peace tended to look
at the influence of one variable at a time, Richardson was clearly sensitive to
multivariate analysis with interactions between factors: As Smith (2020: 26) notes,
he recognized that a common border would increase the probability of war, but also
amount of trade, which may in turn have a pacifying effect.’ This basic point was
frequently overlooked in many early studies of the trade-conflict relationship
(Schneider, Barbieri & Gleditsch, 2003).
Niall MacKay (2020, in this volume) offers a comparison between Lanchester’s
model of war attrition and the Richardson arms race model. Their starting-points
were quite different. Richardson was concerned with the hazard of war and how
arms races could be prevented or limited. Lanchester was interested in how to win a
war. Both are models of two-way interaction. Both can be generalized from duels to
‘truels’. In both models, a scholar can work out the conditions for a stalemate.
MacKay discusses the possibilities of combining insights from the two models.
1.7 The Conscience of a Scholar
Richardson came from a Quaker background and his religious affiliation had a
pervasive influence on his life and career. His interest in psychology was apparently
inspired by the social service of the Society of Friends (Ashford, 1985: 51). When
World War I broke out, he was working for the Meteorological Office in
Eskdalemuir. Given the national importance of his work there, he could probably
have continued until the end of the war. Instead, he applied for leave from the Met
Office to join the Friends Ambulance Unit in France as a conscientious objector.
His application for leave was turned down, and he eventually resigned from his
position in order to join the ambulance unit in 1916. He served there for nearly three
years. While in France, he wrote some of his early papers on war and peace. He
rejoined the Met Office in 1919 at Benson Observatory. However, in 1920 the Met
Office was transferred to the Air Ministry, and Richardson resigned. As he wrote to
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the Norwegian meteorologist Vilhelm Bjerknes, ‘I do not like preparations for war’
(Ashford, 1985: 105). Richardson nevertheless continued to publish papers in
meteorology in the 1920s. In the 1930s, researchers in chemical warfare became
interested in Richardson’s work on atmospheric turbulence and made ‘delicate
approaches’, causing ‘a time of heart-break’ according to his wife. He then
destroyed research results that had not been published (Körner, 1996: 189).
Not all Quakers or other British pacifists reacted to World War I in the same way
that Richardson did. For some, national patriotism trumped their peaceful princi-
ples. This was, of course, even more so in World War II, because the enemy seemed
particularly evil. Körner (1996: 207), in a sympathetic review of Richardson’s
work, is left uneasy by Richardson’s refusal to assign blame for any conflict,
although he acknowledges that participants in a deadly conflict routinely accuse the
other side of starting it.
Scholars today are faced with similar dilemmas. Is it immoral to do research on
weapons of mass destruction? Or is it immoral to leave the field to the other side?
Traditionally, such dilemmas have been faced mainly by natural scientists.
However, the military and intelligence services are also increasingly interested in
the social sciences. In the US, for instance, they are heavily involved in funding the
social sciences through the Minerva Research Initiative (https://minerva.defense.
gov/) and the Political Instability Task Force.13 The research is unclassified and
published openly and has spawned a number of seminal books and articles. The
policy orientation of these funding initiatives is not in doubt and they serve as
vehicles for bringing social scientists and policymakers in closer touch. Critics
might argue, as they did in the mid-1960s when the US Department of Defense
started recruiting social scientists for a counterinsurgency program called Project
Camelot (Horowitz, 1967), that such efforts aid US policymakers in cementing a
hierarchical and unjust international order. Others would respond that it would be
counterproductive to leave major sources of social science funding to ideologues or
less competent social scientists. There are no easy answers to these dilemmas, but
those who shy away from research sponsorship under the rubric of national security
today, probably sacrifice less in career terms than did Richardson.14
Despite Richardson’s devotion to theory, he was not an impractical scientist
unconcerned with practical implementation. He developed ingenious procedures for
carrying out experiments and held several patents. He wrote two papers on voting
procedures in international organization and seemed to have been convinced that if
he could persuade decision makers of the hazard of arms races and war prepara-
tions, he could help to prevent them. It was precisely because he was concerned
13PITF does not appear to have an official website, but a Wikipedia article explains the history and
nature of the research sponsorship: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_Instability_Task_Force.
14There is little public discussion of these issues, but one member of the PITF resigned after the
election of Donald Trump, with a harsh indictment of his colleagues (‘academic courtiers’) who
preferred to remain silent in the face of a situation where ‘the greatest source of political instability
in the world will be the administration of the US Federal Government.’ Cf https://scatter.
wordpress.com/2017/01/20/why-i-resigned-from-the-political-instability-task-force/.
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with putting science into practice, that he was wary of contributing to the prepa-
ration for war. One of the things he had learned from a teacher at Bootham School
in York, was that ‘science ought to be subordinate to morals.’ (Gold, 1954: 218)
1.8 The Impossible Dream
Richardson helped to create a new field of research virtually from nothing. In this
brief introduction, I have focused on some of the key areas of his research on war
and peace, but those who consult Statistics of Deadly Quarrels will find chapters on
languages and war, religions and war, economic causes of war, and many others.
One of his conclusions on interreligious wars speaks directly to an important
current debate: ‘There were more wars between Christians and Moslems than
would be expected from their populations, if religious differences had not tended to
instigate quarrels between them.’ (Richardson, 1960b: 245)
Richardson was ahead of his times in approaching the question of war and peace
with tools he had acquired in his work in physics. He was unafraid to tackle
problems that were hard to solve, or even insoluble with the resources available to
him at the time. His work on weather forecasts required an enormous number of
calculations just to predict tomorrow’s weather from today’s. In fact, his own
attempts at weather prediction took longer than the passage of the actual weather.
Unfazed, Richardson calculated that a ‘staggering’ staff of 64,000 (human) com-
puters would be needed to complete a weather forecast before the deadline.
(Actually, there was an error in his calculations, the correct figure was 256,000.)
‘Perhaps in some years’ time it may be possible to report a simplification of the
process.’15 Indeed! With the advent of digital computers, predicting the weather
using the methods introduced by Richardson has become standard practice.
With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that his work was given less attention at
the time of publication than it deserved. Cambridge University Press agreed to
publish his now celebrated book Weather Prediction by Numerical Process in 1922
only after receiving subsidies from the Royal Society and the Met Office. It was
printed in just 750 copies and sold even fewer. This and similar experiences have
led to Richardson being portrayed as neglected genius. Nevertheless, his work did
in fact inspire early pioneers in peace research like Kenneth Boulding, Karl
Deutsch, Anatol Rapoport, J David Singer, and Quincy Wright (Nicholson, 1999:
555, 559). The very first issue of Journal of Peace Research contained an article on
Richardson’s arms race model (Smoker, 1964) and the first volume of Journal of
Conflict Resolution a whole special issue (1957, 3) on Richardson. Dina Zinnes
(2020, in this volume) explains how her encounter with Richardson came to
determine the direction of her own distinguished career in the field. No doubt, the
work of Lewis Fry Richardson will continue to inspire new generations of scholars.
15Richardson (1922: 219). Cf Ashford (1985: 91f).
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Chapter 2
Lewis Fry Richardson: A Personal
Narrative
Dina A. Zinnes
Abstract This chapter is the personal story of how the author, just out of graduate
school, encountered Richardson’s two posthumous volumes, Arms and Insecurity
and Statistics of Deadly Quarrels, and how these volumes helped her resolve key
issues that had troubled her. What is theory and how does it differ from a model?
The first volume pushed her to learn mathematics and, through various twists and
turns, eventually to an understanding of the power of a mathematically written
story. The second volume provided insights into data collection and measurement
as well as a deeper understanding of the mechanics of mathematical modeling.
Thus, the two volumes together gave her the basis for finally answering the
questions from her graduate school days.
2.1 Introduction
When I finished graduate school in political science, I was left with a set of
troubling, unanswered questions. I had found the debates of realism and idealism
unsatisfying and believed that a science of international politics was both needed
and possible. But I was baffled and confused about what I believed were the critical
pieces of a science. What is ‘theory’? Why is it important? What is a ‘model’ and
how does it differ from ‘theory’? Where do mathematics, statistics, and data fit? It
was the work of Lewis Fry Richardson that, over the years, pushed and nudged me
along a journey that finally led me to the answers. The combined volumes of Arms
and Insecurity Richardson (1960a) and Statistics of Deadly Quarrels Richardson
(1960b) became the ‘intellectual bibles’ for my search. They were bewildering at
times, frustratingly challenging at others, but they ultimately teased me into an
understanding of the bits and pieces that transform a study of international politics
into a science of international politics.
This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Richardson panel at the 59th Annual
Convention of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, CA, 7 April 2018. I am
grateful to participants in the panel for comments.
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My journey with Richardson began when I was a graduate student at the
University of Michigan. Journal of Conflict Resolution had recently been founded
and the graduate students were made part of the organization team. An initial topic
of conversation was how and when a special issue might be devoted to this
meteorologist’s unpublished notes on conflict and war. Work was under way to
compile the extensive notes into publishable book form following Richardson’s
death, but it was felt that the significance of the material might go unrecognized by
the potentially most relevant audience – the social sciences – because of its
mathematical nature. Thus, it seemed an obvious idea to combine the launch of a
journal dedicated to analytical research on conflict with a layman’s introduction to
Richardson’s mathematical approach to issues of conflict. A long review article by
Rapoport (1957) in a special issue of the journal served as my introduction to this
amazing work.
When Arms and Insecurity was published in 1960, I was eager to tackle the ‘real
thing’. But while the book was captivating, it also posed enormous challenges. The
‘dialogues’ – Richardson talking to himself as he puzzled his way through a
question – were exciting and provided a wonderful insight into the strategy of
thinking about a research problem. When the dialogues led to the ‘story’ of two
statesmen arguing how best to protect their country against the other, I was intri-
gued. But when the story was translated into two equations, confusion began.
Richardson waived a mathematical wand, and out of the equations came the ‘ex-
plosion’ of ‘war’ – and confusion turned into amazement. It was magic. Richardson
had pulled a rabbit out of a hat!
Since I had not taken mathematics in college, my mathematical training had
ended with high school trigonometry. I understood algebraic equations, but I had
never encountered the symbol dx/dt. Moreover, Richardson’s ability to move from
verbal language to mathematics was baffling. My only encounters with the transi-
tion between verbal language and mathematics were word problems: How long
would it take to go from X to Y when traveling at …? But most mystifying of all
was Richardson’s ability to draw conclusions about ‘war’ and ‘peace’. How did he
know that certain inequalities between parameters of the equations would produce
an ‘explosion?’ Where did these rabbits come from?
Puzzling over the equations for hours forced me to conclude that my mathe-
matical training was deficient. If I was going to be able to understand Richardson’s
work, I had to go back to school. I had recently finished my Ph.D. and followed my
husband to his first academic job at Indiana University, so there was a breathing
spell of free time to explore mathematics. I began with the basics – calculus – and
proceeded through the ‘bread and butter’ sequence of college mathematics courses.
It was a slow and, at many points, difficult process – mathematics was a very
different world for someone coming from the social sciences. But bit by bit I
acquired the basic vocabulary, grammar, and mode of thinking of this new and
intriguing world.
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When my first teaching job materialized at Indiana University, I came across a
book that seemed to compliment Richardson’s work. Introduction to Models in the
Social Sciences by Lave & March (1975) was similar to Richardson in three ways.
First, Richardson had begun his arms race model with a question: Why do two
peaceful states end up in a violent conflict? Similarly, Lave & March illustrate the
importance of starting with a question. They explore a series of simpler questions:
Why do high school friends get assigned to adjacent rooms in freshman college
dorms? Why are the students who ask silly questions in class typically athletes?
Why do women who attend all-women high schools perform at a higher level in
college than women at co-educational high schools?
Second, Richardson’s question led him to formulate a story about two statesmen
from two different states wanting to protect their respective countries from possible
aggression by the other. Similarly, Lave & March provide verbal stories that answer
each of the questions raised in their examples. Third, both Richardson and Lave &
March draw conclusions from their stories. In each case the authors use their stories
to predict something new, an observable phenomenon that, as Lave & March put it,
would follow if the stories were in fact ‘true’.
But there was a significant difference between the authors. Unlike Richardson,
Lave & March never translate their stories into mathematics. Instead, they draw
verbal conclusions from each story. As I examined these verbal conclusions, I
found myself troubled. Some seemed direct and reasonable, but others were far less
clear. This was an intriguing contrast with Richardson’s analyses. Although I was
still not competent to follow all the details, Richardson’s conclusions appeared less
ambiguous and far more convincing. Thus, Lave & March (1975) reinforced the
significance of questions and stories, but simultaneously made me aware of the
potential value of translating a story into mathematics.
As I moved further into my research career the focus on theory and mathematical
modeling was overshadowed by another part of the science puzzle. Singer (1969)
argued that if the study of international politics was to go beyond the philosophical
realist/idealist debates to become a science, it was critical that arguments be sub-
jected to empirical verification. Singer called for brush-clearing research in which
the major hypotheses of the field would be evaluated with data.
Obtaining data relevant to international issues, however, was not a simple
matter. Thus, the focus of the newly emerging field of ‘quantitative international
politics’ turned to issues concerning data: How do you define the variables of
interest (e.g. national power, conflict, war, crisis), what are the appropriate sources
from which to extract ‘data’, how can data extraction be made reliable? Some
argued that relevant data could be created in laboratories as in the Inter Nation
Simulation (Guetzkow, 1963) where people played the roles of statesmen and
interacted according to rules believed to govern the international system. But the
validity issues inherent in these laboratory representations seemed insurmountable
and the field moved instead towards real time data and the subsequent creation of
large datasets.
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The resultant data movement had three prongs: (1) the collection of daily events
in contemporary time to better understand crises (e.g. WEIS,1 COPDAB2), (2) the
compilation of major historical international crises, e.g. wars (COW3), and (3) the
collection of national attributes (such as DON4). The datasets were typically the
work of independent researchers, each concerned with specific questions that dic-
tated both the definition of variables and the type of data to be collected.
Consequently, as the various datasets were compiled, comparisons became
important and questions arose as to the ‘true’ meaning of concepts like ‘war’. Did
one ‘operationally’ define a ‘war’ as an overt declaration by one state against
another? Or was it an event in which at least 100 combatants were killed? Or was
‘war’ just the end point of a scale that began with one human killing another?
Fascinated by these issues and wanting to understand the art and science of data
collection better, I purchased Statistics of Deadly Quarrels, which contained one of
the early datasets relevant to conflict and war. Initially, my interest was in the
dataset that comprised the first half of the volume. As had been true in Arms and
Insecurity, the volume began by describing the author’s thinking process behind the
collection of data and was both captivating and enlightening. Part of the discussion
consisted of his definition of the key variable of interest – a ‘deadly quarrel’.
Richardson’s Quaker background made him primarily interested in those situations
in which one human killed another, i.e. human conflicts that ended in at least one
death. Murder was simply one end of a scale that ended in a world war.
This different but creative way of conceptualizing and measuring a variable
made me aware of the fact that ‘data’ do not exist independent of their operational
measurement. The operational definition of a variable would necessarily determine
the kinds of questions that could be answered using a given dataset. This realization
led me to conclude that collecting data to test a specific hypothesis was important,
but collecting data for a data bank could be of limited value. The operational
definition used to collect the data for a data bank is unlikely to fit many research
questions. In fact, the existence of data banks may have the unfortunate effect of
pushing scholars to adjust their research questions to fit the definitions used to
collect the data bank variables.
Although my purchase of Statistics of Deadly Quarrels had been motivated by
Richardson’s dataset, I discovered that the book also contained valuable informa-
tion relevant to my original concerns. It is actually two books in one. While the first
part consists of Richardson’s discussion of his data collection procedures and the
resultant dataset, the second part is, in many respects, an answer to Singer’s call for
a brush-clearing of old arguments about conflict and war. The second half of the
book puts the dataset of the first half up against a variety of age-old arguments: Do
borders cause wars? Do differences in religion lead to conflict? Is economics the
1McClelland (1978).
2Azar (2009).
3Singer & Small (1972).
4Rummel (1972).
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source of conflict? Each chapter looks at one of these questions and, using the
dataset, either formulates hypotheses that are statistically tested, or, in a few cases,
develops stories that lead to the formulation of simple mathematical models. It was
Richardson’s use of these two forms of analyses that brought me back to my
original queries. The contrast clearly posed the question: What was the difference –
if any – between the statistical test of a hypothesis and the creation of a mathe-
matical model?
This question became increasingly pressing as statistics began to permeate the
discipline. The field’s focus on data collection and hypothesis testing necessarily
required decision rules that could provide guidelines for rejecting hypotheses. Like
many others, I joined the statistics bandwagon and began my education in this new
set of tools. But my study and use of statistics increased my puzzlement. Statistics
was mathematics. Did that mean that the application of statistics to data was
mathematical modeling? Are chi square tests and correlations mathematical mod-
els? How did the equation for a correlation coefficient differ from the equations of
the arms race model? Were the arms race equations a set of hypotheses that needed
to be tested? Was there a difference between a mathematical model and a statistical
analysis?
As I pondered these issues, I was asked to write a review of Mathematics and
Politics by Alker (1965). Without explicitly noting the difference between a sta-
tistical analysis and mathematical modeling, Alker’s survey of both made the
contrast between the two explicit. The difference became obvious. The goal of
statistics was to make coherent decisions: Did the data support the hypothesis? But
the goal of mathematical modeling was to tell a story: How does an arms race begin
and evolve? They were both mathematical enterprises, but their purpose was very
different.
I returned to Statistics of Deadly Quarrels in an effort to better understand this
difference. Many of Richardson’s questions were simple hypotheses, and so he used
his dataset together with statistical tests to confirm or reject. A few others, however,
led him to formulate stories about a process he believed underlay the answer to the
question. I found one such story to be of particular significance. It was a story about
how nations might form alliances to fight a war. This story was especially valuable
because Richardson used probability theory – combinations and permutations – a
form of mathematics I understood. For the first time, I was able to follow
Richardson’s translation from a verbal story into its mathematical counterpart and
witness the emergence of a testable conclusion.
While the story was too simple to be believable, its very simplicity made it
possible to observe the mathematics in action. As Richardson put it, if his story
were true – a phrase often used by Lave & March – then one would observe a
specific distribution of the number of wars over the number of nations on either
side: i.e. the number of wars in which one nation fought one nation, the number of
wars in which one nation fought two nations, etc. Thus, the simple story about how
nations formed alliances necessarily implied that types of wars (one nation against
another, one against two, etc.) would result in a particular, i.e. predicted, distri-
bution. The predicted distribution was a hypothesis and as such could be tested by
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comparing it to the distribution found in Richardson’s dataset. For the first time, I
saw the critical link between stories, mathematical modeling, and hypotheses. The
translation of a story into a mathematical representation could lead to testable
hypotheses.
The bits and pieces of answers to the questions from my graduate school days
were emerging: the relevance of an initial question, the role of story-telling, the
importance of mathematics, the difference between mathematical models and
statistics. But gaps still remained, and the pieces still did not fit together. Where do
the questions that initiate stories come from? How are stories developed? What
information is needed to tell a story? How do you translate a story into mathe-
matics? What is the difference between testing a hypothesis or telling a story,
translating it into mathematics, and generating a hypothesis for testing? And finally,
and most significantly, what happened to ‘theory?’
In an attempt to fill the gaps, I returned to Richardson and Lave & March.
Richardson had begun his arms race model with a story. Lave & March gave
example after example of stories. But what constituted a ‘story?’ Merriam Webster
proposes that a story is ‘an account of incidents or events … pertinent to a situa-
tion’. This definition suggested that a string of time-dependent sentences would
qualify as a story if the sentences all referred to the same situation.
Trying out the definition, I constructed a ‘story’: ‘I’m sitting in a coffee shop and
a young lady enters, walks to the counter, and orders a cappuccino. She pays her
bill, the waitress puts the money in the register, and makes the drink. The waitress
hands the drink to the young lady who then goes to a vacant table, sits down, and
enjoys her purchase.’ According to the definition, I had created a story: a set of
sequentially connected sentences concerning an incident. But despite the dictionary
definition, the set of sentences didn’t look like anything I would call a ‘story’. I tried
the exercise multiple times before becoming convinced that there was more to the
‘story’ concept than captured by the dictionary.
I headed back to Richardson’s arms race and the Lave & March examples and
discovered that I had overlooked a critical piece. Richardson’s arms race story
began with a question, the desire to understand the onset of war – he had a reason, a
purpose, a question that he was attempting to understand. Likewise, Lave & March
were curious about dorm friendship patterns or why all-women high schools pro-
vided a better education for college-bound women. In short, stories begin with a
question. Thus, a story has a purpose: it is designed to answer a question, to explain
why something happened. My sequentially connected sentences about the lady in
the coffee shop was not triggered by a question, thus the set of sentences explained
nothing. Perhaps if the young lady’s boyfriend had been killed an hour earlier, the
question might have been about the woman’s potential complicity in the event. But
in isolation, the coffee shop episode was of no interest, it explained nothing, it
answered no question. It wasn’t a story.
With this revelation in hand, I turned to storytelling by considering questions for
which I wanted answers, events that I wanted to explain. But the task was daunting
as I began by asking questions about wars, failed states, the reasons for revolutions.
I quickly discovered that the questions were too big, or I didn’t know enough to
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formulate a story to provide an answer. Then, taking a cue from Lave & March, I
realized that if I looked around in my daily life I was frequently asking questions.
They were tiny questions compared to a question about why wars occur, but they
were questions that were nevertheless looking for answers. Moreover, they were
questions for which I had enough information to construct a story. I decided to use
these daily questions as a training ground to teach me how to recognize questions
and formulate stories.
It quickly became obvious that lots of things were happening daily that I didn’t
understand, that didn’t make sense. Why were there potholes in one part of town
and not another? Why was grass growing alongside the road in a desert? Why did
caterpillars congregate at certain intersections on country roads? Why was it so
difficult to find a common time for three retired women to share lunch? As I spun
stories about each question, I began to understand how questions arise. A question
arises when an event occurs that contradicts what is expected. Potholes are the
consequence of erratic temperatures during rough winters, but this should happen
randomly throughout town. Since deserts receive little rain, how is it possible for
grass to grow along a road? Caterpillars have limited cognitive abilities, so why are
there congregations at ‘intersections’? Retired folks no longer have work com-
mitments, so why is it so difficult to find a mutual free time to meet for lunch?
Richardson’s story about an arms race was similar. His question was why war
occurred when statesmen in opposing nations were attempting to prevent war
through armament buildups?
I had begun to understand how questions arise and stories were developed. But I
was still unclear about the use of mathematics. While I was convinced that trans-
lating a story into mathematics could produce a testable hypothesis, I was perplexed
as to how to make the translation and use the mathematics to generate hypotheses.
Then serendipity stepped in.
A colleague asked me to join forces on a methods textbook. The topics of the
proposed text were to be typical, e.g. survey research, experimental design, etc.
However, my colleague suggested that we approach the material from a very dif-
ferent perspective. He proposed that the text focus on questions about political
processes and provide answers to those questions by constructing stories similar to
those found in Lave & March. The stories would then be translated into the
mathematics of basic logic – propositional calculus – and using the mathematics of
propositional calculus, conclusions (hypotheses) could be generated. The resultant
hypotheses would then be tested with a given methodology (e.g. survey research).
To illustrate the process, my colleague had written a variety of political stories
about congress (his area of expertise), translated them into propositional calculus,
and using the mathematics of propositional calculus drawn some intriguing
conclusions.
The methods text never materialized (too avant-garde for the publisher), but my
colleague’s examples became the critical final step towards answering my ques-
tions. Richardson’s probability model provided the insight into how a mathematical
translation occurs and how the mathematics of probability could generate a testable
hypothesis. But the language of probability theory seemed too limited to be useful
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for stories about politics. Propositional calculus, however, appeared both accessible
and useable. It was time for more study.
Perhaps the most important thing to come from my dive into the rudiments of
propositional calculus, was the insight it gave me into the significance and meaning
of theorems. Understanding the power of theorems led to my discovery of the home
of the rabbits. I learned that everything is implicit in the original definitions,
assumptions, and the basic rules of a form of mathematics. These are the building
blocks needed to prove theorems. Theorems are just restatements of combinations
and permutations of the definitions and assumptions given the accepted mathe-
matical rules. The conclusion of a theorem is a restatement of the original
assumptions. Theorems are then used to prove more theorems. Thus, it is always
there – the rabbit is in the initial definitions and assumptions. A ‘new’ rabbit is the
original one wearing different clothes. By translating a story into mathematics, it is
possible to use theorems that point to ‘new’, i.e. implicit, information embedded in
the assumptions that constitute the statements of a story. This is the power and
value of mathematical languages. You begin by accepting as ‘true’ a basic set of
premises and when you sign that contract you are given a panoply of consequences
through theorems that show you all the other things that are then ‘true’.
Propositional calculus is a very primitive form of mathematics compared to
differential equations, but the underlying logic is the same. Theorems begin with
definitions and assumptions that are accepted as ‘true’ and proceed to demonstrate
that, given the rules of mathematics, another set of things are also true.
Richardson’s deductions about ‘war’ and ‘peace’ are implicit in the mathematics of
differential equations used to capture the story of an arms race. Richardson’s
conclusions about ‘war’ and ‘peace’ come from the mathematics of differential
equations. Thus, the link between a story translated into mathematics, and a gen-
erated hypothesis is transparent to anyone trained in that form of mathematics. This
cannot be said about conclusions from purely verbal stories. This was the difference
between Richardson’s analyses and the verbal conclusions of Lave & March.
As I learned the specifics of propositional calculus and followed the examples of
my colleague’s political stories, the translation and hypothesis generation processes
became clearer and the value of mathematics more obvious. Translation forces one
to identify the key components of a story and the principle links between the
components. This makes the outlines of a story obvious. The use of theorems to
unambiguously draw conclusions links the theoretical world to the empirical.
Moreover, drawing hypotheses from mathematical models can produce insights not
seen otherwise.
To briefly see how mathematical modeling might work, let us consider
Richardson’s story about two statesmen in two neighboring states who are con-
cerned about the possible intentions of the other. To translate this story into the
mathematics of propositional calculus we need two sets of definitions. The first is
the concept of an ‘atom’, defined as a simple statement that can be either True or
False. In the arms race model, we can identify the following ‘atoms:’ Using
symbols to represent the atoms we define:
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X = the head of state X wishes to protect state X
A = the head of state X puts considerable resources into armaments
Y = the head of state Y wishes to protect state Y
B = the head of state Y puts considerable resources into armaments
It is easy to see that each of these statements could be assigned the value of T or
F, e.g. the head of state does wish to protect state X (i.e. statement is T) or the head
of state X does not wish to protect state X (i.e. the statement is F).
The second component of propositional calculus is the set of four ‘operators’ that





Thus, the first part of the story might be translated into:
X ! A
If the head of state X wishes to protect state X, then the head of state X puts
considerable resources into armaments and
Y ! B
If the head of state Y wishes to protect state Y, then the head of state Y puts
considerable resources into armaments.
To continue the story, we define
C = state Y feels threatened
D = state X feels threatened
and then construct the compound statements:
A ! C
If the head of state X puts considerable resources into armaments, then state Y
feels threatened and
B ! D
If the head of state Y puts considerable resources into armaments, then state X
feels threatened.
To make the story simple let’s define
E = state X declares war on state Y
F = state Y declares war on state X
Then C ! F
If state Y feels threatened by state X, then state Y declares war on state X
D ! E
If state X feels threatened by state Y, then state X declares war on state Y.
Finally, we define
W = states X and Y go to war.
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and propose the compound proposition
ðF^EÞ ! W
If state Y declares war on state X and state X declares war on state Y, then states
X and Y go to war.
The theorems of propositional calculus tell us that if we begin with the atoms X
and Y, together with the above story, we can conclude that the two states will go to
war. Namely, given X and Y, i.e. two states with statesmen that wish to protect their
state by putting resources into armaments, then W is a consequence, i.e. these two
states will go to war.
Another intriguing conclusion that emerges from this story is the following:
Using theorems from propositional calculus and skipping a few steps, the following
can be concluded:
W ! ðF^EÞ ! ð F vEÞ ! ðDvCÞ ! ðBvAÞ
This deduction says that if the story is true, then it should also be the case that
when there are two (neighboring) states that have not gone to war it must be the
case that at least one or both of those two states did not put considerable resources
into armaments.Clearly, the above translation is overly simplistic. Like the
translation of a text from one language to another, the process of translating a verbal
story into a mathematical language is more an art form than a science. For any
given verbal story there are many possible mathematical translations. We could for
example have made the story more complicated by having only one state declare
war and then the other retaliate. In this particular case, the conclusions are unlikely
to be very different. However, it will be the case that different representations can
lead to very different conclusions.
Propositional calculus was essentially the last step in my journey. I had the
pieces needed to answer my graduate school questions. Stories are at the heart of
theories. Theories, like stories, begin with a question and are designed to provide an
answer to the query; theory/stories explain something. Casting a story in the
language of mathematics – mathematical modeling – makes it possible to
unambiguously produce conclusions, i.e. hypotheses, (deductions) that provide
new insights and may be empirically verified. Empirical tests of deductions using
statistical decision rules provide support for or against the original story. Theory
and mathematical modeling are not equivalent; the latter provides a medium for
evaluating the former. Mathematical modeling and statistical analyses are both
mathematical enterprises, but they are used towards different ends. Mathematical
modeling is an aid in the story-telling process while statistical analyses can provide
the rules for empirical evaluation of the story. The story comes first and then its
mathematical restatement provides the tool that produces new insights (hypotheses)
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to be evaluated. Data and statistics then follow to determine the empirical validity
of the hypothesis and thus the grounds for determining the viability of the story.
Richardson had a profound effect on my life and career. Arms and Insecurity
pushed me to learn mathematics and, through various twists and turns, eventually to
an understanding of the power of a mathematically written story. Statistics of
Deadly Quarrels provided both insights into data collection and measurement as
well as a deeper understanding of the mechanics of mathematical modeling. Thus,
the two volumes together gave me the basis for finally answering the questions of
graduate school days.5
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Chapter 3
The Influence of the Richardson Arms
Race Model
Ron P. Smith
Abstract This chapter reviews the Richardson arms race model: a pair of differ-
ential equations which capture an action reaction process. Whereas many of
Richardson’s equations were quite specific about what they referred to, the arms
race model was not. This lack of specificity was both a strength and a weakness. Its
strength was that with different interpretations it could be applied as an organising
structure in a wide variety of contexts. Its weakness was that the model could not be
estimated or tested without some auxiliary interpretation. The chapter considers the
impact of these issues in interpretation and empirical application on the influence of
the Richardson arms race model.
3.1 Introduction
There are many definitions of arms races, but for the purpose of this chapter they
can be thought of as enduring rivalries between pairs of hostile powers which
prompt competitive acquisition of military capability. Two approaches to modelling
arms races have been particularly influential. One is as a two-person game, in
particular the Prisoner’s dilemma, where the choices are to arm or not to arm, and
the dominant strategy, for both to arm, is not Pareto optimal. The other, which is the
focus of this chapter, is the Richardson model of the arms race as an action-reaction
process, represented by a pair of differential equations.
Just as the two supply and demand equations have structured thought about the
dynamics of markets for most economists, the two Richardson equations have
structured thought about the dynamics of arms races for most subsequent analysts.
Not only did he develop the model, he attempted to test it using data on military
expenditure prior to World War I. One of the strengths of the model is that it has
prompted a range of questions, many of which Richardson himself posed. This
chapter reviews the influence of the Richardson arms race model on the subsequent
literature through these questions, which include: What are the characteristics of the
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solution to this model? What are the variables and actors? What is the time
dimension? How do arms races relate to wars? How should the parameters be
interpreted? How can the model allow for strategic factors and budget constraints?
How should the model be related to the data? How do you stop arms races?
Given the variety of ways that his arms race model has been used, I was tempted to
call this piece ‘variations on a theme byRichardson’, but specifying the theme precisely
proved problematic. The voluminous arms race literature that arose from his work has
many themes. In trying to identify the themes, I found the papers in the collection edited
by Gleditsch & Njølstad (1990), hereafter G&N, very useful. G&N provides an over-
view that lies roughly half way between the publication of Richardson (1960a) which
brought his arms racemodel to awider audience and the present day.With the end of the
ColdWar, interest in arms races declined somewhat and many of the themes that are in
that book remain central. It is difficult to say anything new in this area, and Wiberg
(1990) makes many of the same points as I make below. There is a more technical
discussion of many of the issues mentioned here in Dunne & Smith (2007).
As most readers of this chapter will probably know, Lewis Fry Richardson (1881–
1953) was a Quaker physicist, a Fellow of the Royal Society, who made major
contributions in the mathematics of meteorology, turbulence and psychology as well
as his work on quantifying conflict. The significance of the work on conflict was only
widely recognised posthumously with the publication of Richardson (1960a), Arms
and Insecurity, which introduced the arms race model, and Richardson (1960b)
Statistics of Deadly Quarrels, which looked at the distribution of conflict deaths.
Richardson was a very careful scientist. When he was investigating the
hypothesis that the probability of war between two countries was a function of the
length of their common border, he double-checked the data and noticed that
adjoining countries gave different lengths for their common border: the smaller
country tending to think the border longer than the larger. This was because the
measured length was a function of the size of the ruler or scale of the map used;
small countries tended to use smaller rulers and larger scale maps. Richardson’s
subsequent studies on this phenomenon introduced the idea of non-integer
dimensions and prompted Mandelbrot’s work on fractals. A common border may
increase the probability of war but, as Richardson recognised, it also tends to
increase the amount of trade, which may have a pacifying effect.
Richardson approached the analysis as a physicist. He often used differential
equations to characterise the dynamics, and tried to match the models to data, often
using probabilistic techniques. His work provides excellent teaching material in
applied mathematics. Students find the arms race model a nice motivation for a neat
system of differential equations which has a range of interesting solutions. Korner
(1996) makes pedagogical use of a number of examples of Richardson’s work to
motivate the applications of mathematics, as well as discussing Richardson’s life
and influence. The teaching aspect is also noted in a recent paper, Beckmann,
Gattke, Lechner & Reimer (2016: 22–23), say about the Richardson equations: ‘our
objective was to see whether this old staple can be brought back from the world of
teaching (where it serves as an example for solving systems of differential equa-
tions) into modern research on conflict dynamics.’
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While serving in the Friends Ambulance Unit during World War I, Richardson
began to try to describe the causes of war in systems of equations, which he
published as Richardson (1919). Maiolo (2016: 1) says the term arms race origi-
nated in the 19th century and was commonly presented as one of the causes of
World War I. He quotes Lord Grey, who had been Foreign Secretary when Britain
went to war, as writing after the war that ‘Great armaments lead inevitably to war. If
there are armaments on one side, there must be armaments on the other sides’
(Maiolo, 2016: 2). Richardson also cited Grey and thus his equations captured a
common perception of the cause of that war. However, as Maiolo (2016: 4) also
notes, the sporting metaphor can be misleading: in athletics races have clear start
and finish lines, arms races do not.
Richardson was not alone in trying to develop mathematical models of conflict.
About the same time, Lanchester (1916), based on articles published in Engineering
in 1914, developed models of the evolution of different types of battle. The models
examined the role of the quantity and quality of forces deployed. Lanchester also
used a pair of differential equations though to different ends. One might distinguish
a Lanchester tradition, in operational research, of mathematical modelling to win
wars, from a Richardson tradition, in peace research, of mathematical modelling to
stop wars. MacKay (2020, in this volume) discusses a combination of Richardson’s
arms race equations with Lanchester’s attritional dynamics.
3.2 The Equations
The Richardson model describes the path over time, t, of the level of arms, x and y,
of two countries, A and B.
dx=dt ¼ ky axþ g
dy=dt ¼ lx byþ h
The rate of change of the arms of each country is the sum of a positive reaction
to the arms of the other country, a negative reaction to the level of its own arms
through a ‘fatigue’ factor and a constant component through a ‘grievance’ factor.
Setting it up in this way prompts a set of questions which are internal to the
mathematical structure of solving linear differential equations. Does an equilibrium
exist? Is it unique? Is it stable? Are there boundary conditions, e.g. x, y > 0?
In equilibrium dx/dt = dy/dt = 0, so the equilibrium reaction functions are two
straight lines
0 ¼ ky axþ g
0 ¼ lx byþ h
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If ab = kl the lines are parallel, otherwise they intersect once at an equilibrium,
which may involve negative values. Because of linearity, if the equilibrium exists, it
is unique, and one can then consider how stability varies as a function of the
parameters. Here arms race stability refers to the nature of the solution to these
equations. An unstable solution would diverge from an equilibrium, for instance
exhibiting exponential growth by both countries. Arms race stability is not the same
thing as strategic stability, which can itself have many meanings. Richardson
related them by suggesting that exponential growth could lead to war, though in
principle it could lead to bankruptcy. Diehl (2020, in this volume) discusses the
links between arms races and war.
Again, within the internal mathematical structure it is natural to ask if the model
generalises. What happens if there are three or more actors? What happens if one
relaxes the assumption of linearity? There is a large literature on both these
questions. Broadly, as in the three-body problem in physics, the neat simplicity of
the conclusions is lost when the model is generalised and multiple equilibria may
exist. For instance, among three countries, the equations for each pair of nations
may be stable, but the triplet is unstable.
The model has an immediate common-sense plausibility as a description of an
interaction between hostile neighbours. This is what makes it such a nice teaching
tool. There are also historical examples of such reaction functions, for instance the
British policy before World War I of having a fleet as large as the next two largest
navies combined. But the model has no unambiguous interpretation. In the physical
sciences, when Richardson used equations, for instance in fluid dynamics, he knew
exactly what the variables were, what measures they corresponded to, and the time
dimension of the dynamic processes involved. Little interpretation was needed. But
in the social sciences the interpretation of mathematics is rarely unambiguous.
3.3 Interpreting the Equations
The arms race equations prompted a number of questions about the interpretation.
There were questions about how to interpret the measures of arming, x and y. In a
symmetric arms race, they were the same variable, such as military expenditures or
number of warships. In an asymmetric arms race, they could be different types of
variable; historically there was an arms race between castle design and siege train
technology. They might be quantitative, number of warheads, or qualitative,
accuracy of the missiles. They might be given a more psychological interpretation
as hostility or friendliness. There were many possibilities.
There was also a question about how to interpret the nature of the actors, A and
B, and the motives for their actions. They might be countries, alliances, decision
makers or non-state actors like terrorists. Their actions might be the result of
rational calculations or bureaucratic rules of thumb and there were many possible
sources of their hostility. Some, like Intriligator (1975), felt the need to motivate the
equations with an explicit objective function for the actors. There were also
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questions about the time period, months or centuries, over which the interactions
were taking place and the extent to which the parameters could be regarded as
stable. Finally, from the policy perspective there was the crucial question: how
might you stop the process?
This lack of specificity was both a strength and a weakness. Its strength was that
the model could be applied in a wide variety of domains, by giving the variables x
and y and the actors A and B different interpretations. As it was imported into a
particular domain, other questions would arise. For instance, an economic inter-
pretation would immediately prompt questions about the nature of the budget
constraint. Economists tended to allow for the budget constraint by adding income
as an extra variable, but there were many other ways, for instance Wiberg (1990:
366–367) assumes a fixed amount of resources available.
The weakness of the lack of specificity was that there was little clarity either
about the precise predictions of the model or about the evidence that would falsify
it. As a specific example, the parameters a and b could be interpreted as repre-
senting: (a) a measure of fatigue, as Richardson did: increased spending exhausts a
country depressing the growth of arms; (b) the speed of adjustment towards a
desired level in a stock adjustment model or (c) a measure of bureaucratic inertia; or
perhaps some combination of the three. The form of the equation would be iden-
tical, but the story one told about the parameters would be different in each case.
This was important, since in practice these parameters were estimated statistically
and needed interpretation. If one does not know where the parameters came from or
why they might differ, between the countries or over time, it is difficult to judge
whether the statistical estimates are sensible.
Just as the term arms race is a metaphor, any model is a metaphor (the equations
are interpreted as being like the world in some respects) and there is an issue as to
how literally to take these equations. Some, like Beckmann et al. (2016) in a
critique of the Richardson equations, treat them very literally. If they do not hold
exactly, then the Richardson model is wrong or it is a different model. Others treat
the model as being more loosely defined and are happy to label any set of equations
involving action-reaction processes as a Richardson type model. Intriligator (1975)
and Dunne & Smith (2007) take this approach. Economists, treating them like
supply and demand curves, organising principles rather than exact specifications,
seem inclined to take them less literally.
Of course, some do not accept the action-reaction description itself. Senghaas
(1990: 15) rejects the explanation of the arms race as an other-directed reciprocal
escalation spiral: ‘As much research on the biography of weapons systems has
shown, the action-reaction scheme is at least highly dubious, if not completely
false.’ Instead he sees it as inner-directed by the self-centred imperatives of national
armaments policy. Gleditsch (1990: 8–9) lists a very large number of explanations
for arms acquisitions, organised under four levels: (1) internal factors, such as
particular interest groups; (2) actor characteristics such as being an alliance leader
or authoritarian rule; (3) relational characteristics, such as action reaction or rela-
tions to allies and (4) system characteristics, such as upswings in long economic
waves and technological imperatives. While the focus in this chapter is on
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action-reaction explanations of arms races, much of the work on other explanations
was prompted by the desire to criticise the Richardson action-reaction explanation.
On whose behaviour they described, Richardson (1960a: 12) was enigmatic
about the interpretation of the equations: ‘the equations are merely a description of
what people would do if they did not stop to think’. Intriligator (1975) derives
Richardson type equations from optimising strategies in a nuclear war. Brito &
Intriligator (1999) argue that new military technologies which imply increasing
returns should mean the end of the Richardson paradigm with its implicit
assumption of constant or declining returns to scale. The behaviour of participants
and the research questions in increasing returns to scale systems are very different.
For instance, multiple equilibria are possible, and arms control may have the
potential to move the system from a high to low equilibrium. Increasing returns to
scale increases the dominance of the dominant actor in its chosen technology,
providing incentives for the non-dominant actors to choose alternative technologies
such as terrorist attacks.
Relating the equations to data
Richardson evaluated the model through an examination of the growth in military
expenditures, 1908–14, of the two belligerent alliances, the Entente and Central
powers, prior to World War I. He took the observed exponential growth as an
indication of support for his models. He interpreted x and y as measuring military
expenditures, A and B as coalitions, and the relevant time period as 7 years.
However, he noted that other conflicts were not preceded by arms races.
As has been widely noted, e.g. by Gleditsch (1990: 9–10), there is an identifi-
cation problem: quite different models can give observationally equivalent pre-
dictions. While one solution of the arms race model is exponential growth,
exponential growth may equally well result from purely internal processes within
each country, such as a military industrial complex, with no action-reaction com-
ponent. Exponential growth may also result from both countries responding to a
third country. Expectations further complicate the matter as discussed in Dunne &
Smith (2007).
The empirical literature separated into a number of separate tracks. One track
looked at whether arms races, suitably defined, preceded conflicts, again suitable
defined. Diehl (2020) reviews this track. Another track looked at estimating the
Richardson equations directly to see whether they showed action reaction features:
significant coefficients for the arms of the other countries. This was usually done
from time series though there are also some cross section and panel papers looking
at arms race interactions.
To estimate the Richardson equations directly from time series data, they
required various modifications. The equations had to be converted from continuous
into discrete time, with corresponding judgements about the time-scale involved,
how many lags were required and the interval over which one might expect the
parameters to be stable. Typically, the lagged dependent variable, arms in the
previous period, is a very strong predictor of the current value.
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Specific measures had to be chosen for x and y. The logarithms of military
expenditures and the shares of military expenditure in GDP were popular choices,
but there were many other possibilities, including physical measures like number of
warheads. Even when using military expenditures, the estimates could be quite
sensitive to other measurement issues, such as the choice of exchange rate used to
make them comparable. Of course, expenditures are an input rather than an output,
capability, measure. Countries may differ in their efficiency, the amount of military
expenditure required to achieve a particular level of capability.
The equations are deterministic and had to be supplemented by stochastic
specification. Typically, ‘well-behaved’ error terms were added to the equations,
but again there were many other possibilities, depending, for instance, on how one
treated the endogeneity that resulted from the variables being jointly determined,
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. Supplemental variables might be added to
control for other factors, e.g. GDP to allow for the budget constraint.
Given all these decisions, it could be difficult to judge what light these estimates
threw on the Richardson equations. Firstly, as noted above, since Richardson
provided little in the way of interpretation of the coefficients, it was not always clear
whether the statistical estimates were consistent with his model or not. Secondly,
there is the Duhem-Quine problem: any test involves a joint hypothesis. What is
being tested is both the substantive hypothesis, the validity of the Richardson model
in this case, and a set of auxiliary hypotheses, such as those about choice of
measure, dynamics and functional form. One never knows whether it is the sub-
stantive or the auxiliary hypotheses that has led to rejection. McKenzie (1990)
discusses the Duhem-Quine problem in the context of the sociology of nuclear
weapons technologies. The converse of this problem is that since the Richardson
model is not very specific, this allows great freedom for specification search over
such things as measures for x and y; functional forms; dynamics; estimation
methods; sample period and control variables included. This search can continue
until one finds a specification that confirms one’s prior beliefs.
Despite these qualifications most surveys of this literature including Dunne &
Smith (2007) conclude that there is limited time-series evidence for stable equa-
tions, of the Richardson type, describing the interaction of quantitative measures of
military expenditure or capability. That article discusses the case of India and
Pakistan, where there had been more evidence of a stable Richardson type
action-reaction process between constant dollar military expenditure, 1962–97, but
it seemed to have broken down after 1997, about the time both powers went
nuclear. Empirical estimates of Richardson type equations are sensitive to choice of
measure of military expenditure and to many aspects of specification such as other
covariates included and functional form used.
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3.4 Other Arms Races
The arms race metaphor has spread beyond military interactions and a comparison
with its use in another area is revealing. We changed the title of Dunne & Smith
(2007) from the one we had been given ‘The econometrics of arms races’ to ‘The
econometrics of military arms races’, because on putting the term ‘arms races’ into
Google Scholar the top paper was Dawkins & Kreps (1979) ‘Arms races between
and within species’, followed by many highly cited biological papers.
The comparison between Dawkins & Kreps and Richardson is interesting both
for the similarity in the process and difference in approach: they are much more
specific, much less metaphorical than Richardson. They do not cite Richardson but
have a very similar process in mind: ‘An adaptation in one lineage (e.g. predators)
may change the selection pressure on another lineage (e.g. prey), giving rise to a
counter-adaptation. If this occurs reciprocally, an unstable runaway escalation or
‘arms race’ may result’ (Dawkins & Kreps, 1979: 489).
They begin using a military analogy and clarifying the time scales considered.
‘Foxes and rabbits race against each other in two senses. When an individual fox
chases an individual rabbit, the race occurs on the time scale of behaviour. It is an
individual race, like that between a particular submarine and the ship it is trying to
sink. But there is another kind of race, on a different time scale. Submarine
designers learn from earlier failures. As technology progresses, later submarines are
better equipped to detect and sink ships and later-designed ships are better equipped
to resist. This is an ‘arms race’ and it occurs over a historical time scale. Similarly,
over the evolutionary time scale the fox lineage may evolve improved adaptations
for catching rabbits, and the rabbit lineage improved adaptations for escaping.
Biologists often use the phrase ‘arms race’ to describe this evolutionary escalation
of ever more refined counter-adaptations (Dawkins & Kreps, 1979: 489–490). They
cite use of the term arms race in a biological context in a 1940 biology paper,
though as noted above the term arms race goes back to the 19th century.
They are also specific about who is involved. ‘In all of this discussion it is
important to realize who are the parties that are ‘racing’ against one another. They
are not individuals but lineages’ (Dawkins & Kreps, 1979: 492). They distinguish
between symmetric and asymmetric arms races, arguing that asymmetric arms races
are more likely between species and symmetric ones within species, e.g. male-male
competition for females. They propose the ‘life-dinner principle’: when a fox
chases a rabbit, the fox is running for its dinner, the rabbit is running for its life.
Thus, the incentives and the evolutionary selection pressures on the rabbit are
greater. This principle has obvious military analogies in cases such as Vietnam
where the weak defeat the strong, because the weak have more at stake. They do not
have any equations in the paper, but much of the work they cite, such as by
William D Hamilton and John Maynard Smith, is mathematical, often involving
game theory, particularly evolutionary stable games.
Dawkins & Kreps are quite specific about the time scales, parties and mecha-
nisms involved in their biological arms races. This is like Richardson’s treatment of
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physical processes and statistics of deadly quarrels, but unlike his more
metaphorical treatment of the mathematics of military arms races.
3.5 Conclusion
Military arms races are perceived as common and usually regarded as a bad thing.
Wiberg (1990: 353) suggests that they are matters of concern because of the risk of
war, the waste of resources, the threat to other states, and the danger that they can
breed militarism. The two main tools we have for understanding the process have
been game theory, particularly the Prisoner’s dilemma, and the Richardson model.
The Richardson model has motivated much more empirical work than game theory,
where papers tend to just use illustrative historical examples to motivate the
mathematics, rather than to attempt to test the theory.
The strength and the weakness of the Richardson arms race model was that it
was not very specific. This was a strength in that by giving the variables and actors
different interpretations, it could be applied in a wide variety of contexts and prompt
a range of interesting questions. It was a weakness in that it made it difficult to
evaluate the theory. Richardson’s models for the distribution of conflict statistics,
power laws for size and Poisson distributions for frequency, were more like
physical results and have been widely replicated. It may be that arms races, rep-
resenting historically specific human decisions, are not subject to systemic regu-
larities, so being prompted to ask the right questions is helpful in itself.
As Gates, Gleditsch & Shortland (2016: 345) put it ‘Richardson’s formal
dynamic model of arms races may not be very useful as a description of the data or
as an explanation of conflict – indeed, no decision to use force per se appears in the
model. Still it is clear that it has helped move the field ahead and stimulate new
research and interest in formal models of conflict.’
References
Beckmann, Klaus; Susan Gattke, Anja Lechner & Lennart Reimer (2016) A critique of the
Richardson Equations. Economics Working Paper, Helmut Schmidt University (162).
Brito, Dagobert L & Michael D Intriligator (1999) Increasing returns to scale and the arms race:
The end of the Richardson paradigm? Defence and Peace Economics 10(1): 39–54.
Dawkins, Richard & John R Kreps (1979) Arms races between and within species. Proceedings of
the Royal Society of London, Series B, Biological Sciences 205(1161): 489–511.
Diehl, Paul F (2020) What Richardson got right (and wrong) about arms races and war. Ch. 4 in
this volume.
Dunne, J Paul & Ron P Smith (2007) The econometrics of military arms races. Ch. 28 in: Todd
Sandler & Keith Hartley (eds) Handbook of Defence Economics, 2. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 914–
941.
3 The Influence of the Richardson Arms Race Model 33
Gates, Scott; Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & Anja Shortland (2016) Winner of the 2016 Lewis Fry
Richardson Award: Paul Collier. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy 22(4):
338–346.
Gleditsch, Nils Petter (1990) Research on arms races. Ch. 1 in: Nils Petter Gleditsch & Olav
Njølstad (eds) Arms Races. London: Sage, 1–14.
Gleditsch, Nils Petter & Olav Njølstad (eds) (1990) Arms Races: Technological and Political
Dynamics. London: Sage.
Intriligator, Michael D (1975) Strategic considerations in the Richardson model of arms races.
Journal of Political Economy 83(2): 339–353.
Korner, Thomas W (1996) The Pleasures of Counting. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lanchester, Frederick W (1916) Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth Arm. London:
Constable.
MacKay, Niall (2020) When Lanchester met Richardson: The interaction of warfare with
psychology. Ch. 9 in this volume.
Maiolo, Joseph (2016) Introduction. Ch. 1 in: Thomas Mahnken, Joseph Maiolo & David
Stevenson (eds) Arms Races in International Politics: From the Nineteenth to the Twenty-first
Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1–10.
McKenzie, Donald (1990) Towards an historical sociology of nuclear weapons. Ch. 8 in: Nils
Petter Gleditsch & Olav Njølstad (eds) Arms Races. London: Sage, 121–139.
Richardson, Lewis F (1919) The Mathematical Psychology of War. Oxford: Hunt.
Richardson, Lewis F (1960a) Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes and
Origins of War. Pittsburgh, PA: Boxwood.
Richardson, Lewis F (1960b) Statistics of Deadly Quarrels. Pittsburgh, PA: Boxwood.
Senghaas, Dieter (1990) Arms race dynamics and arms control. Ch. 18 in: Nils Petter Gleditsch &
Olav Njølstad (eds) Arms Races. London: Sage, 346–351.
Smith, Ron P (1987) Arms races. In: John Eatwell, Murray Milgate & Peter Newman (eds) The
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, vol. I, A to D. London: Macmillan, 113–114.
Wiberg, Håkan (1990) Arms races, formal models and quantitative tests. Ch. 2 in: Nils Petter
Gleditsch & Olav Njølstad (eds) Arms Races. London: Sage, 31–57.
Ron P. Smith, b. 1946, Ph.D. in Economics (University of Cambridge, 1975); Professor of
Applied Economics, Birkbeck University of London; most recent book Military Economics: The
Interaction of Power and Money (Palgrave, 2009), r.smith@bbk.ac.uk.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
34 R. P. Smith
Chapter 4
What Richardson Got Right
(and Wrong) About Arms Races
and War
Paul F. Diehl
Abstract This chapter considers Richardson’s classic arms race model and his
book Arms and Insecurity in relation to the association between arms races and war.
The analysis begins with a short review of the academic debates and empirical
research about arms races and war. This is a prelude to an examination of the
dynamics of arms races as they are specified by Richardson in his book and in his
arms race model. Following is an evaluation of the specific claims about arms races
and war derived from the model as well as Richardson’s own empirical analyses
about the connection between the two phenomena. Although in light of subsequent
research, a number of Richardson’s arguments seem misguided or inaccurate, other
insights were validated by later studies or remain understudied but worthy of future
research.
Lewis Fry Richardson was one of the pioneers of the quantitative study of war
(along with Quincy Wright and Pitirim Sorokin), and his work has stood the test of
time and continues to influence scholars. Richardson is most famous for his
equations that model the dynamics of arms races. Indeed, these dominate much of
his book Arms and Insecurity (Richardson, 1960). Nevertheless, it is easy to forget
that the subtitle of the work is A Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origins of
War. Thus, there was a clear belief for Richardson that arms races, although not all
of them, were associated with the outbreak of war. Periodically throughout the
book, he refers to arms races and war, and includes a series of case studies of arms
races in the 19th and first half of the 20th century.
How much of Richardson’s assessment of arms races and war have turned out to
be correct (or not)? Since the publication of his work, there has been an extensive
set of research on the connection of these two phenomena, and we now have an
empirical basis for reflecting on Richardson’s insights at the dawn of systematic,
empirical work on war. The focus of this chapter is to present Richardson’s models
and claims as they related to arms races and war, and then evaluate them in light of
subsequent research.
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4.1 The Arms Race–War Debate
A debate over the dangers (or lack thereof) of arms races for the onset of war have
been among the most enduring in international relations scholarship. Although
Huntington (1958) first raised the issue, controversy did not ensue until the pub-
lication of Wallace’s (1979) article more than two decades later. This article
received extensive attention in the scholarly and policymaking communities not the
least for its relevance to the nuclear disarmament campaign at the time and its
provocative findings. Wallace essentially argued that arms races were extremely
dangerous and had strong likelihood of leading to war between the participants. The
study was severely flawed and not replicable, and consequently it attracted a fair
amount of criticism for its methodology and case selection (e.g., Houweling &
Siccama, 1981; Diehl, 1983).
The original Wallace article had the benefit of raising the issue of the arms
race-war connection, but also the unfortunate side effect of focusing the debate on
research design concerns rather than theoretical explanations. The arms race-war
debate has settled down somewhat with a consensus emerging that the competitions
are dangerous in some contexts and under some circumstances (see Sample, 2012
for an overview), although whether they are causal or merely symptomatic is still
contentious (Rider, Findley & Diehl, 2011). The work of Richardson (1960) was
often perfunctorily cited in these debates, but rarely if ever were his specific ideas
about the arms races and war discussed or incorporated in the analyses. The dis-
cussion below is designed to return to Richardson’s original formulation to correct
that deficiency and determine whether the literature has missed anything that would
be of value to future research.
4.2 Richardson on Arms Races and War
For a work that is purportedly about the origins of war, Arms and Insecurity has
remarkably little to say directly about the conditions for the outbreak of war,
especially as they relate to arms races. Indeed, the book is largely dedicated to
modelling the dynamics of arms races, which is also the focus of Smith (2020, in
this volume). The famous differential equations for arms races and their variations
take up most of the work. Not surprisingly then, most of the research that has been
influenced by (and cites) Richardson’s work has been dedicated to arms race
models, even as those models have some notable limitations (see Zinnes, 1980). To
the extent that empirical analyses are found in his work, they are focused more on
fitting the models to data on military expenditures than on linking arms races to war
in a causal process. Case studies of World Wars I and II are sprinkled throughout
the book, and these are no doubt chosen because they were contemporary examples
for Richardson, but their magnitude also commanded attention.
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Trawling through the work, there are numerous insights about arms races and
war. Some of these come from the differential equations that reviewed by Smith
(2020). Nevertheless, more are found in the narrative and case studies that make up
the rest of the book. In sorting these out, I have roughly divided these into three
categories below. The first set covers the dynamics of arms races as they relate to
the study of arms races and war. The second deal with specific claims about the
connection between the two phenomena. Finally, there are empirical analyses,
primary and secondary, reported by Richardson.
4.2.1 The Dynamics of Arms Races and Their Implications
for the Study of War
Richardson was prescient in a number of ways on how scholars should look at arms
races and the conditions for war more broadly. Several of his ideas portend later,
and more precise, formulations in the conflict studies literature. A number of the
insights specifically about arms races remain salient and somewhat unexplored
today. Richardson was also very concerned about data quality and measurement,
specifically the reliability and comparability of the data were as well as the match
between concepts and indicators. Although this chapter does not cover these issues,
the reader is encouraged to examine and emulate the good practices followed by
Richardson.
A repeated theme in the narrative is a concern for considering the power dis-
tribution of the states involved and whether each had a status quo versus revisionist
orientation (Richardson, 1960: 26, see also 13, 35). This is now evident in light of
empirical research on war over the last 70 years, but at the time (contemporary to
Morgenthau and realism), this was an important formulation. With respect to arms
races, Richardson (1960: 21) claims that the defense coefficient is proportional to
the size of the state, indicating that extant capabilities and resources matter. There is
also the related concern that defense burdens are important, both for the pace of the
arms race and for the timing of the outbreak of war (more on this below).
Despite what might now seem as obvious considerations, much of the arms
race-war empirical work ignores these considerations, even as these are centerpieces
of general theories of war (for a general review of the literature, see Sample, 2012).
For example, there is a tendency to look at the rates of increase in military spending
for each side in an arms race without consideration to how the power distribution
affects those rates, or vice-versa. There is also little consideration given to
how defense burdens constrain (part of the fatigue factor in Richardson, 1960: 13),
or facilitate arms increases and their relation to the outbreak of war
(an exception is Diehl, 1985). Such failures have led much of the arms race-war
literature to be delinked from the rest of the empirical conflict literature on power
transitions and other theoretical models.
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In a related fashion, Richardson makes reference to what we call ‘rivalries’ and
how these influence arms races. The rivalry element suggests that we look at arms
races in that context, a point raised in some recent debates about arms races and war
(Rider, Findley & Diehl, 2011; Sample, 2012). Doing so brings in the issues of
relative power distribution and status quo-revisionist considerations noted above.
Rivalry can also be one element of what Richardson calls ‘grievances’, one of the
drivers of arms increases in his model; grievances is a polyglot category encom-
passing all factors independent of the opponent’s expenditures in driving one’s own
arms increases (Richardson, 1960: 16). This comports with rivalry research that
finds that the ‘pull of the past’ and prior rivalry interactions influence current
conflict behavior (Goertz, Jones & Diehl, 2005).
Richardson also captures the elements of what we now refer to as the ‘security
dilemma’ (Jervis, 1978a, b) when he states that ‘… governments which develop
their armaments cannot expect their professions of peace intentions to be believed
…’ (Richardson, 1960: 65). Mistrust and hostility coming from threat perception is
the theoretical basis for scholarly arguments that posit that arms races increase the
likelihood of war (Sample, 2012). Arms races increase the perception of threat, and
indeed it is the reactivity of the Richardson model that captures this, and this
undermines the ability and willingness of states to resolve their disagreements
peacefully.
Another aspect of arms race dynamics put forward by Richardson that could
influence its connection to war is the existence of cooperation between arming
states. This could mitigate the impact of arms races (Richardson, 1960: 29ff,
Chs VIII, XX). Trade is treated as the indicator of cooperation for Richardson’s
purposes, but his point is broader than about the effect of this particular variable
(Richardson, 1960: 32). Although there is a large and vibrant literature on the
impact of trade and interdependence on war (Schneider, 2010), countervailing
factors are not usually a part of the arms race-war literature.
Richardson offered several propositions that subsequently have or should have
influenced the arms race-war literature, but there are other aspects of his dynamics
of arms races that are suspect for understanding their connection to war. One is how
one treats aligned states in an arms race context. Richardson assumes that all allies
are part of the arms race dynamics on the given side; in practice, this means
aggregating their military expenditures (Richardson, 1960: 31f). The justification
for this is atheoretical and especially weak: ‘… an important advantage to be gained
by lumping together the statistics from as many nations as can be reasonably
treated; for this agglomeration smooths the statistics and moves them further away
from the domain of free will toward the domain of exact science’ (Richardson,
1960: 80). He does back away from this later in the book when he raises the
concern that one must pay attention to whom is targeted by the increases
(Richardson, 1960: 159ff). The arms race-war literature has struggled with the
problem of disaggregating war initiations (e.g., World War I) into dyads
(see Wallace, 1979; Diehl, 1983), but has not generally aggregated alliance
spending when calculating arms race scores. To do so masks individual state
decisions for spending and war, implying that allies act as one entity and are
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perceived as such by enemies; nevertheless, we know that alliances are not all
reliable (Leeds, 2003). Richardson’s claim that after alliances the defense coeffi-
cients of allies vis-à-vis each other go to zero (Richardson, 1960: 170) seems more
of an unwarranted assumption than a reflection of cases in which allies are also
rivals with each other (e.g., Greece-Turkey) or fight wars against one another (Ray,
1990).
4.2.2 More Specific Claims About Arms Races and War
At various junctures in the book, Richardson makes references to arms races and
war, albeit sometimes cryptically and others in ways that make it difficult to discern
when arms races are dangerous and when they are more benign. Indicative of this is
late in the book when he refers to have presented a ‘theory of the stability or
instability of peace’ (Richardson, 1960: 147). One might guess that he is referring
to negative peace, or the absence of war, but this is perhaps the first time
Richardson makes explicit reference to the conditions for peace.
The most direct discussion of arms races and war comes in Ch V in the subsection
labelled ‘Bankruptcy or War?’ (Richardson, 1960: 61f). Starting with his famous
equations, Richardson notes that x and y (the increases in defense expenditures)
would go to positive infinity, as the action-reaction process was deterministic. He
notes that a critic (Professor Piaggio) argued that ‘An infinite cost of armaments is
interpreted as denoting war, though it might have seemed more natural to have taken
it as bankruptcy’ (quoted in Richardson, 1960: 61). In a strict interpretation, neither
the bankruptcy nor war is a plausible outcome from the arms race process as
specified. As Richardson correctly notes, there is no known case of a state going
bankrupt from an arms race, a statement as true when written as today. More sig-
nificant is the imprecision as to what point war becomes the outcome of the arms
race. Is it only when one or both states have exhausted all their resources in pursuit of
building armaments? This seems absurd and equally without empirical referents.
Richardson’s other responses to his critic offer somewhat better, albeit still
flawed, clues as to when arms races lead to war (Richardson, 1960: 61–62). Least
compelling is the idea that ‘… diplomatic relations become, during the tacit mutual
threats of an arms race, such a strain that the outbreak of war is felt as a relief’
(Richardson, 1960: 61). This suggests a threshold for war short of resource
exhaustion, but it is not clear when that might be or how it might vary across states
and their leadership. Nevertheless, the crippling effects of resources devoted to
military spending is the basis for Huntington’s (1958) assertion that quantitative
arms races are destabilizing and prone to war, especially as they lengthen; this is
consistent, although no more precise in terms of timing, with Richardson’s
formulations.
More useful is the implication that arms races have a strong psychological
impact on decision makers, and this maps well with Richardson’s emphasis on
threats and the aforementioned security dilemma argument. Indeed, Richardson
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argues that the x and y variables in the structural equations of arms races concep-
tually represent threat and that military expenditures are merely imperfect measures
of threat (Richardson, 1960: 61). The psychological element is also derived and
discussed in more detail in Richardson’s other work on ‘war moods’ (Richardson,
1948). Threat perception is a central element of most explanations for the arms
race-war connection (Sample, 2012). Nevertheless, the psychology of arms races
and their connection to war are often assumed or discussed, but not frequently
tested in experimental or empirical studies (see Jervis, 1978b; Kydd, 2000).
Most promising is Richardson’s response to his critic that x is not merely a term
representing threat, but ‘threats minus co-operation’ (Richardson, 1960: 61, quote
marks in original). Often forgotten in applications of his model, this is a significant
qualification to models that seemed to portend runaway arms races. This suggests
that there can be substantial limits on arms races stemming from cooperation
between the competitors. As noted above, trade is used as a surrogate indicator for
such cooperation. Rivalry is treated as a possible accelerator for arms races.
Similarly, Senese & Vasquez (2008) list arms races as one of the ‘steps to war’
along with other war-promoting conditions. In both cases, however, scholars add
other factors that make the escalatory effects of arms races worse rather than taking
the lead of Richardson and incorporating factors that mitigate those impacts.
The above suggestion that arms races are not deterministic is segue to some of
Richardson’s other theorizing about their connection to war. Some of this is
inductively derived from an analysis of cases (see next section). De facto, he makes
a distinction between ‘stable’ and ‘unstable’ arms races, with the latter to be
regarded as dangerous (Richardson, 1960: 74–76). Richardson makes an important
distinction between the ‘velocity’ and the ‘acceleration’ of an arms race
(Richardson, 1960: 63). The former refers to the speed of the race, and can be
signified by the yearly rate of arms increases. The latter is the degree to which that
speed increases over time. Roughly, unstable arms races, and therefore ones likely
to end in war, are those in which the acceleration rate is increasing. In contrast,
stable arms races are those that show a slowing of the rate of increase and ones that
might promote a balance of power between the two enemies. Contrary to what
Richardson suggests about the importance of acceleration relative to velocity, more
contemporary scholars focus on yearly increases in military expenditures – speed –
and do not pay attention to whether this is increasing over time or not. This gap in
the literature suggests possible future lines of inquiry.
4.2.3 Empirical Findings
Although Richardson’s work is more about mathematical modelling than empirical
testing, he does present some findings specifically on the arms race-war connection.
This is done by reference to his reading of historians’ assessments, his own
quantitative analyses, and a series of case studies.
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To his credit, Richardson was not an ahistorical modeler, but someone deeply
steeped in actual cases with a good command of history. Accordingly, it is not
surprising that he delved into the conclusions of historians as a way of framing his
own investigations. Richardson notes that historians mention arms races for only 10
of 84 wars in the period 1820–1929; World War I is the most notable (Richardson,
1960: 70). He suggests that historians might have missed some arms races, and in
any case they would not normally pay attention to statistics and in particular
whether the acceleration was increasing or not (Richardson, 1960: 70); the latter is
what he regards as a core component of dangerous arms races.
Richardson’s own empirical analysis at the outset of the book suggests looking
more carefully at different kinds of arms races (Richardson, 1960: 2ff). The domain
of his examination is 15 countries in World War I. He examines the opposite of the
si vis pacem, para bellum (‘if you want peace, prepare for war’) dictum. This is akin
to the inverse of a deterrence argument, something that he later suggested might
have the opposite effect: ‘The evidence shows what was designed as a deterrent
sometimes acted instead as an irritant’ (Richardson, 1960: 55). He also looks at
whether increased arms spending results in greater ‘insurance’ for the states
involved, namely that it reduces the suffering should war break out. One of
Richardson’s dependent variable is total deaths (civilian and military) in the war.
Thus, war onset and war severity for individual countries are muddled. He conducts
several simple statistical tests between arms levels and outcomes (product moment
correlations, Fisher’s test) and finds no significant association between arms races
and war, and with war suffering (Richardson, 1960: 8–11). Nevertheless, this initial
exploration looks only at expenditures three years prior to a war (Richardson, 1960:
7), an unnecessary limitation that complicates the ability of the analyst to distin-
guish between spending in anticipation of war and spending that is causal in pre-
cipitating war; such a narrow window also is insufficient to detect acceleration (or
lack thereof).
More detailed examinations are found later in the book, although again the focus
is more on the dynamics of the arms races than their outcomes (Richardson, 1960:
7, Chs VI, VII). Examining some national interactions prior to World War I,
Richardson considers how arms races produced (or not) stable equilibriums, namely
balances of power. These get closer to testing his arguments about acceleration and
(un)stable arms races. Yet the results are decidedly mixed, with Richardson
expressing equivocation or ignorance as to whether arms races produce clear
effects, with some cases fitting the argument and others not (see conclusions in
Richardson, 1960: 7 and 76). Moving to the European context from 1908–14, there
is greater consideration given to a longer time series for arms race data, although the
author does aggregate spending within the two major alliances. It is difficult to
discern precise conclusions about war, but the movement away from a point of
balance and the positive instability coefficients suggest an arms race of a dangerous
type. This is not surprising in that there is consensus even among arms race-war
skeptics that World War I was preceded by an arms race. Richardson does conclude
that there was equilibrium among European powers in 1907 and 1908, and had the
arms race been muted by a small amount, the First World War might have been
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avoided (Richardson, 1960: 109–110). This counter-factual claim is one that is
unlikely to be accepted by subsequent historians and international relations
scholars.
More interesting is the examination of the relative impact of cooperation
(measured as trade) vis-à-vis arms races. Trade between rival alliance blocs was
increasing prior to World War I. There was also a trade agreement between Russia
and Germany prior to World War II. Thus, the pacifying effects of trade are an
important factor to consider. After considering trade patterns over many years,
Richardson initially and optimistically notes that falling trade from 1929–33 was
associated with a consistent high value of the instability coefficient, signaling
danger (Richardson, 1960: 225). Nevertheless, Richardson is skeptical about the
magnitude of the impact of trade (cooperation) on the negative consequences of
arms races, concluding that ‘… to quell the subsequent arms race by reducing the
instability coefficient to zero would have required, if proportional, an increase in
international trade two and a half times more rapid than the exceptional fall’
(Richardson, 1960: 225).
From today’s research standards, it is easy to critique Richardson’s empirical
analyses. Obviously, he had a tendency to select on the dependent variable, pri-
marily focusing on expenditures before wars, and in particular the two world wars;
his analysis also looked principally at subsequent participants in those wars rather
than giving equal attention to those that stayed out. Subsequent empirical research
does a better job of this in that it includes a number of ‘no war’ as well as ‘no arms
race’ cases. It also expands the empirical domain away from the world wars,
although to give Richardson credit, he does a careful examination of the 19th
century as well. Given Richardson’s death in 1953, he was unable to examine the
impact of nuclear weapons on arms races and the outbreak of war. At least one set
of findings suggests that these might be a factor that mitigates any instability that
arms races produce (Sample, 2012).
Richardson is to be commended for factoring in the power distribution and
cooperation (trade) into his assessment about the dangers of arms races; defense
burdens are also given consideration. The best subsequent research, specifically the
‘steps to war’ model (Senese & Vasquez, 2008), has also developed a multivariate
and interactive approach. That work has also looked at defense burdens and power
distribution gaps, but considered territorial disputes as well (see also Sample, 2012).
That some arms races are dangerous and others not in a probabilistic fashion is
consistent with Richardson’s formulations, although later work is more developed
theoretically. The importance of acceleration and the psychological impact of arms
races, raised by Richardson, however, remain understudied.
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Chapter 5
Richardson and the Study of Dynamic
Conflict Processes
Kelly M. Kadera, Mark Crescenzi and Dina A. Zinnes
Abstract Lewis Fry Richardson made foundational contributions to the study of
international relations. In this chapter, we examine his agenda-setting impact on the
study of dynamics, time, and processes, especially conflict processes. We highlight
the presence of Richardsonian dynamics in various formal and empirical models of
peace and conflict. In so doing we emphasize the role of feedback and interactions
in Richardson’s models as well as other dynamic models, game-theoretic models,
evolutionary game-theory and agent-based models, and quantitative empirical
analyses. To show how these early foundations still inform research today, we then
demonstrate how current research leverages dynamics to yield important insights
concerning the origins and evolution of conflict such as when to expect norms of
reciprocity to be present and to enable peace or exacerbate violence.
5.1 Introduction
Most important research questions in international politics concern processes with
implicit time elements: how do crises evolve, when do hostile interactions become
violent, how do shifts in trade affect alliances, when do regimes change? Answers
inevitably require an explanation of how and why a process produces change over
time. The pathbreaking work by Richardson (1960) helped us establish theories and
methods for understanding time’s role in IR. While Richardson was not the first to
introduce the concept of time in international politics – see, e.g., the contemporaneous
book by Sorokin (1957) on social and cultural change, which he linked to the emer-
gence of war and the earlier work by Lanchester (1916) on attrition in combat1 – he
provided a unique and valuable perspective by linking it to the broader notion of
dynamics.
1For a comparison of the models of Lanchester and Richardson, see MacKay (2020, in this
volume).
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Richardson’s contributions are best seen through a comparison across various
research traditions: game-theoretic models, evolutionary games and agent-based
models (ABMs), differential equations (DEQ) models, and statistical analyses of
time-structured data. We begin with a discussion of the concept of dynamics and
then explore various approaches to time using illustrations from the literature. The
differences across approaches highlight the significance of Richardson’s contribu-
tion and suggest how scholars might incorporate it in future research.
5.2 Richardsonian Dynamics: Time, Feedback,
and Interactions
The term dynamics is ubiquitous in the IR literature, and is often employed loosely
to mean something along the lines of ‘complicated and interesting.’ Webster’s New
Collegiate Dictionary (1973) defines dynamics as ‘the pattern of change or growth
of an object or phenomenon’. Other definitions invoke terms like variation, forces,
and continuous change. Time and process play essential roles. Change happens
over time, according to some force acting on the phenomenon of interest. The word
dynamic shares the same root as the Greek word dyne, which refers to ‘the unit of
force that would give a free mass of one gram an acceleration of one centimeter per
second per second’ (Webster’s, 1973). As dyne is defined in terms of acceleration,
its meaning is inherently tied to change over time.
Causal stories – arguments about what causes a particular variable to shift and
take on different values – necessarily take place over time. Richardson’s formula-
tion of time, however, was more explicit. Although he sometimes used difference
equations, in which a variable’s value at time t is a function of that variable (or
others) at previous times (e.g., t − 1 or t − 2), his canonical work used DEQs,
where forces (represented by first or higher order derivatives) cause variables to
increase or decrease over time.2
Richardson’s models not only portrayed an over-time dynamic process, they
included feedback and were interactive. In his classic arms-race model, each
nation’s current level of arms has a negative impact (feedback) on its own subse-
quent rate of armament, decreasing the rate of change in armaments (see Smith,
2020, in this volume, for Richardson’s full arms-race model). At the same time, the
feedback mechanism is interactive. A rival nation’s increasing level of armaments
positively impacts one’s own calculations, increasing a state’s rate of change in
armaments.
2Brown (2007) thoroughly discusses the differences and similarities of difference equation models
and DEQ models, paying particular attention to the types of trajectories each produces.
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5.3 Dynamics in Formal Theory Traditions
Formal modeling traditions in IR – game theory, evolutionary games and ABMs,
and DEQ models (which directly follow the Richardson tradition) – vary in how
they feature dynamic elements. Here we sort out how each incorporates dynamics in
its core characteristics and how those characteristics, or their absence, inform each
tradition’s understanding of global politics.
5.3.1 Game Theory
Game-theoretic models are commonly used in IR, and consist of players, actions (or
strategies) they can choose, and payoffs associated with the outcomes produced by
all possible combinations of actors’ actions. Early game-theoretic models did not
incorporate notions of time or process into any of these features of a game. In these
simple, single shot, complete information games, players simultaneously choose
their strategies and the outcomes, or Nash equilibria (NE), are immediately deter-
mined. Game-theoretic models have become considerably more complicated over
time, though the basic structure remains.
Analyses of these models focus on finding equilibria, which are given by a list of
the actions (strategies) each player would choose such that none would be better off
by unilaterally changing to a different action (strategy). A sense of stickiness
underlies the NE solution concept. Because no player has the incentive to unilat-
erally defect, a NE is inherently, or by its very design, stable. Osborne’s description
of a strategic form game highlights the absence of temporal features:
Time is absent from the model. The idea is that each player chooses her action once and for
all, and the players choose their actions ‘simultaneously’ in the sense that no player is
informed, when she chooses her action, of the action chosen by any other player. …
Nevertheless, an action may involve activities that extend over time, and may take into
account an unlimited number of contingencies… However, the fact that time is absent from
the model means that when analyzing a situation as a strategic game, we abstract from the
complications that may arise if a player is allowed to change her plan as events unfold: we
assume that actions are chosen once and for all (Osborne, 2004: 14).
As such, scholars anticipate that players identify and immediately implement
strategies congruent with the NE, and that such equilibria are stable. Without time,
feedback is missing. However, interaction resides in the interdependent strategies
that structure the game.
As game theory evolved, scholars incorporated temporal features. Most notably,
modelers sequenced players’ actions and introduced incomplete information. An
actor could now observe what another chose in a previous move, enhancing the
sense of feedback and interaction. Innovations such as the Subgame Perfect
Equilibrium (SPE) concept eliminates equilibria where incredible threats are made
in sequential play (e.g., Fight if the other player Backs Down). Stability still exists,
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as SPE are a subset of the NE and thus invoke the same stickiness inherent in the
original approach.
Sequential play conveys a sense of progression over time. An SPE found
through backwards induction can easily be represented by a highlighted path from
first action to last (starting from the last move and inferred up the extensive form
tree to the beginning move). Sequential games with perfect information yield SPE
characterized by a complete list of plays for what each player will choose contin-
gent on what state of the game they are at (e.g., what all the players have chosen up
until that point in time). These choices are discrete in time and each player’s
strategy can be written down as an entire plan of play (e.g., Fight if the other
Challenges, Accept if the other Offers to Negotiate). As such, an SPE is completely
determined at the outset and we can find the SPE from a collapsed, simultaneous
play version of the game in strategic form, though we will also get some equilibria
that are incredible. Thus, time provides some new information and helps us elim-
inate some unmeaningful equilibria, but the model’s strategic insights remain rather
static.
Games with incomplete information provide more insight into uncertainties of
strategic decision making, but their central solution concept, the Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (PBE) retains the stickiness of the NE and SPE. The PBE ‘stipulates
that all strategies are sequentially rational and consistent with beliefs that are
updated according to Bayes’s rule wherever possible’ (Thomas, Reed & Wolford,
2016: 483). Players no longer know the payoffs of others, but instead assign
probabilities to different payoff orderings. For example, Thomas et al. (2016) model
rebel demands on governments, with war as one potential outcome. Rebels, R, do
not know whether the government, G, can effectively fight or not. In turn, R do not
know G’s preferences for fighting versus yielding. Finding the PBE involves
identification of ‘the range of player-types of G that reject some proposal x’
(Thomas et al., 2016: 506), R’s choice of x such that it ‘never backs down’ in the
final stage of the game. Even though R only knows G’s type (or preferences), with
some probability, and can update beliefs along the way, it decides at the outset what
to do. Accordingly, ‘In equilibrium, R always chooses a demand for which it will
refuse to back down after rejection, making credible its threat to fight by increasing
the range of government types that reject’ (Thomas et al., 2016: 484). From the
start, each player chooses a strategy, or a complete way to play the game. Players
instantly reach and stay at the PBE. Players’ immediate movement to the equilib-
rium and its stickiness characterize prominent and common games and solution
concepts in IR research.3
Bargaining models with iteration incorporate time more explicitly (e.g., Fearon,
1998). In such models, players would both rather reach an agreement than to
continue fighting but prefer different agreements. Players incur costs from fighting,
and the game’s features allow us to ask whether and when players will strike a
3More advanced games incorporate features such as errors in strategy, and third players, and use
more complex solution concepts.
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bargain, what it will look like, and what factors determine the answers to those
questions. For example, Best & Bapat’s (2018) model reveals that insurgent leaders
reject government offers when internal divisions threaten to undermine insurgent
cohesiveness. In such models, time and timing matters more explicitly, but feed-
back is still elusive.
5.3.2 Evolutionary Games and Agent-Based Models
Evolutionary games explicitly incorporate time into game structures but relax
classic game theory assumptions (such as rationality) and forfeit some strategic
insights. Axelrod & Hamilton (1981) develop PD tournaments in which actors
adhere to one among several alternative strategies over the course of repeated plays.
They notably demonstrate that cooperation can evolve because Tit-for-Tat (TFT), a
‘nice’ strategy that defects only if the opponent does so first, is evolutionarily
stable. That is, when it dominates a population, TFT can survive invasion by mutant
strategies. Analyses of evolutionary games focus on identifying evolutionarily
stable strategies (ESS), but they differ from classic game theory strategies because
they do not derive from actors’ preferences; instead strategies are predetermined or
inherited. When introducing replication dynamics, modelers also examine indi-
viduals’ fitness for survival and temporal trends in the population of strategies.
Time plays at least two important roles in evolutionary games. First, results of
past interactions feed back into the algorithm for an actor’s current action. Second,
patterns in the way (sub)populations of strategies rise and decline tell us whether
and when we should empirically observe behavior like cooperation. Although few
IR scholars use evolutionary games (but see, e.g., Johnson & Toft (2013/14) on
fluctuations in territorial conflict), many leverage the concepts in exploring coop-
eration mechanisms such as norm change (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998) or
designing institutions for managing common pool resources (Ostrom, 1990).
Agent-based models similarly sacrifice traditional features of strategic interac-
tion to capture how agent interactions produce temporal patterns at the aggregate
level. ABMs add a social network to agent interactions: a grid system represents
that network, agents are neighbors or distances separate them, and interactions
depend on their closeness. Simulations reveal how populations of types of agents
using various rules evolve, equilibria may not result, and may not be sticky.
Scholars use ABMs to understand phenomena such as how coercion and emulation
produce distinct temporal and geographic patterns in norm adoption (Ring, 2014)
and the interplay between state formation and the severity of war (Cederman,
2003).4
4Cederman’s (2003) agent-based model draws inspiration from Richardson’s empirical work on
power laws and wars. Cf. also Clauset (2020) and Spagat & van Weezel (2020), both in this
volume.
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5.3.3 Differential Equations Models
In contrast to classic game theory, but in concert with the spirit of evolutionary
games and ABMs, Richardson and other scholars using DEQ models explicitly
incorporate time, investigate more varied dynamic processes, and analyze their
models with less focus on the equilibria themselves. Equilibria may or may not
represent predictions of the model, but when they do, the issues concern stability.
These distinctions translate into a greater focus on temporal features that charac-
terize dynamic processes.
DEQ models specify at least one variable’s values as a function of time.
Typically, and in all the examples discussed in this section, a DEQ model uses more
than one time-dependent variable, and the modeler builds a system of (first order)
equations specifying how the change over time in one variable is driven by its own
current value, other variables’ current values, other variables’ first (or higher) order
derivatives, parameters, and the interactions of all of these elements. The resulting
functions represent a variety of interdependencies and feedback loops.
A DEQ model’s equilibrium is defined by the values of all the variables such that
their first derivatives are zero. For example, in Richardson’s arms race model, the
equilibria are found by finding the value of x, nation X’s level of armaments, and
the value of y, nation Y’s level of armaments, when dx/dt = 0 and dy/dt = 0. The
no-change feature introduced by setting the first derivatives at zero seems, at first
blush, to have some resemblance to a NE in game theory. However, not all equi-
libria are stable. That is, when a system in equilibrium is disturbed (e.g., shocked by
an economic downturn that suddenly decreases one state’s military spending), it
might return to the equilibrium, and it might not. In the former case, we say the
equilibrium is stable.5 In the latter, we say it is unstable. Stability is assessed by
analyzing the behavior of the trajectories, or paths over time, near an equilibrium.
Trajectories are paths produced by interdependencies and feedback. Any system
has an infinite number of trajectories, but they can be grouped into different types:
some spiraling outward, indefinitely escalating upward (as in the arms race case of a
Richardson model) or downward (as in the ‘love race’ case of the Richardson
model); settling into stable equilibria (as in the case where the joint defense burden
outweighs the joint threats in the Richardson model, so that the arms race ends);
endlessly cycling but never reaching equilibria (as in population biology’s
predator-prey model or some of the models of demographic, fiscal, and elite models
of state expansion and collapse in Turchin, 2003); approaching the equilibrium
from some directions but move away from it in others, forming a saddle shape
around the equilibrium (as in some versions of the Muncaster & Zinnes, 1990,
systemic hostility model); and so forth. Each type of trajectory is a little story about
how the world might unfold, and savvy scholars can translate these types into
substantively relevant vignettes about the causal process they are investigating.
Multiple types of trajectories means multiple possibilities. In principle, once you
5An analogy in empirical time-series research would be the notion of mean-reversion.
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know the initial conditions, the exact trajectory that the system takes is known, and
assuming no exogenous shocks, the system is indeed deterministic.
Consider, for example, Kadera & Morey (2008), which examines how the
trade-offs of fighting and investing yield different outcomes under three types of
competitions between states: peacetime rivalry, counter-industrial wars, and
counter-force wars. They model the first derivative with respect to time of four
variables: nation I’s military spending (mi), nation I’s level of resources (ri), nation
J’s military spending (mj), nation J’s level of resources (rj). Each is a function of at
least two of the others, and the exact functional form depends on the kind of
competition I and J engage in. Their analysis of the model yields graphs of the four
variables over time. The authors notice an interesting pattern over the course of
counterforce war trajectories: I’s and J’s military expenditures flatten out and stay
equidistant from each other, locking in a particular level for mi and for mj, as well as
for their difference, at all points in time. Kadera & Morey label this type of tra-
jectory a stalemate. They conclude that in counterforce wars, ‘Both states are …
eventually able to replace the military power that is being destroyed from the
fighting without significantly harming their economies. The traditional war trajec-
tories demonstrate that each state is capable of continuing the conflict indefinitely
and neither is able to gain an advantage over the other’ (Kadera & Morey, 2008:
167).
Differential equations models may not have equilibria, or current analytic
methods may not allow the researcher to determine their explicit formulation. But
the absence of equilibria does not negate the fact that the model can provide other,
equally important insights such as trajectory behavior. Leveraging explicit equi-
libria values, Lee, Muncaster & Zinnes (1994) identify types of triadic friend and
enemy relationship structures that persist or evolve into different structures, and
Toft & Zhukov (2012) yield the conditions separating cases in which insurgency
spreads across political subunits from those in which government coercion offsets
transmission. Using simulations rather than explicit solutions or analytic identifi-
cation of equilibria, Kadera, Crescenzi & Shannon (2003) show how a strong global
democratic community insulates nascent democracies from the autocratization
effects of war & Morey (2011) demonstrates how sudden upswings in fatalities
shock a rivalry into termination by eroding support for continued hostilities.
Thus, two important points should be noted in comparing game theoretic and
DEQ models. First, as Osborn (2004: 25) notes, ‘Nash’s theory concerns only
equilibria; it has nothing to say about the path players’ choices will take on the way
to an equilibrium’. While game theoretic models reveal interesting interdepen-
dencies of decision making that are embedded in the final choices actors make, such
as a rebel group making large demands that they know will be rejected by a
government, in order to demonstrate their credibility (Thomas et al., 2016), DEQ
models feature feedback that tells us about the type of route players or the system
take and the speed of their travel. Second, the scholarly utility of a game theoretic
model depends on whether it has few, identifiable equilibria; while the utility of a
DEQ model relies less on the number or identifiability of equilibria and more on
whether the trajectory behavior is substantively informative and interesting. In sum,
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if DEQ models represent what happens when actors do not ‘stop to think’, a famous
characterization by Richardson, then game theoretic models represent what happens
when actors do nothing but think.
5.4 Dynamic Processes in Research Design and Empirical
Analysis
Although Richardson’s work is most notable in its contribution to the modeling of
international conflict, echoes of his approach can also be seen in quantitative
empirical research. Action-reaction dynamics, for example, characterize early event
coding and data. At the same time, scholars were grappling with the research design
challenges of constructing statistical counterparts to Richardson arms race models
(Schrodt, 1978). This early work on conflict processes continues to influence
research today (e.g., Brandt et al., 2019) as is shown below in a brief overview.
5.4.1 Early Work
Early Richardsonian empirical work falls into two categories: (1) research focusing
directly on Richardson’s arms race model and (2) efforts to collect data on inter-
national events. Not long after Zinnes and others began working on theoretical
models drawing from Richardson’s work, empirical analyses of Richardson’s work
also began to emerge. Majeski & Jones (1981), for example, revise and opera-
tionalize Richardson’s equations in an attempt to better understand dyadic arms
races, finding no evidence of an action-reaction process. Ward (1984) also lever-
ages Richardson’s equations when analyzing the arms race between the US and the
USSR. Ward highlights the problem of simplistic operationalizations of the equa-
tions, particularly a confusion between arms stockpiles and current military bud-
gets. He refocuses the work on perceived differences in stockpiles as a motivator for
action and reaction, and in so doing finds that the US and the USSR participate ‘in a
reaction process in which each stimulates the other to spend more on their military
establishments’ (Ward, 1984: 202).
While the empirical work during this time is not explicitly driven by Richardson, it is
possible to identify his influence more abstractly in the genesis of the events data sets
begun in the 1970s. The World Events Interaction Survey (WEIS) codebook, for
example, hints at dynamic processes when it refers to how the data ‘reflect the flow of
action and response between countries’ (McClelland, 1978: 1), even though McClelland
designed the WEIS project to merely catalogue the chronology of international events.
A few years later, the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) (Azar, 1980),
was motivated largely by new perspectives on IR research, as laid out in Zinnes
(1976). Whereas McClelland resisted scaling events, the COPDAB project ranked
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events along a single dimension of conflict and cooperation. These two event data
sets (WEIS and COPDAB) stimulated a large body of scholarship. Although
scholars identified serious challenges to statistically modeling and fitting
Richardson arms race models (Schrodt, 1978), explorations of the broader notion of
action-reaction dynamics developed by Zinnes (1980) and others (e.g., Gillespie
et al., 1977) were well served by event data.
Goldstein (1992) used an expert survey to create a scale to migrate WEIS
categories to a conflict-cooperation scale, launching a new wave of event-data
research. This innovation enabled Goldstein & Pevehouse (1997, see also
Pevehouse & Goldstein, 1999), for example, to examine dyadic and triadic
reciprocity dynamics in Bosnia and Serbia, and Schrodt & Gerner (1997) to
examine phase shift dynamics in the Middle East. At the same time, Gerner &
Schrodt (1996) developed the first machine-coded event data generation processes,
known as the Kansas Event Data System (KEDS), building on the infrastructure
created by McClelland two decades prior.
5.4.2 Current Empirical Research: An Illustration
Quantitative empirical studies of conflict dynamics continue to develop. One
contemporary empirical approach is seen in new research by Brandt, Freeman, Lin
& Schrodt (2019). They apply time series models to analyze the conflict interaction
patterns between dyads (pairs of states or actors) over time to pinpoint phases of
reactivity versus phases of independent action. The focus is on three independent
streams of conflict interactions between: Israel & Palestinian groups, China &
Taiwan, and India & Pakistan. Their search for phase shifts reveals that all three sets
of interactions contain similar shifts between high and low-entropy, where entropy
refers to the volatility and variance of actions and reactions within each dyad.6
Additionally, the authors find patterns that indicate the use of norms of reciprocity,
wherein states react in kind to cooperative or conflictual events. Norms of reciprocation
are useful in producing interactions conducive to peace and stability. The major sub-
stantive finding of the paper is that norms of reciprocity are more likely to govern
behavior in low entropy phases. Thus, high-volatility phases create conditions under
which leaders have a difficult time conveying and perceiving information about their
intentions and the intentions of others. Reputations become harder to establish, signals
are more difficult to send, and the problems relating to the analog of private information
in bargaining environments become more pernicious.
Brandt et al. (2019) offer two important lessons: First, the explicit use of sta-
tistical methods to discern between different patterns of interactions over time could
6Based on our reading of Brandt et al. (2019), low-entropy is analogous to a stable equilibrium in a
dynamic model, and high-entropy is analogous to an unstable equilibrium.
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uncover the complex dynamics of phase shifts and therefore help scholars understand
when Richardson-like action-reaction processes occur. As such, the research design
matters. Second, they find that the differences in the risk of severe conflict substantially
differ across high and low entropy phases. Failing to take these differences into account
runs the risk of pooling action-reaction patterns across high and low entropy phases and
arriving at incorrect conclusions regarding the risk of war.
5.5 Conclusions and Recommendations
Richardson made a foundational contribution to the study of conflict – defining
dynamics as an interactive, feedback-based, temporal process. Differential equa-
tions models explore the dynamics produced by interactive feedback mechanisms
that highlight a rich variety of over-time patterns. In contrast, the focus of game
theory is on interactions and expected interactions in the form of actor strategies and
substantively important equilibrium solutions. Game-theoretic models do not
explicitly capture interactions over time. Evolutionary games and ABMs marry
some features of game theory with more dynamic elements that yield meaningful
temporal patterns. In empirical work, theoretical dynamic processes are embedded
in statistical research designs, while event data analyses utilize dynamic assump-
tions embedded in econometric models.
All the approaches reviewed here contribute to the study of world politics and
contain an important lesson: explicitly incorporating dynamics and feedback
mechanisms into theory, research design, and analysis provides valuable insight
into causal processes (see Crescenzi & Kadera, 2015). Our hope is that future
scholars pay close attention to the role that dynamic processes can play in under-
standing international politics. Ignoring the impact of dynamics can mean the
difference between finding or missing the answer to a research puzzle.
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Chapter 6
Back to the Future: Richardson’s
Multilateral Arms Race Model
Michael D. Ward
Abstract Lewis Fry Richardson was a groundbreaking scholar, not only in modern
meteorology but also in world affairs. His two major books, both published
posthumously in 1960, were harbingers for what was to follow in scholarly inter-
national relations. In one, he collected wide-ranging, detailed quantitative infor-
mation on disaggregated conflict processes in a variety of historical contexts. In the
other, he showed two basic innovations for the social sciences: (a) the power of
mathematics for understanding complex social systems and (b) the importance of
understanding the interdependence of things that are typically studied separately.
That latter insight is the focus of this chapter wherein I show that the Richardsonian
insight on coupled behaviors leads to a network perspective on social interactions at
the global scale. We call these coupled interactions networks. I trace the develop-
ment of Richardson’s thinking about coupled phenomena to the development of
network thinking in the social sciences. I conclude with some recommendations for
the arms race research program as applied to the current era.
6.1 Introduction
Based on his path-breaking work in meteorology (Richardson, 1922), Richardson
imagined a future in which his models were implemented for real time forecasting.
The illustration is shown in Fig. 6.1. He imagines a spherical structure which is
mapped to a globe and painted correspondingly inside. People calculate the pre-
diction equations corresponding to which part of the map they are assigned to. He
imagined 64,000 people – which he called calculators – would be required. A team
would distribute the calculation of each part of his equation system, and it would be
Thanks to Phil Schrodt five decades of inspiration and to Nils Petter Gleditsch for his
stewardship.
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coordinated and monitored by supervisors. At the top of a pillar inside the sphere, a
conductor is in charge of all teams. The musicians in this sense are individuals
playing slide-rules and calculating machines.
Richardson’s work in meteorology continues to be important to this day. Indeed,
they have played a role in the discovery of global warming (NOAA National
Weather Service, 2019; Weart, 2008, 2018) through their role in global circulation
models of weather.
However, when Lewis Fry Richardson learned that his weather models could be
useful in military applications, he quit working in this domain and reportedly
destroyed his unpublished results. Richardson was a Quaker and would eventually
spend part of the First World War as an ambulance driver (Section Sanitaire
Anglaise 13) from 1916 to 1920 (Wilkinson, 1980). During this time, he wrote his
first offering on the causes of war, but at the time there was nowhere to publish it.
During his time in France, his location was under frequent bombardment and not
only were the ambulances quite busy, they also had to run the gauntlet to deliver the
wounded to medical attention. This reportedly had a large impact on Richardson.
When he turned from weather prediction, he focused on wars and conflicts,
notably in two volumes. One of these concentrated on analyzing data (Richardson,
1960b) and the other focused on mathematical analysis of the insecurity of nations
Fig. 6.1 Richardson’s visualization of a laboratory for real-time weather forecasting, based upon
his mathematical models. Source Richardson (1922: 219)
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(Richardson, 1960a). In that latter effort, he drew upon his development of math-
ematical equations in meteorology and applied them to human behavior. His initial
focus was on the arms race that preceded the First World War. In terms of his
modeling, this is his best-known work.1
Although he was not the first person to use the term arms race, he was the first to
formalize what it meant precisely. Richardson begins with a linear model for two
nations, expressed as a pair of differential equations (1960b: 16, Eqs. 7 & 8):
dx=dt ¼ ky axþ g ð1Þ
dy=dt ¼ lx byþ h ð2Þ
where x represents the military spending of one nation and y the military spending
of its main rival. The drag on increasing military spending at ever higher levels is
represented by the term −ax for the first country (aka country x) and −by for the
second country (referred to as country y); g and h are historical constants reflecting
the respective hostility of x and y toward each other.
In the 1960s when this idea was introduced into the study of politics and eco-
nomics, it was very difficult (for social scientists) to solve differential equations.
Even Richardson’s initial attempts to use data to look at these equations were quite
simplistic. Basically, everyone translated these into a set of difference equations
Dx ¼ kyt  axt þ gt ð3Þ
Dy ¼ lxt  byt þ ht ð4Þ
which could be dealt with via straightforward mathematical tools and could (if you
squinted) be examined empirically via linear regression – possibly via a two-stage
least squares estimator. Richardson analyzed this analytically in his volume and
several scholars worked in this domain quite successfully. Hess (1995) provides a
good overview.
During the Cold War, there was widespread empirical work on arms races,
frequently using a statistical approach to estimating and validating the underlying
action-reaction equations developed by Richardson in Arms and Insecurity.2
Following Richardson’s lead most of these studies looked at pairs of countries, or
groups of countries aggregated into pairs (NATO versus Warsaw Pact). Readers
will notice that most of these studies were conducted in the last century during the
(first?) Cold War. Dissolution of the Soviet Union led to a subsequent scholarly
focus on the putative peace dividend. In the meantime, global military spending has
grown from about one trillion dollars per annum to a current total of around 1.7
1Although he made contributions to geography (e.g., the theory of compactness) (see Gleditsch &
Weidmann, 2020, in this volume) and to other disciplines as well, such as criminology.
2For an extensive bibliography of such works, see Gleditsch & Njølstad (1990: 384ff). For ref-
erences to more recent work, see Smith (2020) and Diehl (2020), both in this volume.
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trillion dollars per annum (SIPRI, 2018). But a search for recent articles on arms
races leads to a mountain of research on biological interactions from the micro-
scopic to the species level, but little contemporary social science (Smith, 2020, in
this volume).
6.2 Multilateral Arms Races
The two-nation arms race was actually the toy model through which Richardson
introduced his basic ideas. He quickly moved beyond that, though most scholarly
work has not. A sterling exception is Schrodt (1981), who focused on a multi-polar
world with more nuanced distributions of armaments (and therefore spending).3
The basic structure of a multi-nation arms race, in Richardson’s terms, much like
weather systems is given as a system of ordinary differential equations as shown in
Eq. 5, where xi is the military spending for nation i, and ji,j has the action-reaction
coefficients off the diagonal, and the economic constraints on the diagonal and gi
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This equation is the crux of the multilateral system of equations. Instead of x and
y there is now a vector of countries stored in xi, where i is an index of all the
countries to be included (including the previous y from the bilateral case). j is an
i  i matrix. The off-diagonal elements collect the action-reaction terms, linking
each i to each other i with a coefficient that conveys the reaction of a single country
to each other countries’ military spending. For example, in the first row of
Table 6.1, there is a weak reactivity between Czechoslovakia and Germany (2).
These effects are asymmetric as shown by the coefficient of 36 between Germany
and Czechoslovakia. Germany is threatened by small changes whereas Germany is
more reactive to changes in the military spending of Czechoslovakia. Collected on
the diagonals are the economic constraints, wherein higher spending tends to
dampen subsequent spending in the same country (thus the negative sign). Turning
to the first element, there is a strong economic constraint in Czechoslovakia (−30)
which constrains military spending increases. The country with the greatest eco-
nomic constraint is Great Britain and Northern Ireland (−45). The overall hostility
terms from the two-nation model are collected in the vector g for each country;
these are not shown. In the end, this representation is equivalent to writing out a
Richardson model for each country; what is unique is that it generalizes for any
number of countries.
3There are a few exceptions to this generalization, notably Wallace (1979).
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The j coefficients were calculated by Richardson, but not necessarily using any
statistical methodology. Instead, he coded them from subject matter expertise,
where Richardson was the expert having closely followed current events in the
news and radio reporting of the day. If the determinant of the jij is not zero, the
equilibrium conditions can be easily solved.
6.3 Military Spending
Richardson’s initial study focused on military spending. His Table 1 (1960a: 6–7)
portrays a variety of data about countries over the pre-war period from 1913–15,
but he also collected information on the number of war dead and population. These
data were taken from various almanacs, historical sources, and Parliamentary
documents. Subsequent uses of the Richardson arms-race model largely focused on
military spending data – often normalized by population or total governmental
expenditures.
The data from his study of the multilateral arms race in 1935 (Richardson,
1960a: 202ff) are given in Table 6.1. These ji,j are basically the linkages or reac-
tivity of each nation to each other nation. A value of zero indicates that the two
nations essentially disregard each other’s military spending. Diagonals convey a
negative value that reflects the economic constraints faced by each country.
Many have argued that the arms race leading to the onset of the First World War
was actually a competition over military equipment, notably Navies (Lambelet
et al., 1979), and my own position is that it really makes more sense to think of
arms races in terms of stock-flow models (Ward, 1984a). However, for the purposes
of this exposition, I focus on military expenditure data, eschewing the obligation of
developing a coherent capital stock measure for military technologies in the 21st
Table 6.1 The j matrix from Richardson’s study of the 1935 multi-nation arms race
Czech China France Germany GBNI Italy Japan Poland USA USSR
Czech −30 2 1
China −30 12 18
France −54 4 4
Germany 36 36 −30 18 3 72
GBNI 4 −45 6 2
Italy 18 36 −15 18
Japan 12 −30 36 36
Poland 9 3 −30 9
USA 2 6 2 4 −21 6
USSR 2 8 6 2 4 1 −30
Values are multiplied by 30 for presentation purposes, as in the original. The determinant (unscaled) of this matrix is
−0.37. Source Richardson (1960a: 202, Table 51)
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Century. Data have been taken from the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI) which has been the gold standard for military spending data for
several decades.
Military spending in 2016 US constant dollars is from SIPRI military spending
database (accessed 28.6.2018). For North Korea data are based on an estimate of
one-third of the budget. GNP is estimated in the CIA World Factbook at 40 billion
current dollars. Thus, I have estimated military spending to be about 13 billion
dollars per annum.
Table 6.2 portrays military expenditure data for thirteen countries taken from the
SIPRI database. These data illustrate that the US and China each have an order of
magnitude more military spending than any other country, though current US
expenditures are not as high as they were at the height of the so-called Cold War.
The US current spends over twice what China spends on an annual basis, though
factors of production vary widely between these two countries, as they do for many
others in this list. It also serves to point out that a variety of activities undertaken by
the military are accounted in different ways by different countries. Some countries
do not include space exploration and satellite activities as military ones. Both
intelligence and financial activities sometimes come under a military purview and
other times do not. Thus, an exact comparison is hard to justify in a nuanced way.
Sometimes keeping aging weapons systems is more expensive than buying new
ones, but procurement may dependent upon legislative oversight and always takes
time. As a result, military expenditures are a complicated mixture of procurement of
new systems as well as parts and services for aging systems. Obviously, the cost for
a battalion of infantry varies substantially across these countries, spanning Pakistan,
North Korea, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and many western European countries. Suffice it
to say, however, that the US and China are outliers in the distribution of military
spending for contemporary countries.
Table 6.2 Military spending
in thirteen countries, in











South Korea 36,934 37,560
Israel 14,783 15,501
North Korea 13,000 13,000
Pakistan 9,974 10,378
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The annual changes in these expenditures are not extreme. Saudi Arabia has the
greatest growth in military spending, about 9% per annum, with China, India, and
Israel close behind at about 5−6% growth per annum. All the other countries are
within a percent or two of exhibiting a rate of change that is close to zero. Russia is
negative, but not at any substantial level. I return to these data below.
6.4 Reactivity
Richardson had a complicated way of estimating the coefficients for his model. He
describes his approach:
In September 1938 the author made the assumptions shown in Table 45, remarking, with
apologies to all concerned, that it was an act partaking not only of science but also of art or
perhaps, alas, of caricature. For several years he had been attending to the profuse comment
on the friendships and animosities of nations offered by various publications but especially
by the British radio and the Glasgow Herald. This matrix was intended to be a general
estimate and summary of such common information relating to the year 1935. (Richardson,
1960a: 193)
This can be considered as a network of interactions among these thirteen
countries (ignoring for the moment the diagonals). This is shown in Fig. 6.2.
6.5 The System of Equations
Richardson never got to see his room full of weather calculators, nor to see how his
application of ordinary differential equations might play out when examined with
data. Solving the differential systems of equations by hand was possible analyti-
cally, but deriving real trajectories was a technology then yet to come. Fortunately,
since then the science and engineering of dynamical systems has made enormous
progress.
How much progress? In the course of a weekend eight decades after
Richardson’s work, I encoded Richardson’s jij matrix for 1938, and with military
expenditure data taken from Richardson’s own source (The Literary Digest, 23
February 1935: 42) was able to implement this 10-national differential equation
system.4 Figure 6.3 shows the trajectories of four major countries in this
ten-country arms race: France, Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Soviet Union,
and Germany. There is explosive growth in these trajectories. This shows, as
claimed by Richardson (1960a: 12), that ‘The equations are merely a description of
what people would do if they did not stop to think.’ Richardson was ambivalent
4I am unaware of anyone else having done this.
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about whether arms races brought about wars, but it should be obvious that this
system was embroiled in the Second World War by September of 1939, and the
trajectories of spending by these countries did, indeed, grow exponentially.
Richardson clearly underestimated the damping effect – in peace time at least – of
high levels of spending on subsequent increases. This system probably overestimates
the explosive nature of the arms expenditures because of their reactivity to spending in
a large number of potential rivals (and allies). Several scholars have worked to point
this out in empirical studies of arms races, beginning with Caspary (1967).
In addition, scholars have pointed out that it is not really all about military
spending, but rather what the spending is buying that should be the central focus of
competitive arms processes (Luterbacher, 1974; Ward, 1984, 1985). In economics,
these are called stock-flow models. Richardson’s differential equation system can
Fig. 6.2 Richardson’s ji,j visualized as a weighted network
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easily handle both emendations – though collecting accurate and comparable data
on stockpiles of weapons has proven challenging. Even the US Central Intelligence
Agency had great difficulty of this in the 1970s and 1980s.5
Fig. 6.3 Trajectories of four countries in Richardson’s 10-nation arms race. Source Specified by
his estimates of jij in Richardson (1960a: 202)
5See the description of the Team B project, led by Richard Pipes (Pipes, 1986).
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If we wanted, we could go back and collect more data to better examine the
system. Someone should.6 But I turn, instead, to an agenda for looking at con-
temporary arms races.
6.6 What About the Present?
How can Richardson’s encodings be ‘replicated’ today? Fortunately, a lot has
changed since 1938 to make this feasible. Providentially, content analysis began
with the release of the documents that led up to the First World War and work
thereon by Robert North and colleagues at Stanford University (Choucri & North,
1972; North et al., 1963). The event data movement in international relations also
was founded by work that was started by a historian, who introduced systems
theory into political science, McClelland (1961). His World Event Interaction
Survey (McClelland & Hoggard, 1969) led in turn to CAMEO (Schrodt et al.,
2009) and many others. A recent version has been used in the ICEWS project
(Boschee et al., 2015; O’Brien, 2010) with event data based on coding that has been
tested with subject matter experts. The database on which it is based, has data from
1990 to last week, and at present is based on over 45,000,000 news stories from
more than 300 local, national, and global news sources. The dictionary of actors is
frequently updated, but the verbs that are used in the National Language Processing
algorithms are specified from a defined list of twenty major actions, that are further
disaggregated into 360 categories. The top-level CAMEO codes and an example of
one disaggregation are provided in Table 6.3.
Frequently, the categories are divided into four broad groupings, reflecting a
cross tabulation of verbal and nonverbal events with conflictual and cooperative
ones. These categories are referred to as the quad codes, though there is some
disagreement about whether the comments should be a separate category (some
scholars delete all comments) and result in pentacodes (OEDA, 2016; Schrodt,
2015).
Herein, I focus on material conflicts among nations which occur for event types
16–20 in the CAMEO codebook. This includes types of coercion, assaults, fights,
and unconventional mass violence. These are conflicts that are not just verbal spats
between nations, but rather are those that involve some use of material resources.
This variable is typically called material conflict. I gather the counts of bilateral
material conflict events from the ICEWS database. Herein, I use an annual
aggregation, though any sensible temporal aggregation greater than a day is pos-
sible. The data for 2017 are shown in Table 6.4.
6This, as they say, is left to the reader as an exercise.
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Table 6.3 The CAMEO Codes, and a disaggregation of category 03
Adapted from the CAMEO Codebook by the author, http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/cameo.
dir/CAMEO.09b6.pdf
Table 6.4 Annual counts of material conflict events sent by the country on the row toward the
country on the column in 2017
US Ch Rus Fr Ger Jap NKor SKor SArabia Isr India UK Pak
US 1 42 6 1 1 8 1 1 9 6 6
China 15 6 9
Russia 42 1 2 1
France 8 13 2
Germany 6 2 4
Japan 7 1 3 1
N. Korea 3
S. Korea 5 1 5
Saudi
Arabia
Israel 43 1 1
India 6 3 1 47
UK 8 1 1
Pakistan 14 174
Diagonals are empty. ICEWS Dataverse https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/icews, extracted by
author
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In these data, Pakistan receives the most material conflict, followed by the US,
India, Russia, and China. In terms of sending material conflict, India, followed by
the US, far outpaced any of the other countries, though Russia and Pakistan also
have sizable material conflict patterns. I display these data in Fig. 6.4 as a network,
similar to Fig. 6.1.
This shows reactivity among India, Pakistan, and the UK that is quite strong, as
well as among the US, China, Russia clustering. Also, there is quite a bit of conflict
from Israel to Germany. All the other reactivities are at a low level.
In order to make this representation compatible with the Richardson ji,j matrix,
two things need to be accomplished. First among them is to provide diagonal
elements. Then, the matrix needs to be appropriately scaled. Turning to the first task
we have already established that the growth rate of military spending varies
between 9% for Saudi Arabia to about zero percent for the lowest countries.
Fig. 6.4 Richardson’s ji,j visualized as a weighted network using ICEWS material conflict data
for 2017
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This suggest that the diagonals need to off-set, more or less, the sum of the row
reactivities. But for now, I set aside this task, for which I suggest a solution below.
I focus herein on the year 2017, but it should be obvious that these will fluctuate
from year to year, as shown in Fig. 6.5 which has representations for various years
from 2000 to 2017.
It is straightforward to implement this 13-nation arms race for 2017 using either
Python or R computer libraries that do all the heavy lifting.7 Because we have
access to the SIPRI data for all these countries (more or less), we have enough
information to estimate the parameters of a differential or difference equation
system, with embedded dependencies. There are two approaches to this, one is to
use network methods for the difference equation system (Hoff, 2015; Hoff et al.,
2015). The second is to simply use the simulation itself to generate potential
parameter values, driving the simulation successively closer to the real data tra-
jectories. This later approach was developed in the 1970s (see, for example, Allan,
1983, or for a Bayesian version, Raftery & Zeh, 1993) and is described more
recently in Cellier & Greifeneder (2013).
It is straightforward to use the R packages deSolve and FME to simulate and
estimate the parameters for dynamical systems of differential equations.8 Such
Fig. 6.5 Different annual ji,j representation
7Email me, if you would like a copy, to be available in the fullness of time on my github.
8Many tools also exist for this in other modeling/statistical framework, e.g., MATLAB among
many others.
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systems can be difficult to estimate successfully because of the inherent sensitivity
of the systems. But this sensitivity is a feature, not a bug. If the system were not
sensitive to minor changes in one part of it, it would fail as an implementation of the
design of the system. At any rate, many tools and diagnostics are now available to
estimate successfully such dynamic systems, which can then be used to simulate
different scenarios.
I end this chapter here, with this suggestion for arms race research in the future.
If it is going to carry us forward, it needs first to go back. First, it needs to go back
to the careful tradition of the construction of internally consistent dynamical
mathematical models like those developed in the 1930s. Second, it needs to go back
to the modeling and statistical methods developed in the 1970s. But it also needs to
go forward to the wealth of empirical data on arm and armaments now available to
scholarly and policy communities. And, it needs to embrace the more recent
work-saving devices that sit on our desks and can simulate complicated systems of
interdependent processes while we stand at our desks.
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Chapter 7
From Hand-Counting to GIS:
Richardson in the Information Age
Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Nils B. Weidmann
Abstract Richardson made pioneering contributions to the study of geography and
its influence on social and political dynamics. We use the research of Richardson as
a point of departure to examine how Geographic Information Systems
(GIS) technology and spatial data provide opportunities to answer old and new
questions in conflict research. There is an enduring interest in how geographical
features influence political interactions and outcomes and increasing attention to
how key factors highlighted vary spatially both within countries and beyond
national boundaries. We focus on key motivations for using spatially disaggregated
data and show how such data can help advance core research questions, drawing on
examples from the study of violent conflict.
7.1 Introduction
Lewis Fry Richardson collected an influential early database on ‘deadly quarrels’
and made prominent contributions to modelling interactions such as arms races
using differential equations (Hess, 1995; Nicholson, 1999; Richardson, 1960a).
Less well known is Richardson’s pioneering work on geography, examining topics
such as the relationship between borders and conflict, developing measures of
territorial properties such as ‘compactness’, as well as a number of interesting
observations on the political implications and origins of borders (Richardson,
1960b, 1961). For example, Richardson noted how administratively determined
internal borders tended to look very different from ‘natural’ external borders. While
the latter tend to follow physical features such as rivers or mountain ranges, the
former often take the form of straight lines clearly drawn directly on a map, usually
without regard for natural features (see also Mandelbrot, 1967 on the scale effect of
borders noted by Richardson). Richardson further noted that there were no
instances of four independent states meeting in a single point, such as the Four
Corners area of the United States. He attributed this to the role of warfare in shaping
This chapter is a shortened version of Gleditsch & Weidmann (2012), with some revision and
updating. Reprinted with permission.
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borders and the difficulty of maintaining border arrangements that would be difficult
to defend militarily. The Caprivi Strip, a protruding part of northeastern Namibia, is
sometimes held up as a contemporary counterexample to Richardson’s observation.
Namibia and Zimbabwe do not appear to be contiguous, even if both border the
Zambezi river. Still, this strangely shaped area emerged from complex treaties
between the UK and Germany, and has seen considerable conflict and contention,
consistent with Richardson’s core intuition.
Richardson had limited tools at his disposal whenwriting in the 1930s, andmost of
his geographical computations were done by hand. In this chapter, we review research
picking up the gavel from Richardson, using the tools of the information age and
advances in Geographic Information Systems (GIS). We show that spatial data can
provide important new insights in conflict research, enhance theory-measure corre-
spondence, and inform models of spatial variation and processes.
7.2 The GIS Revolution in the Social Sciences
Contemporary research often uses GIS to examine smaller and more fine-grained
data. ‘Spatial disaggregation’ is often employed to move below the country-level
and use local indicators to better approximate the specific actors and mechanisms of
interest (Cederman & Gleditsch, 2009). For example, researchers have focused on
the conflict zones in civil wars and examining local correlates of violence.
Moreover, GIS can help provide access to new information relevant to conflict
processes such as the spatial concentration of ethnic groups or proximity to conflict.
In addition, spatial datasets can be used to capture phenomena that are plausibly
exogenous to social processes such as for example weather or terrain, which can be
extremely useful for causal identification.
The term ‘Geographic Information System’ denotes a family of software tools
that allow for the collection, visualization and analysis of spatial data. GIS analysis
extends beyond creating maps, and a key promise lies in the ability to compute
spatial indicators. Some computations operate on a single dataset (or ‘layer’) as
input. For example, only one input layer of country borders is required to compute
minimum distances between countries. More complex operations use the spatial
co-occurrence of information contained in different datasets. For example, we can
compute an indicator of terrain ruggedness by overlaying data on units with
information about territorial elevation, and then examine it is relationship with
conflict events.
Richardson’s (1960b) dataset on ‘deadly quarrels’ contained much information
but did not provide very previse spatial information. There has been a rapid growth
in GIS use over the last decade, and many GIS datasets cover issues relevant to
conflict researchers, with explicit spatial information. Furthermore, it is straight-
forward to collect new GIS data for spatial analysis. Spatial data can be represented
either in a vector or a raster format. Vector formats are typically used for discrete
spatial entities, while rasters represent a continuous variable over space. Our
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discussion here must be selective, and we refer to Gleditsch & Weidmann (2012)
and Ward & Gleditsch (2018) for more detailed general overviews.
We focus on a worked example of measuring horizontal inequality across ethnic
groups within countries, based on Cederman et al. (2011). There is a long research
tradition on whether grievances generated by economic inequality increase conflict
(Gurr, 1970). Earlier research found more political protest under higher inequality
(Muller & Seligson, 1987), but many studies of civil war find no clear relationship
between measures of interpersonal income inequality and conflict (Collier &
Hoeffler, 2004). However, ‘vertical’ inequality between individuals is conceptually
distinct from ‘horizontal’ inequalities that coincide with other salient cleavages such
as ethnic divisions. Many argue that the latter is more likely to spur violent
mobilization, given the important relationship between ethnic groups and oppor-
tunities for collective action (see Cederman et al., 2011; Stewart, 2008; Østby,
2008).
The first building block in our example is data on national boundaries. Our
CShapes dataset provides historical country borders as vector polygons for the
post-World War II period (Weidmann et al., 2010). Even if borders are not of
primary interest, these data allow linking other variables of interest to spatial ref-
erents and create maps or spatial measures. In addition, the associated CShapes R
package allows the user to compute derived measures from the country polygons,
such as the minimum distance between countries (Weidmann & Gleditsch, 2010).
GeoEPR (Wucherpfennig et al., 2011) is a spatial extension to the Ethnic Power
Relations dataset (Wimmer et al., 2009), and provides a dynamic spatial coding of
ethnic group settlement regions, with polygon ‘lifespans’. GeoEPR makes it pos-
sible to rely on GIS techniques (in particular, overlays) to derive a variety of spatial
and non-spatial indicators for ethnic groups.
The G-Econ data provides estimate of sub-national economic activity for
1-degree grid cells (Nordhaus, 2006). We can derive per capita and inequality
measures for ethnic groups by overlying the G-Econ data with the GeoEPR set-
tlement polygons and demographic information from the Gridded Population of the
World,1 a raster with a resolution of 2.5 arc-minutes.
Figure 7.1 illustrates the construction of the measures for Yugoslavia.
Overlaying the G-Econ data and the GeoEPR data gives us a measure of total
economic activity by group settlement area. We can then consider group inequality
by comparing per-capita wealth for each group with the national average, with
values above 1 for relatively more affluent groups and values below 1 for poorer
groups (Fig. 7.1, right). The ratios indicate that Albanians in Kosovo are on average
poorer than the national average, while the Croats and the Slovenes are wealthier.
Cederman et al. (2011) use these ratios in a global analysis and find that large
1http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/collection/gpw-v4.
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inequalities along ethnic lines are associated with a higher risk of ethnic conflict,
both for relatively disadvantaged and privileged groups.
Cederman et al. (2011) use information reflecting whether actors in armed
conflict as described by Gleditsch et al. (2002) are linked to ethnic groups, but the
conflict data are not actually spatial. We now have a host of spatial datasets on
political violence. In an early attempt to spatially reference civil war, Buhaug &
Gates (2002) coded a ‘conflict zone’ based on the smallest circle surrounding all
violent events in a given country and year and examined how location and scope
varied by geographical characteristics and country attributes (see also Hallberg,
2012). Other data sources attempt to provide precise information on the individual
events that make up a ‘war’ or conflict episode, tagged each event with temporal
and spatial coordinates in a point vector representation. The Armed Conflict
Location and Event Dataset ACLED (Raleigh et al., 2010, www.acleddata.com) as
well as the Georeferenced Event Data (GED) of the Uppsala Conflict Data Project
(Sundberg & Melander, 2013) provide incident level data for civil wars and
non-state actor conflict. For interstate conflict, the MIDLOC dataset (Braithwaite,
2010) reports the onset of each episode in the Militarized Interstate Disputes
dataset. The Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD, Salehyan et al., 2012)
provides spatial coordinates for non-violent and less organized violent events,
including riots, strikes, and protests.
It is increasingly popular to use GIS datasets for information on geographic or
environmental characteristics that can help support casual inference. Concern over
the potential endogeneity of various economic and political explanatory factors
have led researchers to look to geographic or environmental characteristics as
potentially exogenous sources of variation or ‘deep’ determinants. For example,
Miguel et al. (2004) use rainfall data as plausible exogenous shocks in economies
Fig. 7.1 Example for the computation of the group wealth indicator. The G-Econ dataset on
economic performance is overlaid with the group settlement regions from Geo-EPR (left).
Aggregating the (partial) G-Econ cell values by group results in wealth estimates at the group level
(shown as proportions of the national average, right). Source The authors
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dominated by rainfed agriculture to improve causal identification of the effects of
economic growth on conflict. Michalopoulos (2012) argues that soil quality and
elevation provide exogenous sources of ethnic diversity, as higher regional varia-
tion should reduce migration and lead to a higher number of ethnic groups. Many
environmental variables can be measured using satellite imagery. The GTOPO30
dataset is a global raster data on territorial elevation, measured at the level of grid
cells with a resolution of 30 arc-seconds.2 Estimates of rainfall and related variables
are provided in raster formats by the Global Precipitation Climatology Project,
available at https://rda.ucar.edu/datasets/ds728.3/.
Disaggregated spatial data come in different resolutions and combining different
data sources usually require scaling to some common resolution. The PRIO-GRID
project (Tollefsen et al., 2012) provides a standardized grid structure that integrates
different data sources to a common set of geographical cells with a resolution of 0.5
decimal degrees (roughly 50 km at the equator). Buhaug et al. (2011) provide a grid
cell analysis of local economic characteristics and the initial onset event in a
conflict, controlling for a host of social and political factors believed to influence
the risk of conflict.
Rather than relying on existing spatial datasets, researchers may create new
spatial datasets by either recording spatial coordinates when data are collected, or
appending spatial information to existing, non-spatial data, a step that is usually
called ‘geo-referencing’. Spatial coordinates for observations can be derived by the
Global Positioning System (GPS), where a GPS receiver with the help of satellites
can determine geographic position with a high level of accuracy. Surveys often
record the geographic position of a respondent or an interview, which allows
linking these to other GIS layers. The Demographic and Health Surveys project, for
example, conducting surveys on various living standards and health related out-
comes for households, routinely attaches GPS coordinates (www.measuredhs.com).
For example, Hegre et al. (2009) use DHS data to approximate geographical
variation in poverty by grids in Liberia.
Existing, non-spatial datasets can be made GIS-compatible in different ways.
Event datasets from news reports usually obtain spatial coordinates by converting
place names into geographic coordinates. The location of the village or city men-
tioned in media reports can be found with the help of gazetteers, a list of place
names and their spatial coordinates. Useful gazetteers include the Falling Rain
database (www.fallingrain.com/world/index.html), or the GEOnet Names Server at
the NGA (http://geonames.nga.mil/gns/html/). Since the spelling of place names
often is not standardized, the JRC Fuzzy Gazetteer (http://isodp.hofuniversity.de/
fuzzyg/query/) is particularly convenient, since it retrieves place names even if the
spelling does not match perfectly.
Alternatively, GIS databases can be created by converting existing maps into
GIS-compatible formats. After scanning maps and aligning the map correctly with
the spatial reference system used by the GIS, the spatial features of interest can be
2https://eros.usgs.gov/#/Find_Data/Products%20and_Data_Available/gtopo30_info.
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extracted manually or by applying a feature recognition algorithm (see Longley
et al., 2010). Vanzo (1999), for example, geocodes historical maps reflecting
boundary changes to examine to what extent post-conflict borders reflect a tendency
towards greater territorial compactness.
7.3 GIS and Spatial Data Analysis
Our first example of GIS in analysis considers how information on the location of
violence can help inform research on the causes and consequences of conflict.
Much research has considered ‘civil war’ as a dichotomous outcome, where states
are either ‘at war’ or not over some specific period. However, civil wars rarely
engulf entire countries and come in many different degrees, both in terms of the
severity and geographical scope of fighting. The Conflict Sites dataset expands the
Uppsala Armed Conflict Data to a geographical representation of the zone where
violence takes place, using a polygon representation. Figure 7.2 displays two
important examples of variation in the distribution in civil wars. For example, the
Chechen War in 1995 (left panel) is confined to a relatively small and peripheral
part of the territory of Russia, and clearly does not extend to the entire country. The
conflict zone is small and unlikely to influence national figures, and national level
data are unlikely to reflect the local impact of the conflict in the region. Conversely,
the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2007 (right panel) experiences two distinct
civil wars that take place in completely different parts of the country, with the
National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP, a Tutsi dominated
organization) in the East, and the Bundu Dia Kongo, which claims to represent the
Kongo people, in the West. Treating the country at large as ‘at war’ distracts our
attention from the distinct actors and conflictual interactions taking place.
Fig. 7.2 Conflict polygons for the Chechen War in Russia in 1995 (left), and the 2007 civil wars
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (right). Source The authors
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GIS provide opportunities for more systematic analyses of how spatially varying
features influence conflict. If politics are local, then the causes of the conflict are
more likely to reflected in the characteristics of the areas where they occur rather than
features of state at large. By construction, many conventional country-level mea-
sures such as Gross Domestic Product per capita or ethnic fractionalization are
averages that reflect population density and will not reflect variation within coun-
tries. Buhaug & Lujala (2005) compare conflict zones to other areas within the same
country without conflict using GIS data, and demonstrate that conflict zones tend to
be very different from other areas of a country. Since civil wars tend to be fought by
small groups, often in thinly populated peripheral areas, the risk of conflict may be
better reflected by ‘worst case’ indicators, or measures of the geographical areas
most likely to see conflict, rather than population weighted measures (Buhaug et al.,
2014). More generally, researchers should think carefully about correspondence
between actual measures and the underlying theoretical concepts. Just because a
particular measure is available or is used in existing research it does not necessarily
follow that it is a suitable indicator for testing a particular argument.
Buhaug & Gates (2002) examine a number of hypotheses on possible factors
that may account for variation in the size or geographical scope of conflict zones.
They find strong evidence that the presence of natural resources within conflicts and
their overall duration influence the geographical scope of conflicts, and their results
suggest a possible endogenous relationship between the peripheral location of
conflict and its geographical scope.
The consequences of conflict are likely to be proportional to their magnitude.
Although civil wars can be shown to have a negative impact on social and eco-
nomic development, it seems unreasonable to expect that conflicts with a limited
geographical scope would have identical consequences to large conflicts with broad
geographical reach. As a supplement to national level studies (e.g., Bozzoli et al.,
2010), many studies that look at the impact of conflict at the household or indi-
vidual level using survey data (Verwimp et al., 2009).
Beyond static features, spatial data can also be used to analyze the dynamics of
change over time, such as the diffusion of conflict. Many important mechanisms can
create spatial dependence between actors or locations and increase the risk of
conflict. More generally, if ongoing conflict in one country can affect the risk of
conflict in other states, the individual conflict outbreaks are not independent as the
outcomes are shaped by events and outcomes in other, connected observations.
Much of the research on civil war has adopted a ‘closed polity’ approach,
assuming that the relevant causes of internal conflicts must be found within the
boundaries of the country experiencing conflict (Gleditsch, 2007). However, there
are strong theoretical reasons why the risk of conflict may be shaped by events and
features in other states, especially neighboring countries. For example, many con-
flicts involve demands for autonomy or independence by ethnic communities, who
often reside in multiple countries (Cederman et al., 2009; Lake & Rothchild, 1998).
The decision to contest the state militarily can be influenced by experiences of the
group in another state, or the ability to rely on financial or military support from kin
in another state. An ongoing civil war in a neighboring country can increase the
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availability of arms and recruits and make it relatively less costly to mobilize
insurgencies (Lischer, 2005; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006). Hostile relations between
states can give governments incentives to support insurgencies in a neighboring state
to undermine their rival (Davis & Moore, 1997; Salehyan et al., 2011).
GIS data can used to examine whether conflict affected areas cluster geo-
graphically and how they evolve over time. The Great Lakes Region of Africa in
the 1990s is often cited as an example of a cluster of interdependent civil wars
(Prunier, 2008; McNulty, 1999). Figure 7.3 displays the Conflict Sites polygons for
the years 1991 to 1999. The civil war in Rwanda erupted when the Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded from Uganda in 1991, where a Tutsi refugee pop-
ulation of about 200,000 individuals had organized militarily, with assistance from




Fig. 7.3 Conflict polygons in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, 1991–99. Source The authors
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The conflict polygon in Rwanda is clearly located on the border, reflecting the
important ties to Uganda, as the RPF on occasion retreated into Uganda to regroup
and rearm during the initial period.
The maps for the subsequent years reflect the escalation to encompass the whole
country around the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the eventual RPF victory. The
Rwandan civil war generated a major Hutu refugee crisis in neighboring countries,
in particular Zaire, where the refugee camps provided a fertile environment for a
Hutu insurgent movement, the Rassemblement Démocratique pour le Rwanda. In
response, the Kagame government in Rwanda supported an insurgent group in
Zaire, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) led
by Kabila. This is reflected in the conflict polygon in Eastern Zaire in 1996, again
clearly on the border with Rwanda. The 1997 maps show the subsequent escalation,
where the AFDL overthrows Mobutu in 1997 and declares a new Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC). The maps for the subsequent years demonstrate how
peace has remained elusive in the region, and possibly may have fueled an esca-
lation of the civil war in Uganda.
These spatial representations are in line with Richardson’s emphasis on borders
as an opportunity for interaction and the diffusion of conflict (Richardson, 1960b,
1961; see also Siverson & Starr, 1991). Although this is just a single case, many
global studies find considerable support for the importance of spatial proximity in
conflict diffusion (Bosker & de Ree, 2014; Gleditsch, 2007; Ward & Gleditsch,
2002). Hegre & Sambanis (2006) report neighboring conflict as one of the key
features with a robust positive influence on the risk of civil war in their sensitivity
analysis. Other researchers have estimated the effects of specific mechanisms or
transnational linkages, including transborder ethnic kin (Bosker & de Ree, 2014;
Cederman et al., 2009), or refugee flows (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006). More recent
studies have looked at diffusion within individual conflicts. Schutte & Weidmann
(2011) distinguish between two types of diffusion, relocation and escalation, each
of which is the result of a particular type of warfare. They find that civil wars
primarily exhibit escalation diffusion as a result of irregular warfare without con-
ventional front lines. Weidmann & Ward (2010) consider the spatial and temporal
diffusion for conflict events in Bosnia, demonstrating that violence is likely to recur
over time and spread spatially, and showing that taking advantage of this infor-
mation can substantial improve the ability to forecast conflict.
7.4 Conclusion
We started by arguing that GIS and the increasing availability of spatial data
provide many opportunities for advancing research on the spatial features of con-
flict and political interactions highlighted in the pioneering research by Richardson.
There is an interesting analogy here to Richardson’s (1922) work on weather
forecasting, which proposed a system based on solving differential equations that
was not computationally feasible at the time. Subsequent advances in computing,
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however, have vindicated Richardson’s ideas (Lynch, 2006). The first modern
computer ENIAC generated a weather forecast in 1950, and similar models are
today used extensively for weather forecasting and modeling climate change. Of
course, meteorological processes are different from social interactions that often
involve strategic behavior and responses, but spatial variation and features can be
incorporated in many strategic formal models (e.g., Fujita et al., 2001; Alesina &
Spolaore, 2003) or computational models (e.g., Turchin, 2003; Epstein, 2007).
Our overview provides strong support for the claim that GIS and spatial data has
helped advance research on spatial features and political interactions and outcomes
in the spirit of Richardson’s initial efforts. Spatial data have helped facilitate new
approaches to the study of inequality and conflict, which at least to some provide a
vindication of the role of grievances in civil war often dismissed in other research.
We have learned important things about the risks of conflict diffusion, as well as of
specific conditions where conflicts are more or less likely to generate instability in
other countries. Although much work remains to be done, we believe that
Richardson would have been very pleased to see the results of existing research
using GIS and spatial data.
The spatial perspective is not just a question of tools and techniques, but also
helps foster a substantively novel theoretical approach for understanding political
events and outcomes. Whereas much research often takes states as predetermined
units with fixed boundaries, Richardson’s work on borders alerts us to the
endogenous nature of borders, and how present-day borders reflect historical and
political processes that have generated and preserved borders (Alesina et al., 2011;
Englebert et al., 2002). Whereas much comparative research traditionally may have
treated individual countries as independent units, interdependence is an essential
characteristic of a globalizing world.
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the copyright holder.
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Chapter 8
Weather, War, and Chaos: Richardson’s
Encounter with Molecules and Nations
Jürgen Scheffran
Abstract Richardson’s pioneering work on modeling conflict and arms races has
demonstrated that mathematics can contribute to peace and conflict research, using
system dynamics and stability conceptions to study both nature and society.
Drawing from limitations and extensions of Richardson’s model, including decision
rules and chaos in arms races, an integrated modeling framework of social inter-
action among multiple agents is presented to study conflict phenomena in a com-
plex world. Conditions for instability and chaos are discussed, potentially leading to
arms races and violent conflicts, as well as transitions between conflict and coop-
eration. The model offers a basis for insights into the analysis of potential rela-
tionships of natural resources and climate change with social stability and conflict,
building bridges between Richardson’s research in atmospheric sciences and his
work on peace and conflict.
8.1 On Molecules and Nations: Richardson’s Scientific
Conceptions
Lewis Fry Richardson (1881–1953), a British physicist, psychologist and pacifist,
made important contributions to weather forecasting and conflict research and
applied approaches and methodologies from physics, mathematics and atmospheric
science to social phenomena (Ashford, 1985; Vulpiani, 2014). In particular, the
concepts of equilibria and stability which are relevant for differential equations in
meteorology and their solutions were transferred to the understanding of arms races
(Richardson, 1956: 1247): ‘stability is not the same as equilibrium; for on the
contrary stable and unstable are adjectives qualifying equilibrium. Thus, an equi-
librium is said to be stable, or to have stability, if a small disturbance tends to die
away; whereas an equilibrium is said to be unstable, or to have instability, if a small
disturbance tends to increase. … It is the instability which has the disastrous
consequences.’
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Regarding the notion of small differences versus large impacts, Richardson
preempted concepts of chaos and complexity. In a letter to Nature he paid attention
to the similarities between the behavior of nations and of gas molecules
(Richardson, 1946a: 135). Starting from the observation that in a gas ‘encounters of
two molecules are much more frequent than encounters of three’ he explained this
by the product of three probability factors relevant in a theory of gas and the
political world. He continued: ‘Although three factors of the aforesaid sort are
likely to appear in the theory of any chaos, yet their particular forms depend on
circumstances; so that many varieties of chaos are conceivable. In the political
world there were restrictions depending on geography and on sea-power. When
they had been formulated, another effect became conspicuous, namely, the infec-
tiousness of local fighting.’
This analysis has been expanded in two separate publications, concerning gases
(Richardson, 1946b), and concerning the political world (Richardson, 1946c). In the
latter, Richardson tested 13 theories of various degrees of complexity, and derived
the interpretive idea of chaos, ‘with its characteristic property that complicated
events are rarer than simpler events. … the complicated events are regarded as built
up from simpler elements … The more such elements, the less resultant proba-
bility.’ (Richardson, 1946c: 138). He highlighted ‘chaos, restricted by geography,
and further modified by the infectiousness of fighting’ (Richardson, 1946c: 130).
By ‘geography’ he meant the ‘opportunity of war for each country, depending on
whether it was a worldwide sea power, a coastal state or a landlocked state’. By
‘infectiousness’ he meant the ‘tendency to join the winning side.’1
Modern understandings of chaos and fractals were derived in the context of
turbulence, which is different from a laminar flow where the volume of a fluid
follows the same path as its predecessors. ‘It is rather like the difference between the
orderly progress of a well-disciplined company of soldiers and the wild rush of an
unruly mob – the difference between order and chaos’ (Ashford, 1985: 83). Chaos
theory became prominent after Richardson’s death, inspired by the Lorenz-Attractor
in a simple weather model, and was extended to arms race models.
The complexity of Richardson’s theory of atmospheric processes precluded
manual weather forecasts, until the rise of computers after World War II. In 1946,
John von Neumann proposed to the US Navy to apply high-speed, electronic,
digital computing to dynamic meteorology. The ENIAC computer, derived for
military purposes, was ready by March 1950 for the first test of simplified equations
using meteorological observations, with promising potential to predict large-scale
weather patterns (Ashford, 1985: 243). With the growing success of numerical
weather prediction, Richardson’s contributions became widely appreciated. To
facilitate access to his annotated list of fatal quarrels, he presented a revised version
1Both quotations from Ashford (1985: 209).
88 J. Scheffran
in machine-readable form (Ashford, 1985: 257). Long before Geographical
Information Systems and cellular automata, Richardson suggested cell-based geo-
graphical approaches to conflict analysis, together with other conceptions that later
became successful.2 In the following, some are highlighted for his arms race model
which served as a starting point for the conflict model derived by the author and
applied to environmental conflict.
8.2 The Framework of the Richardson Arms Race Model
8.2.1 Stability and Balance of Power
Richardson’s study of conflict modelling was inspired by his meteorological work
(Hess, 1995). Similar to weather forecasting, he tried to predict war by finding
general laws, common to all nations. Following his empirical analysis of World
War I, he derived a set of differential equations to describe the arms buildup
between major powers in Europe during the 1930s, possibly leading to major war
(Richardson, 1960a, b). Richardson’s model is based on the assumption that for two
countries each increases its own armament level proportional to the armament of an
opponent (weighted by the defense coefficients) and reduces it proportional to its
own armament (weighted by the fatigue coefficients) plus a grievance term.
The equilibrium where the armament levels of both sides do not change, cor-
responds to the so-called ‘balance of power’. Its stability is determined by the
eigenvalues of the matrix of coefficients: For a positive eigenvalue a deviation from
the equilibrium grows exponentially (corresponding to instability), for a negative
eigenvalue it decays asymptotically (indicating stability). For two nations instability
is given if the product of their defense coefficients exceeds the product of their
fatigue coefficients, indicating that the drivers of arms-buildup exceed the damp-
ening factors. Then the arms race becomes unstable and escalates, while for stability
the armament levels approach the equilibrium, favoring disarmament. Richardson
extended the equations to several nations for the arms races 1909–14 and 1933–39,
using military expenditures as armament variables, which was modified to the
difference between threat and cooperation, taking into account beneficial relation-
ships between nations, in trade, travel and correspondence (Richardson, 1938).
These calculations supported his view that ‘foreign policy had then a rather
machine-like quality’ (Richardson, 1960a: 33) and lead him to conclude that
increasing armaments could lead to war breaking out, while a constant level of
armament corresponds to a steady state without war.
2Cf. Gleditsch & Weidmann (2020) in this volume.
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8.2.2 Critical Issues and Decision Rules
Richardson’s model initiated a flood of publications on the armament dynamics and
a debate about its applicability to real-world phenomena which raised several
critical issues (see Smith, 2020, in this volume). Richardson himself was aware of
the strengths and weaknesses of applying mathematics to social phenomena.
Describing countries as structureless entities by one single variable was seen as
questionable. Data on expenditure are not easily available and do not directly
indicate security impacts. An arms race does not only have quantitative features, but
also qualitative aspects, such as perceptions and doctrines. The Richardson model
describes politics without personalities, where state authorities are black boxes and
decisions are hidden in the budget. The fixed Richardson coefficients represent a
linear and mechanistic interaction, where the initial conditions and coefficients
determine the future, leaving no room for political decisions or control. Nations are
assumed to have complete knowledge of the armament levels and react instanta-
neously. In reality, each side has limited information about other countries, and
worst-case assumptions provoke reactions towards arms buildup, often with deci-
sion time lags.
The linearity and simplicity of the Richardson equations represents a few types
of system behavior (oscillations, asymptotic decay, exponential increase). Reactions
of real systems may be disproportionate and non-linear, showing qualitatively
different modes of behavior. Decision-making may be better represented by
time-discrete difference equations than by time-continuous differential equations.
The arms buildup is not only an action-reaction process, driven by the opponents’
armaments, but is also stimulated by a bureaucratic and budgetary dynamics with
competing domestic interests. Although an arms race may provoke crisis-unstable
situations, it does not necessarily lead to war if both sides want to avoid war or
because one side reaches upper limits of armament which excludes an unlimited
arms race.
Several extensions have been proposed to address the deficiencies of the
Richardson model. Intriligator (1975) developed a framework for the strategic
armament dynamics, based on decision rules that bridge the gap between desired
and actual levels of missiles, taking into consideration the outcomes of a missile
duel and the boundaries between deterrence and war initiation. This is represented
by linear Richardson-type equations, whose coefficients can be derived from
strategic considerations.
8.2.3 Chaos and Predictability in the Arms Race
While the Richardson model identifies basic system variables and relationships
among countries, its rather simple structure does not represent the complexity of
reality. Contrary to the well-ordered world of Newtonian mechanics, symbolized by
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the predictable swinging pendulum or the regular movement of the celestial bodies,
complex systems, such as the turbulent weather patterns that Richardson studied,
tend to be unpredictable. Since the 1970s, the natural sciences have begun to
systematically explore critical phenomena, such as self-organization, tipping points,
discontinuous phase transitions, and irreversibility. During the 1980s new mathe-
matical concepts were developed, such as complexity, chaos, and non-linear
dynamics. Chaos became not only a paradigm for the complex atmospheric
dynamics but also for the turbulent transformation of the international system
leading to the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the time after. Given the complexity
of conflict, it seems appropriate to expand the Richardson model to non-linear
phenomena.
The concept of chaos in arms race and war was introduced to show that simple
non-linear deterministic arms race models may lead to the breakdown of pre-
dictability (Saperstein, 1984: 303). In chaos-like conflict situations, human actions
and interactions are hardly foreseeable. Saperstein used a pair of non-linear differ-
ence equations with quadratic mappings for two variables, denoting the fractions of
the available resources devoted to armaments which two countries pay annually. The
problem of chaotic dynamics in arms race models was further investigated by
Grossmann &Mayer-Kress (1989). The difference equations have a Richardson-like
form with reaction parameters corresponding to the defense and fatigue coefficients
and a grievance term, but with discrete time and a non-linear term that dampens
armament expenditures at the upper cost limits. Factors provoking chaotic behavior
are overshooting or underestimation, hectic responses, delay in information pro-
cessing or discretization. The authors distinguish between chaos and instability: ‘it is
wrong to identify the general onset of bounded chaos with the outbreak of a war or
another global crisis. The really dangerous case is instability’ (Grossmann &
Mayer-Kress, 1989: 702). Another non-linear time-discrete model, using decision
rules for weapons procurement, was used by Saperstein & Mayer-Kress (1988)
to simulate the impact of missile defense systems (Strategic Defense Initiative) on
the East-West arms race. If production rates strongly increased, a chaotic transition
from offense to defense occurred.
8.3 Multi-agent Interaction of Conflict and Cooperation
The Richardson model and other arms race models can be embedded into a broader
framework of dynamic conflict modelling, bridging the gap between models for a
few agents who optimize game strategies, and models for a large number of agents
following dynamic decision rules. Inspired by Richardson’s thinking about con-
nections between the natural and the social world, in the following a dynamic
agent-based modeling approach of social interaction is introduced that combines
motivation and opportunity of multiple human agents to act upon and interact with
their natural and social environment (for an overview see Scheffran & Hannon,
2007; BenDor & Scheffran, 2019).
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8.3.1 From Individual Action to Multi-agent Interaction
The social interaction model follows the basic logic that individual agents act upon
the environment, taking the opportunity to invest their capabilities to action path-
ways for achieving value-based goals which are a function of the benefits, costs,
and risks of the actions taken. In repeated time steps and learning cycles agents
mutually adapt their capabilities, action priorities and values, as a function of unit
costs and values that represent the mutual sensitivities between agents and the
environment (Figs. 8.1 and 8.2). Capabilities can change as a result of the dynamic
interaction. Analytical conditions for conflict and cooperation as well as stability
and chaos have been identified as a function of the value-cost efficiencies of each
other’s actions.3
Within the available capability limits, agents can adjust their investments and
action pathways to meet their value goals according to decision rules, over time
Fig. 8.1 Interaction between two agents and two environmental systems. Adapted from Scheffran
et al. (2012)
3In more formal terms, the VCX model describes the dynamic action and interaction of agents who
use part of their available capabilities (K) as investments (C) with priorities (p) to given action
pathways (A) that change their environment (X). The observed impacts of actions are evaluated in
each time step based on the agent’s values (V) and goals (V*). Important parameters are the
sensitivity of human value to environmental change (vx) and the inverse sensitivity (unit cost) of
environmental change to human investment (cx). The respective value-cost ratio f = vx/cx indicates
how sensitive human value is to human investment and thus how efficient an action is. Negative
efficiencies f indicate a conflicting action path where agents hurt their values.
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switching to more efficient action pathways in a transition process. An interaction
evolves for their responses to each other according to their respective decision rules
which determine the fixed points where agents jointly achieve their goals. Decisive
are the existence and location of the equilibria where all agents meet their goals
within capability limits (corresponding to the ‘balance of power’ in Richardson’s
terminology) and the stability conditions of the multi-agent interaction matrix
composed of the mutual action efficiencies.
Agents can control and stabilize or destabilize the dynamic interaction to some
degree by using their capabilities and changing their action priorities to achieve the
respective value goals. If the action priorities are directed towards hostile relations
(damaging the values of other agents), the equilibria move towards higher invest-
ments, corresponding to an escalation. On the other hand, agents can switch to
mutually beneficial cooperative actions lowering necessary investments. While this
can be done independently, agents can also negotiate on their action priorities,
leading to intertemporal dynamic games. In addition, they can form coalitions by
pooling some of their invested capabilities and redistributing the gains (or losses) to
the individual agents, or they may agree on the same values and goals, thus moving
from individual to collective or institutionalized action and interaction (Scheffran,
2006).
8.3.2 Conditions for Stability
The type of social interaction is represented by the interaction matrix and its sta-
bility, mathematically determined by the eigenvalues around the social equilibrium.
If agents are powerful in terms of their capabilities and efficient in pursuing their
action goals, they can withstand, compensate, or counter-act a certain level of
hostility by others, thus keeping eigenvalues in the negative range and avoiding
major deviations from the equilibrium conditions. If the number and intensity of
Fig. 8.2 VCX interaction model of multiple agents. Adapted from BenDor & Scheffran (2019)
8 Weather, War, and Chaos: Richardson’s Encounter with Molecules … 93
hostile actions exceed a critical threshold, then an unstable escalation may occur,
leading to the breakup of the social system. As a general rule, stability of social
interaction can be maintained if the positive (cooperative) effects of agents on each
other (including on themselves) exceed their negative (conflicting) effects. This is a
generalization of the stability condition found by Richardson. Thus, a social system
can withstand a certain level of conflict and still satisfy the goals of its members.
For unstable eigenvalues, some agents are dissatisfied with existing action
pathways and may select new ones, including those that damage others, e.g. though
the use of violence, if they are not forced or incentivized to follow socially accepted
action pathways. With a growing number of agents, the complexity of the interaction
matrix as well as the number of eigenvalues increases, including those that are
potentially unstable. This is known in systems theory as the ‘complexity-stability’
tradeoff, and raises the question whether complex systems are more unstable
(Scheffran & Hannon, 2007; Gravel et al., 2016). Beyond tipping points complex
systems may become destabilized and break apart into simpler ones, through cas-
cading events and escalating conflict. Alternatively, mutual adaptations of actions or
institutional control mechanisms can stabilize the interaction and contain conflict,
e.g. by social security or other forms of support for the disadvantaged.
8.3.3 Connection to the Richardson Model
The presented multi-agent interaction model serves as a framework for the
Richardson arms race model where countries are the main agents and their military
expenditures are the investments. These are adapted according to decision rules
driven by goal functions which are the differences between an adversary’s expen-
ditures and one’s own (weighted by the defense and fatigue coefficients, serving as
efficiencies) plus the grievance terms with strategic considerations. Both the
Richardson model and the interaction model have a balance of power equilibrium
and stability conditions for the interaction matrix when dampening coefficients
exceed threatening ones. Richardson’s focus on two countries is compatible with
his observation that multi-country encounters tend to be more unlikely, unstable
and chaos-like, corresponding to the complexity-stability tradeoff. He was thinking
about the effect of alliances and organizations in multi-country contexts
(Richardson, 1946c). Thus, Richardson has presented a role model with key ele-
ments relevant in the general model of social interaction.
94 J. Scheffran
8.4 Model Applications
The described interaction model has been applied to different fields, including arms
races and arms control, economic production and environmental sustainability,
resource conflicts, energy security and climate change (see Scheffran & Hannon,
2007; BenDor & Scheffran, 2019). To demonstrate its relevance, a few cases are
selected beyond Richardson’s narrower focus, including issues where atmospheric
processes, weather patterns, and anthropogenic climate change could affect
emerging conflict landscapes.
8.4.1 Complex Conflict Landscapes and the Spiral
of Violence
The VCX model was born in the final phase of the Cold War, as part of the author’s
Ph.D. thesis in physics, to understand the stability of the nuclear arms race between
the two major rivals. The study analyzed potential transitions from nuclear deter-
rence to a world where the nuclear threat is contained through missile defense (as
suggested by former US President Ronald Reagan) or abandoned through nuclear
disarmament (proposed by then Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev).
Simulating a shift from worst-case to best-case perceptions, or from hostile to
friendly attitudes, the model showed chaos-like events beyond a tipping point,
leading to nuclear disarmament (Scheffran, 1989). Shortly after, the Cold War
ended in a domino effect and a breakup of the Eastern Block (Scheffran, 2008).
The following globalized world was characterized by growing connectivity
between multiple agents and security dimensions. Within the model, the fractal
security landscape was represented by a bifurcation diagram, which for increasing
response rates of agents moves from periodic oscillations via stable equilibria to a
sequence of multiple fixed points (Scheffran, 2003), challenging the predictability
beyond the edge of chaos. Adding to complexity is an unstable interaction of
multiple agents, some of whom benefit from the interaction while others suffer,
separating into groups of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ (Scheffran, 2003).
Some conflicts are related to the ‘security dilemma’, where threats to the security
of agents provoke reactions that threaten the security of others. Key lessons can be
drawn from the study of World War I and the diffusion of threats leading to it, using
social network analysis to understand the arms race among alliances before this war
(Vasquez et al., 2011), as studied in Richardson (1938). Beyond critical thresholds
of instability, violent acts provoke more violent acts, leading to a self-enforcing
‘spiral of violence’, which today can be found in fragile regions of Africa. A key
question is how to induce a transition to a self-enforcing cycle of cooperation and
peace-building, similar to Richardson’s change from threat to cooperation as part of
‘collective security’ (Richardson, 1935).
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8.4.2 Climate Change, Social Instability, and Violent
Conflict
Richardson was aware that weather and climate are among the most complex
systems. Although the climate system has been largely stable in the Holocene,
human interference may become a destabilizing factor in the Anthropocene if
critical tipping points are exceeded (Steffen et al., 2018). Weather extremes such as
hurricanes, droughts, forest fires, floods, and heatwaves, often correspond to
non-linear mechanisms such as phase transitions, critical thresholds, and chaos.
Natural disasters are generally associated with extreme consequences that burden
the stability of natural and social systems and overwhelm their adaptive capacities.
The effects may be aggravated by compound events, i.e. the complex combination
of multiple climate drivers and hazards. Together, they are more likely and risky
than their independent occurrence, e.g. concurrent hot and dry summers
(Zscheischler et al., 2018).
In this context, climate change has been called a potential risk multiplier that
combines with other risks, including those to human security and societal instability
(such as forced displacement, riots, insurgency, intervention, urban violence, and
civil war). The implications of compounding risks have not been sufficiently
addressed in climate-conflict research where some studies claim climate change to
be a significant driver of violent conflict, while others find no clear causality. This
deficit can be addressed by an ‘agent-based approach to assess the interplay
between capabilities and motivations for violence and the conditions for conflicting
or cooperative interactions. … In the most affected regions, the erosion of social
order and state failure as well as already ongoing violent conflicts could be
aggravated, leading to a spiral of violence that further dissolves societal structures’
(Scheffran et al., 2014: 369). One compound effect is the double vulnerability to
violence and environmental hazard: environmental change can make societies more
vulnerable to violence which in turn can make societies more vulnerable to envi-
ronmental change, leading to a trap from which escape is difficult (Scheffran et al.,
2014: 375).
These theoretical considerations increasingly attract empirical research on con-
flict sensitivity to climate change (von Uexkull et al., 2016: 12391): ‘Results from
naive models common in previous research suggest that drought generally has little
impact. However, context-sensitive models accounting for the groups’ level of
vulnerability reveal that drought can contribute to sustaining conflict, especially for
agriculturally dependent groups and politically excluded groups in very poor
countries. These results suggest a reciprocal nature – society interaction in which
violent conflict and environmental shock constitute a vicious circle, each phe-
nomenon increasing the group’s vulnerability to the other.’
Within the described model of social interaction, climate change may affect the
allocation of investment to conflict, by undermining resource productivity (e.g. of
agricultural output) and diminishing efficiency of human capabilities, or by pro-
viding incentives for violent resource capture, leading to stronger hostile actions.
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In both cases, this can undermine the achievement of human goals und trigger more
investments fueling conflict. Some effects could act over long distances, for
instance large migration movements, interventions or humanitarian aid in remote
regions affected by violent conflict. In this way, climate change may act as a global
connector, adding to globalization, communication, transportation, and other link-
ages. To stabilize climate-induced interactions, agents could move towards mutu-
ally beneficial solutions (win-win), e.g. by innovation, resource sharing, risk
management, and transition from high-emission to low-emission pathways within
the temperature goals of the Paris Treaty (BenDor & Scheffran, 2018: Ch. 9).
Modeling climate-related conflict is still in an early stage and Richardson’s work
can provide some guidance, although he did not explicitly discuss the linkages
between weather/climate and conflict, besides the observation that wars in the north
temperate zone have ordinarily begun in spring or summer (Richardson, 1960b:
129). However, he pointed out that the probability of encounter in conflict is
affected by geography (opportunity of war) and infectiousness (tendency to join the
winning side) which are related to capability and motivation in conflict interaction.
Richardson (1946c) also noted several factors that are important for conflict con-
nectivity: ‘Aviation is now tending to put every nation into contact with every
other’ (147) … ‘The more persistent contact, the more opportunity for quarrels.’
(152) … ‘the trouble begins with the existence of a world-wide controversy’ (155).
Apparently climate change is one such ‘world-wide controversy’. Considering
Richardson’s general observations of multiple encounters, climate change could
result in an increasing number of multi-actor and multi-factor encounters and
related conflicts, which are not independent but result in compound risks. Further
discussing these linkages could build bridges between Richardson’s work in
meteorology and peace.
8.5 Summary and Outlook
Starting from the Richardson arms race model and possible extensions, an inte-
grative model framework of social interaction was presented in order to analyze
conflict and cooperation, instability, tipping points, and cascading risks as well as
transition and transformation processes. To cope with destabilizing consequences,
affected systems need to adapt to the changing circumstances. Adaptive mecha-
nisms influence critical decision points and adjust actions along multiple causal
chains to protect human security and move from conflict to cooperation. The goal is
to avoid risky pathways and facilitate a sustainable transformation, coping with
conflict and climate change, developing social structures, political strategies, and
institutional mechanisms that avoid or minimize social conflict and instability.
Model expansions may contribute to improved understanding and forecasting of
climate change and violent conflict in a turbulent world, encountering Richardson’s
research in atmospheric sciences and in peace and conflict studies.
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Chapter 9
When Lanchester Met Richardson: The
Interaction of Warfare with Psychology
Niall MacKay
Abstract Simple dynamical systems, in the spirit of Richardson’s arms race, can
be used to investigate the core dynamics of various models of insurgent and
multilateral war. This chapter describes two such models. The first combines
Richardson’s two-nation arms race with Lanchester’s attrition model and
Deitchman’s guerrilla variant of it to create a model in which the typical long-term
outcome is neither annihilation nor escalation but rather a stable fixed point, a
stalemate. The scaling it implies for the force required to defeat an insurgency
matches that which has been observed. The second model is of multilateral attri-
tional war, in the spirit of Richardson’s multinational arms race. We describe the
case of three antagonists, whose objective is to win but, if they cannot win, to
minimize their remaining opponents. In contrast to truels and triads in which the
objective is survival, and the weakest actor often emerges in a position of surprising
strength, here the outcome is mutual annihilation, unless one side can beat the
others put together.
Much of the controversy about the value of Richardson’s arms race models can be
set within a wider discussion of the value of mathematical modelling generally. An
excellent modern essay is Joshua Epstein’s (2008) ‘Why model?’, whose killer
point is that a mathematical model at least gives a hypothesis that can be analyzed
and falsified, in contrast to a purely verbal argument which may be too slippery to
be tractable. Epstein also notes that a central purpose of simple mathematical
models is to illuminate ‘core dynamics’ – that is, in dynamical systems, the ways
that growth, decay, cyclicity and finally chaos appear. Whether in the
FitzHugh-Nagumo model of an excitable system such as the human heart, the
Kermack-McKendrick (‘SIR’) model of the epidemiology of a rapidly-developing
infectious disease, the Lotka-Volterra model of predator-prey ecosystems or Alan
Turing’s model of pattern formation, an understanding of the essential dynamics is
a necessary beginning and complement to more elaborate simulations. As so often,
Lewis Fry Richardson himself put it well:
This chapter builds on MacKay (2015). Permission granted by the Operational Research Society
to reprint material from that article.
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Strange to say, it is to the advantage of realism that mathematicians customarily replace the
actual world by various idealized models. For they choose models that can be analyzed with
ease; and thus they are free to think about the resemblances or misfits between the model
and the actual world. If, with a solemn feeling of the importance of things as they really are,
we were to admit the irregularities of the actual world into the statement of our problems,
we should in consequence have to attend to enormous elaborations of mathematics in the
process of solution, whereby our attention would for a long time be distracted away from
the actual world (Richardson, 1960: 169).
But there is a stronger argument for the importance of simple models, namely
that they necessarily capture the central truths hidden within more complex simu-
lations, which, it must be understood, refine rather than supersede the simpler
models. Approximations to complex models exist, describe their core dynamics,
and can be classified. The classic example, post-dating Richardson, is Thom’s
‘catastrophe theory’ from the 1960s, to which an excellent introduction is given by
Poston & Stewart (1978). This was heavily oversold at the time, but is nowadays
undervalued for what it contains, a classification of all the ways that change can
occur in dynamical systems. Indeed, it is no more than slightly simplistic to
characterize catastrophe theory as a body of results about Taylor’s theorem in
higher dimensions – and Taylor’s theorem, taught in school calculus classes, is no
more than the writing down of the simplest approximation to any nonlinear
behaviour: first a constant, then a linear variation, then a quadratic, and so on. In
that light, Richardson’s arms races are just the simplest, linear approximation to the
dynamics of the tension between antagonism and fatigue. Of course, a dynamical
system may not be the correct conception of such a situation, but to the extent to
which it is so, Richardson’s conclusions necessarily follow. As he himself said, ‘All
that can be proved by mathematics is that certain consequences follow from certain
abstract hypotheses’ (Richardson, 1960a: 145).
This chapter is based on two ideas: The first is a small conceit, an imagined
meeting in the world of the intellect, of LFR’s ideas with those of someone very
different, the irascible and occasionally belligerent British engineer Frederick
Lanchester, who wrote down the first models of attritional war, with their grim
calculus of constant warfare and resulting annihilation (MacKay, 2015). The
original motivation was the observation that rather similar core dynamics pervade
various of the attempts in the literature to model attrition in insurgent warfare, in
which the military forces are bound up with more nebulous, psychological vari-
ables. Many of these attempts can be encompassed in a combination of Richardson
arms races with Lanchestrian attrition and its variants. The action is all in the
scaling, in whether it is the attrition or the escalation which scales faster, and
whether it does so asymmetrically in a consistent way.
The second is in the spirit of Richardson’s generalization of his arms races from
two to an arbitrary number of countries. His conclusion there was that ‘the world
will for most of the time be content with just enough stability’ (Richardson, 1960:
183). I analyze general multilateral wars of attrition but present the situation here
for just three antagonists. There is some history of modelling conflict among three
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actors, and the generalization of a pistol duel – the truel – throws up similar
conclusions in most of its variants: when each actor’s overriding objective is sur-
vival, it is often the weakest actor whose prospects are the best. Our conclusions,
however, are in stark contrast: in Lanchestrian attrition, whether Square or Linear
Law, with the objective of maximizing one’s own numbers minus one’s opponents’
numbers at the end of the war, either one actor can beat the others put together, or
mutual annihilation is the robust outcome.
9.1 Richardson’s Arms Race Model
We begin by looking at the ‘phase plane’ of the Richardson arms race. For reasons
which will become apparent we denote by S and R the variables x and y in his arms
race model (cf. Smith, 2020, in this volume), here restricted to be positive. The
phase plane then shows a field of arrows which denote the direction (but not the
magnitude) of the flow of (S, R), and also shows the curves (for Richardson’s model
they are lines) on which the flow is either horizontal or vertical. These ‘null clines’
therefore intersect at points at which the flow is both horizontal and vertical: that is,
where there is no flow, so that the intersections are the ‘fixed points’ of the system.
Figure 9.1 shows the two qualitatively different possibilities. In Fig. 9.1a, on the
left, fatigue outweighs antagonism. Whatever the starting point, the resulting flow
reaches the stable fixed point, an equilibrium in which the two sides’ forces are
somewhat larger than would be the case in the absence of antagonism but are
nonetheless stable. Figure 9.1b, on the right, illustrates what happens when
antagonism increases: the null clines have passed through being parallel and now
diverge, resulting, from all starting points, in a runaway arms race. I have heard it
objected that there never has been an exponentially growing arms race of the kind
implied, but of course the phase plot tells us nothing about the magnitude of the
flow, and one can perfectly well nonlinearly rescale the time variable to alter the
functional form of the rate of growth.
In (a) fatigue is predominating, resulting in a stable fixed point; in (b) antago-
nism is predominating, resulting in runaway arms growth. The null clines (of
horizontal or vertical flow) are shown as thin red lines.
9.2 A Lanchester-Richardson Model
In Richardson’s model the parameters which link the variables with their rates of
change are psychological. A very different classic warfare model is that of
Lanchester (1914), which describes attritional war. In Lanchester’s ‘aimed-fire’
model, each force causes damage in proportion to its numbers, and the constant of
proportionality is the rate at which each unit kills its enemies. There is little intrinsic
interest in the phase plane, for there is no possibility of fixed points other than
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mutual annihilation (S, R) = (0, 0). The classic result, rather, results from the
trajectories’ being hyperbolae: the difference between the forces’ kill-rates multi-
plied by the square of their numbers is constant, and thus determines the winner, in
Lanchester’s Square Law. Mathematically, of course, this is similar to Richardson’s
model, with altered parameters (merely), not altered (linear) dynamics: fatigue and
constant grievance are absent, and antagonism has a negative effect on opponents.
Suppose that we combine the two models. At its simplest, the model is simply as
in Fig. 9.1, but with antagonism reduced by kill-rate. The growth of the forces is
now supplemented by the horror of continuous attrition to create either a stable
equilibrium, or (if antagonism still outweighs all else) an arms race continuing
during open war. Both situations are perhaps not so different from that of 1914–17:
the fixed point in Richardson’s model can just as well describe stasis in ‘hot’ war as
in ‘cold’. Nowhere in either phase plane do we see either side ‘winning’.
Now suppose instead that we make the model asymmetric between S and R,
letting S be the ‘state’ and R the ‘rebels’ or ‘revolution’ in an insurgent war, and
think about the conditions for a state win – that is, for the state to annihilate the
rebels. Assume that the state uses its resources both to inflict high damage (in
proportion to its own strength) on the rebels and to reduce the rate at which by its
antagonism it causes the rebellion to grow, so that the former is greater than the
latter. In contrast the state is able to reinforce itself in proportion to rebel numbers at
a greater rate than it loses units to them. There are then two possible outcomes,
whose controlling parameter is the (net negative) rate at which the state antagonises
the rebellion minus the rate at which it kills the rebels. The result is, in Fig. 9.2a on
the left, a low-antagonism regime which sees an inevitable state win, or, on the right
in Fig. 9.2b, a high-antagonism regime which may see either (for sufficiently large
initial S and small initial R, to the right of the thick curve) a win for the state, or
(otherwise) a fixed point, a stalemate.
Fig. 9.1 The Richardson arms race
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This model captures some useful features. Set up in this way, it does not allow a
rebel takeover. But it does distinguish an ongoing insurgency from a state win, with
the latter requiring a reasonable set of conditions: effective attrition of the insur-
gency, low antagonism by the state, and a relatively strong initial state position. But
(and this goes back to the issue of ‘core dynamics’), it probably gets one crucial
ingredient wrong: insurgencies almost certainly do not have the (symmetric)
Lanchester square-law model as their attritional dynamics.
9.3 A Deitchman-Richardson Model
It is a standard feature of asymmetric variants of Lanchester models intended to
describe insurgent or guerrilla warfare that (at its simplest) R’s fire is ‘aimed’
whereas S’s is ‘unaimed’, that the rebellion is able to target its fire more efficiently
that the state (Deitchman, 1962). The upshot is an asymmetry of scaling, in which
the state’s action becomes relatively more effective when the insurgency is larger.
The horizontal-flow null cline is then not a straight line but a curve, and the phase
portraits are as shown in Fig. 9.3. Here both low antagonism (left, Fig. 9.3a) and
high antagonism (right, Fig. 9.3b) result in a stalemate. There can be no unlimited
escalation, for the asymmetric nonlinear scaling of the attrition of the rebellion by
the state prevents it.
Fig. 9.2 A combined Lanchester-Richardson model. a Low antagonism, resulting in a state win,
or b high antagonism, resulting either in a state win or – if the state is initially relatively weak – a
fixed point (stalemate). The thin red lines are the null clines; the thick curve in (b) is the separatrix
between stalemate and state win
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In this Deitchman-Richardson model the only way for the state to win is for its
ability to direct aimed fire – targeted, intelligent military action – at the rebellion to
outweigh its antagonism. If this effect is sufficiently strong (Fig. 9.4a) the state
always wins. If not (Fig. 9.4b) then there is, as in Fig. 9.2, a separatrix between the
regime in which the state is sufficiently initially relatively strong to win and that in
which a stalemate is reached.
These results are robust to more generalized scalings and subsume various
results in the literature. Of course, a 2D dynamical system can do no more than
illustrate some simplified dynamics and can anyway capture behaviour no more
complex than growth, decay or a (perhaps cyclic) stale-mate. But the general
conclusion is that simple Richardson-like linear antagonism, when combined with
Lanchester-Deitchman theory in which the theoretical signature of insurgent war-
fare is that insurgent attrition scales faster than state attrition, typically results in
stalemate.
This makes the crux of any empirical verification clear. Good time-series data on
insurgent wars are hard to find: not only are the parties otherwise engaged, but the
rebellion – both R and its growth rate dR/dt – remains largely hidden. But what one
can do is to examine, for a set of insurgencies, the relationship between the level
S of state military force needed to win and the effectiveness rate dS/dt of rebel
military action. Goode (2009–10) did precisely this, analyzing 42 insurgencies. The
theoretical expectation in Deitchman’s model, deduced from its analogue of the
Square Law, is that S2  R (where  is to be read as ‘scales like’), while _SR:
combining these, S ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffidS=dtp Goode found S  (dS/dt)0.45, a strikingly good
match.
Fig. 9.3 A combined Deitchman-Richardson model has a stable fixed point for both a low
antagonism and b high antagonism
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9.4 Models with Three Actors
Richardson extended his model first to three and then to a larger general number of
actors. In the case of three actors, suppose first that all individual actors have the
same rate of fatigue, and the strengths of all pairwise antagonisms are equal.
Pairwise, each interaction results in an arms race if and only if antagonism is greater
than fatigue. Unfortunately, when we have three actors the situation is worse, for
there is more antagonism going on – indeed it is, in a precise sense, doubled. An
arms race occurs if and only if the pairwise antagonism is greater than half the
individual rate of fatigue (Richardson, 1960: 154–155).
Now that we have three actors, however, we can introduce decision parameters
and create differential games. We can also allow coalitions or alliances. A great deal
of literature covers such possibilities, but a common thread runs through much of it:
the apparent weakest actor is in many cases in the strongest position. For example,
in a simple quantitative model of three forces, the largest force or coalition being
the winner, it is typically the smallest force which has the greatest capacity to
ensure it ends up on the winning side (Caplow, 1956: 490): ‘the triadic situation
often favors the weak over the strong’.
Battles among three actors, or ‘truels’, can be set up in many ways. Perhaps the
very simplest is to give A, B and C each one shot and require them to act, in that
order. What should A do? If he shoots B, then C will shoot him. If he shoots C, then
B will shoot him. Yet suppose he shoots in the air: then, by making himself
powerless, he has become no threat to B, who shoots C, leaving A and B standing.
Many variations – deterministic or probabilistic, with shooting in fixed or in ran-
dom order – are possible, and it is often the worst shot or otherwise-weakest actor
Fig. 9.4 Combined Deitchman-Richardson model with state targeted action greater than
antagonism. In a when this effect is large, the state wins; in b when this effect is modest, the
state wins if the initial rebellion is relatively small, else a stalemate is reached
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who has the greatest chance of success (Kilgour & Brams, 1997). The underlying
reason is that most actors value their own survival above all else, so that to be a
threat is also to be a preferred target and thus to be in danger.
9.5 The Lanchester Truel
But here is a model in which this is not so: the ‘Lanchester truel’, a generalization
of the Lanchester aimed-fire model in which each of three forces causes damage in
proportion to numbers, but may divide its fire between its two opponents, and must
decide how to do so for an optimal outcome. The model is thus
dA=dt ¼ bð1 bÞBccC
dB=dt ¼ aaA cð1 cÞC
dC=dt ¼ að1 aÞAbbB
where A(t), B(t), C(t) are the force numbers and a, b, c their individual kill-rates, all
positive. The three forces begin with given numbers A(0) = A0, B(0) = B0, C(0) = C0
units. Each unit of A kills opponents (of either type) at rate a, B does so at rate b,
and C at rate c. When one force is eliminated the other two fight a Lanchester
aimed-fire duel, and the truel finishes when only one force remains. We’ll call these
final values, only one of which can be positive, A∞, B∞ and C∞.
All of the parameters described so far – the initial numbers A0, B0, C0 and the
kill-rates a, b, c – are fixed for a given truel. But each force also has a decision
parameter under its (and no one else’s) control: for A it is a, for B it is b, for C it is c.
If a = 1 then A targets only B; if a = 0 then A targets only C; and the two are
interpolated by 0  a  1. Each side can vary its parameter continuously
throughout the fight if it wishes.
A set of coupled linear differential equations such as these is straightforward to
solve, but the solution in itself is not very instructive (Kress et al., 2018a). The
crucial first step is to decide on the objective. This is a war of attrition, but there is
no equivalent, for general values of the parameters, of Lanchester’s Square Law for
this model – technically, this is because there is no quadratic quantity which
remains the same throughout the battle, at least for general values of the parameters.
Instead we take A’s objective to be to maximize
A1  B1  C1
and likewise for B and C. That is, if A can win then it wishes to do so with the
largest possible remaining force, but if it cannot win then it wishes to minimize the
sum of its opponents’ remaining forces. It does so without discriminating between
B and C, but in fact this does not matter: the results apply to any objective function
which is increasing in A∞ and decreasing in B∞ and C∞. Thus, the outcome in the
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end does not depend on the implied relative worth of one’s own survival against
one’s opponents’ destruction.
This outcome, in contrast to most truels and coalition models, is that either one
side can beat the other two put together, or all three actors are locked in an
attritional stalemate which leads to mutual annihilation. The reason is the valuing of
the destruction of opponents by an actor which cannot emerge victorious. The proof
is in two parts, and, while I shall not reprise the mathematical details, the essential
content is easy to describe with the aid of Fig. 9.5. Here, for simplicity, I have
projected (A, B, C) onto the positive octant of the unit sphere, thereby concerning us
only with the relative numbers of A, B and C. In reality, the dynamics is, of course,
of absolute numbers of A, B and C always declining.
Consider just one corner of this octant, where A has very large numbers relative
to B and C, and A dominates. That is to say, if A chooses the correct fire distribution
between B and C, following the prescription of Lin & MacKay (2014), then it can
Fig. 9.5 The Lanchester truel. Force sizes A, B, C are projected onto the unit sphere. In the
hachured triangle no one actor ‘dominates’ – that is, can beat the other two together. The
game-theoretic outcome is that by altering their fire distributions the actors move the condition for
collective mutual annihilation (dot) onto the present state (cross)
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guarantee to beat the other two forces even if they each fire only at A. Likewise for
B and C. These three regions bound (with the hachured lines) the central triangle,
the non-dominant region, within which none of A, B or C can by their own choices
guarantee to win.
Now consider the markings, which describe a lovely result in linear algebra. The
dot is the Perron-Frobenius (or PF) eigenvector, the state from which the dynamics
send (A, B, C) directly in a straight line to the origin (thereby remaining static in the
projection onto the unit sphere), to collective annihilation. Its position depends on
the actors’ policies a, b, c, and moves as these policies change. Within what bounds
can it move? These are shown as the dashed lines, and it is an elegant result that the
range of the dot, the PF eigenvector, bounded by the dashed lines, strictly includes
the non-dominant region, with equality when a = b = c.
The rest of the result is a straightforward differential game. The dot is a Nash
equilibrium, a position from which, within the non-dominating region, none of A, B
or C can do better (according to their objectives) by departure; and the combined
action of A, B and C will always push the dot onto whatever is the current state
(marked as a cross on the figure). The combined effect of the actors optimizing their
policies is for the dot (the state from which the outcome is mutual annihilation) to
chase the cross (the current state) wherever it goes. This gives the result a great deal
of robustness: the present state (cross) may move, but the annihilating state
(dot) will chase it. Departures of the cross from the dot could be caused by small
reinforcements, changes in kill rates, missteps in policy; whatever. But as long as
the cross does not move into a dominating region, and as long as the actors can
change their policies more rapidly than attrition changes the state of the forces, the
dot will catch up with the cross and remain there. In fact, the result is much more
general even than this: it applies to a general number of actors, to kill-rates which
depend on opponent as well as on attacker, and to Lanchester’s ‘ancient’ (linear
law) model of warfare as well as to his aimed fire (Square Law) model (Kress, Lin
& MacKay, 2018b).
Where does this leave the original truel insight, that the weakest is paradoxically
strong? Can this be replicated in the Lanchester truel? In fact, it can, but one needs
to choose a different objective function. In the Lanchester one-against-many
problem, the optimal policy can be fixed by thinking about quadratic quantities, but
it is identical with the policy produced by trying to maximize the rate of reduction
of one’s own casualty rate. Here this would amount to A trying to maximize d2A/
dt2, and likewise for B and C. Suppose one takes this to be the objective. One can
then impose a differential game in which each side alters its policy so as to max-
imize its own casualty-rate reduction. Let a > b > c, so that A is the most
individually-effective force, followed by B, then C. It turns out that if A’s and B’s
numbers are approximately balanced, C can judiciously divide its fire between A
and B and emerge the winner. Why do A and B not also fire at C? Essentially
because A is the bigger threat to B, and vice versa: and derogation by A and B from
concentrating on each other, by firing at C, will only make their casualties worse.
Within the cube 0  a, b, c  1 of fire policies, this is the outcome with the
largest basin of attraction; there is a smaller line-segment for which the same is true
110 N. MacKay
of an A-C duel with B looking on; and, only for b + c > a, a small line-segment of
stable fixed points of B-C duel with A looking on.
The action, then, is all in the objective function: the overall conclusion is that, in
multilateral war, if actors value their opponents’ destruction as well as their own
survival, then truel-like results no longer hold: rather, if no one actor can beat all the
others put together, then all of them are headed for mutual destruction. If, instead,
actors value only their own hurt, then something like classic truel results may
follow. One can also show that, if your opponents value your destruction but you do
not value theirs, then you must also inflict hurt on them (even if your objective is
only to avoid your own hurt); it does no good with such opponents to withhold any
of your own fire.
9.6 Concluding Thoughts
A fine review of Richardson’s arms race models, including the multi-actor case and
connecting it to the modern theory of dynamical systems and properties of the
associated matrices, is given by Hess (1995). The recent literature on the modelling
of insurgent war, much of which falls under the scope of generalized
Lanchester-Richardson models (MacKay, 2015), still has much to learn from
Richardson’s work. Indeed, there are many more connections to be made in work
on multilateral conflict, not only between arms races and attritional war, but also
with the literature on stability in complex ecosystems which has grown from the
pioneering work of May (1973), and even, in ongoing work which brings attention
full-circle back to pressing questions of human social structures, with the stability
of banking systems (Haldane & May, 2011; Bardoscia et al., 2017).
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On the Frequency and Severity
of Interstate Wars
Aaron Clauset
Abstract Lewis Fry Richardson argued that the frequency and severity of deadly
conflicts of all kinds, from homicides to interstate wars and everything in between,
followed universal statistical patterns: their frequency followed a simple Poisson
arrival process and their severity followed a simple power-law distribution.
Although his methods and data in the mid-20th century were neither rigorous nor
comprehensive, his insights about violent conflicts have endured. In this chapter,
using modern statistical methods and data, I show that Richardson’s original claims
are largely correct, with a few caveats. These facts place important constraints on
our understanding of the underlying mechanisms that produce individual wars and
periods of peace and shed light on the persistent debate about trends in conflict.
10.1 Introduction
Lewis Fry Richardson (1881–1953) stands as one of the founding fathers of the
modern field of complexity science (Mitchell, 2011), which aims to understand both
how complexity arises from the interaction of simple rules and how structure
emerges from the chaos of contingency. One of his most celebrated works was his
analysis of the frequency and severity of interstate wars and other deadly conflicts
(Richardson, 1944, 1948, 1960). Richardson also played critical roles in two other
major pieces of complexity science, which continue to inform scientific efforts to
understand systems as varied as developmental biology, the formation of galaxies,
and the collective behavior of humans in its many forms.
The first of these arose in his work on the ‘coastline paradox’, which is captured
by a deceptively simple question: how long is the British coastline? Richardson
showed that the length of a coastline depends, paradoxically, on the length of the
ruler used to measure it – the shorter the ruler, the longer the coastline’s total length.
This effect, now called the Richardson effect, paved the way for Benoit
Mandelbrot’s celebrated work on fractal geometry (Mandelbrot, 1967), which has
informed numerous studies of complex social, biological, and technological sys-
tems (Mitchell, 2011). Richardson’s insight also foreshadowed his discovery of a
‘scale-free’ pattern in the statistics of wars.
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The second arose from Richardson’s pioneering work in meteorology, which
was his primary focus for many decades. Much of his work here aimed to develop
the mathematics of weather forecasting, and in recognition of those contributions, a
dimensionless quantity related to buoyancy and shear flows in turbulent systems is
called the Richardson number. Richardson (1922) also pioneered the use of
numerical approaches to forecast the weather, despite the fact that sufficient com-
puting power to make useful weather predictions would not be developed until
several decades later. In this way, Richardson very nearly discovered, almost a half
century earlier, the same mathematical chaos lurking in the equations of turbulence
that Lorenz (1963) would later make world famous. Richardson’s work on weather
forecasting also foreshadowed his interest in the long-term statistics of wars.
These intellectual threads came together in Richardson’s foundational studies of
violent conflict, in which he argued that the frequency and severity of deadly
‘quarrels’ of all kinds, from small-scale events like homicides to large-scale events
like interstate wars, followed universal statistical patterns (Richardson, 1960).
Although little attention is now paid to his claims about small-scale events like
homicides, Richardson’s ideas about larger events have become central to the study
of political conflict, including civil unrest (Biggs, 2005), terrorism (Clauset et al.,
2007), insurgency (Bohorquez et al., 2009), civil wars (Cederman, 2003; Lacina,
2006), and interstate wars (Cederman, 2003; Cederman et al., 2011; Pinker, 2012;
Harrison & Wolf, 2012). In this chapter, I focus on Richardson’s ideas about the
statistics of interstate wars.
Richardson’s original analysis only covered interstate wars from 1820–1945
(Richardson, 1948). On the basis of these events, he made two claims about their
statistical pattern. First, he argued that the sizes, or ‘severities,’ of these wars
followed a precise pattern, called a power-law distribution, in which the probability
that a war kills x people is Pr(x) / x−a, for all x  xmin > 0, and where a > 1 is
called the ‘scaling’ parameter. Second, he argued that the timing of wars followed a
simple Poisson process, implying both a constant annual probability for a new war
and a simple geometric distribution for years between wars (Richardson, 1944).
Although his statistical methods were not rigorous by modern standards and his
data were far less comprehensive, these patterns – a power-law distribution for war
sizes and a Poisson process for their onsets – represent a simple and testable model
for the statistics of interstate wars worldwide. Crucially, Richardson’s model is
‘stationary,’ meaning that the rules of generating new wars do not change over time.
If the empirical statistics of interstate wars really do follow the simple patterns
claimed by Richardson, it would indicate strong constraints on the long-term
dynamics of the underlying social and political mechanisms that generate wars and
periods of peace (Ray, 1998; Ward et al., 2007; Leeds, 2003; Jackson & Nei, 2015;
Alesina & Spolaore, 1997). A long-running debate within the study of conflict has
focused on whether or not such conflicts are characterized by genuine trends (see
Gleditsch & Clauset, 2018 for a recent review).
If the underlying mechanisms that produce wars are stationary, then any ‘trend’
is inherently illusory. However, deciding whether trends exist has proved difficult to
resolve, in part because there are multiple ways to answer this question, depending
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on what type of conflict is chosen, what variable is analyzed, and how the notion of
change is formalized. Different choices can lead to opposite conclusions about the
existence or direction of change in the statistics of conflict (Payne, 2004; Harrison
& Wolf, 2012; Braumoeller, 2013; Cirillo & Taleb, 2015; Gleditsch & Clauset,
2018; Clauset, 2018).
Here, I consider a more straightforward question: given modern statistical tools
and interstate war data, do Richardson’s claims about statistical patterns hold up,
and if so, what does that imply about the long peace of the post-war period? For this
investigation, I apply state-of-the-art methods (Clauset et al., 2009; Clauset &
Woodard, 2013) to the set of interstate wars 1823–2003 given in the Correlates of
War data set (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010) (Fig. 10.1). This data set provides
comprehensive coverage in this period, with few artifacts and relatively low mea-
surement bias, and allows us to focus on a period during which Richardson’s model
is plausible (Cederman et al., 2011).
10.2 Preliminaries
Before analyzing any data, I must clarify several epistemological issues and the
impact of different assumptions on the accuracy and interpretation of the analysis.
Power-law distributions have unusual mathematical properties (Newman, 2005),
which can require specialized statistical tools to analyze. (For primers on power-law
distributions in conflict, see Cederman, 2003; Clauset et al., 2007.) For instance,
when observations are generated by a power law, time series of summary statistics
like the mean or variance can exhibit long fluctuations resembling a trend. The
largest and longest fluctuations occur for a scaling parameter of a < 3, when one or
both the mean and variance are mathematically infinite, i.e., they never converge,
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Fig. 10.1 Interstate war 1823–2003. The graph shows severity (battle deaths) and onset year for
the 95 conflicts in the 181-year period based on data from the Correlates of War (CoW) interstate
war data (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). The absolute sizes of wars range from 1,000, a minimum by
definition, to 16,634,907, the number of recorded battle deaths in the Second World War. Delays
between consecutive war onsets range from 0 to 18 years, and average 1.91 years. Most wars
(79%) ended no more than two years after their onset. Originally published in Clauset (2018)
10 On the Frequency and Severity of Interstate Wars 115
even for infinite-sized samples. For interstate wars, this property could produce
long transient patterns of low-severity or the absence of wars, making it difficult to
distinguish a genuine trend toward peace from a mere fluctuation in a stationary
process.
To illustrate the counter-intuitive nature of power-law distributions, consider a
world where the heights of Americans are power-law distributed, but with the same
average as reality (about 1.7 m), and I line them up in a random order. In this world,
nearly 60,000 Americans would be as tall as the tallest adult male on record
(2.72 m), 10,000 individuals would be as tall as an adult male giraffe, one would be
as tall as the Empire State Building (381 m), and 180 million diminutive individ-
uals would stand only 17 cm tall. As we run down the line of people, we would
repeatedly observe long runs of relatively short heights, one after another, and then,
rarely, we would encounter a person so astoundingly tall that their singular presence
would dramatically shift our estimate of the average or variance of all heights. This
is the kind of pattern that we see in the sizes of wars.
Identifying a power-law distribution within an empirical quantity can suggest the
presence of exotic underlying mechanisms, including nonlinearities, feedback
loops, and network effects (Newman, 2005), although not always (Reed & Hughes,
2002), and power laws are believed to occur broadly in complex social, techno-
logical, and biological systems (Clauset et al., 2009). For instance, the intensities or
sizes of many natural disasters, such as earthquakes, forest fires, and floods
(Newman, 2005), as well as many social disasters, like riots and terrorist attacks
(Biggs, 2005; Clauset et al., 2007), are well-described by power laws.
Testing if some quantity does or does not follow a power law requires spe-
cialized statistical tools (Resnick, 2006; Clauset et al., 2009), because uncertainty
tends to be greatest in the upper tail, which governs the frequency of the largest and
rarest events, i.e., the frequency of large wars. Modern statistical tools provide
rigorous methods for estimating and testing power-law models, distinguishing them
from other ‘heavy-tailed’ distributions, and even using them to make statistical
forecasts of future events (Clauset & Woodard, 2013).
Poisson processes pose fewer statistical issues than power-law distributions.
However, for consistency, our analysis applies similar methods to both war timing
and size data. Specifically, I estimate an ensemble of models, each fitted to a
bootstrap of the empirical data, which better represents our statistical uncertainty
than would a single model. Technical details are described in Clauset (2018).
Richardson’s models are defined in terms of absolute numbers, i.e., the number
of interstate wars per year and the number of battle deaths per war. Hence, I
consider war variables in their unnormalized forms and consider all recorded
interstate wars, meaning that our analysis takes the entire world as a system.
Analyses of interstate war statistics sometimes normalize either the number of
wars or their sizes by some kind of reference population, e.g., dividing a war’s size
by the global population at the time. Such normalizations represent additional
theoretical assumptions about the underlying data generating process.
For instance, normalizing the number of wars per year by the number of pairs of
nations that could be at war assumes that war is a dyadic event and that dyads
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independently generate conflicts with equal probability (Ward et al., 2007). This
choice of normalizer grows quadratically with the number of nations and will create
the appearance of a trend toward fewer wars, even if Richardson’s stationary model
of wars is correct in an absolute sense. Considerable evidence indicates that dyads
do not independently generate conflicts, and that dyadic likelihoods vary across
time and space, and by national covariates (Ray, 1998; Ward et al., 2007; Leeds,
2003; Alesina & Spolaore, 1997; Jackson & Nei, 2015).
Similarly, normalizing a war’s size by the nations’ or world’s total population,
producing a per-capita rate (Pinker, 2012; Cirillo & Taleb, 2015), assumes that
individuals contribute independently and with equal probability to potential or
actual violence, regardless of who or where they are. Normalizing by world pop-
ulation is thus equivalent to assuming that doubling Canada’s population would
linearly increase the level of violence in a war in Yemen. In general, human
populations have increased so dramatically over the past 200 years that this nor-
malizer nearly always produces the appearance of a decline in violence, even if
wars were, in an absolute sense, stationary. However, there is little evidence that
real conflict sizes or rates increase linearly with population (Bowles, 2009; Oka
et al., 2017; Falk & Hildebolt, 2017).
That said, per-capita variables can be useful for other reasons (Pinker, 2012), and
population surely does play some role in the sizes of wars, albeit probably not a
simple one (Oka et al., 2017; Falk & Hildebolt, 2017). A realistic per-capita nor-
malizer should instead account for the effects of alliances, geographic proximity,
geopolitical stability, democratic governance, economic ties, etc. (Cederman et al.,
2011), in addition to population, and would be akin to modeling the underlying
processes that generate interstate wars. This represents an important direction for
future work.
10.3 The Size and Timing of Wars
In Richardson’s view, the size or severity of an interstate war (number of battle
deaths) follows a power-law distribution of the form Pr(x) / x−a for some a > 1
and for all x  xmin > 0. Using standard techniques to estimate a and xmin, and to
test the fitted distribution (Clauset et al., 2009), I find that the set of observed
interstate wars sizes, from 1823 to 2003, are statistically indistinguishable from an
iid draw from a power-law distribution (Fig. 10.2).
Similarly, Richardson posits that the onset of a new interstate war follows a
Poisson process, meaning that wars arrive at a constant rate q, and the time t be-
tween onsets of new wars follows a geometric distribution of the form Pr(t) / e−qt
for some q > 0 and for all t  1.
Using the same techniques as above to estimate q and test the fitted distribution,
I find that the set of observed delays between onsets are statistically indistin-
guishable from an iid draw from a Poisson process (Fig. 10.3). That is, both the size
and timing of interstate wars 1823–2003 are statistically indistinguishable from
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Richardson’s simple model of a power-law distribution for war sizes and a Poisson
process for their arrival (Richardson, 1944, 1960). This agreement is remarkable
considering the overall simplicity of the model compared to the complexity and
contingency of international relations over this period, and the fact that this time
period includes nearly 60 years of additional data over Richardson’s original
analysis.
10.4 Are Large Wars Declining?
Combining the two parts of Richardson’s model allows us to generate simulated
interstate war data sets, drawn from a stationary process, with similar onset times
and war sizes as the historical record. The statistics of these simulated histories
define a reference distribution against which we can compare aspects of the his-
torical record.
I now apply this model to address a long-running debate in international rela-
tions: did the underlying processes that generate interstate wars change after the
Battle deaths, x

























x0.75 Power-law exponent, α





Fig. 10.2 Interstate wars sizes, 1823–2003. The maximum likelihood power-law model of the
largest-severity wars (solid line, a = 1.53 ± 0.07 for xmin = 7061) is a statistically plausible
data-generating process of these 51 empirical severities (Monte Carlo, pKS = 0.78 ± 0.03). For
reference, distribution quartiles are marked by vertical dashed lines. Inset: bootstrap distribution of
maximum likelihood parameters Pr(a), with the empirical value (black line). Originally published
in Clauset (2018)
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Second World War? This point in history is commonly proposed as the beginning
of a ‘long peace’ pattern in interstate conflict, meaning a pronounced decrease in the
frequency and severity of wars, especially large ones (Gaddis, 1986; Ward et al.,
2007; Levy & Thompson, 2010; Pinker, 2012; Braumoeller, 2013).
To test the long peace hypothesis from Richardson’s perspective, I consider the
accumulation of large interstate wars over time, and assess whether or when that
accumulation in the post-war period represents a low probability event under the
stationary model. If the accumulation during the long peace is statistically unusual
under the reference distribution, it would indicate support for an underlying change
in the generating processes.
I define ‘large’ wars as those in the upper quartile of the historical war size
distribution, meaning x  x0.75 = 26,625 battle deaths, but similar results are
obtained for other large thresholds. The initial 1823–1939 period contains 19 such
large wars, for an arrival rate of one per 6.2 years, on average. The ‘great violence’
pattern of 1914–39, which spans the onsets of the First and Second World Wars,
includes ten large wars, or about one every 2.7 years. The long peace of the 1940–
2003 post-war period contains only five large wars, or about one every 12.8 years.
Figure 10.4 shows the historical accumulation curves of these events, and for
smaller wars, as a function of time.
Years between war onsets, t

























Fig. 10.3 Times between interstate war onsets, 1823–2003. The maximum likelihood geometric
model (solid line, q = 0.428 ± 0.002 for t  1) is a statistically plausible data-generating process
of the empirical delays (Monte Carlo, pKS = 0.13 ± 0.01), implying that the apparent
discontinuity at t = 5 is a statistical artifact. Inset: the bootstrap distribution of maximum
likelihood parameters Pr(q), with the empirical estimate (black line). Originally published in
Clauset (2018)
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Our combined model takes the historical war onset years as given, and then for
each of these 95 conflicts, draws a synthetic war size iid from the empirical size
distribution (with replacement), as in a simple bootstrap of the data. Clauset (2018)
considers two additional models of this flavor, which produce larger variances in
the accumulation curves for large wars but yield similar results and conclusions.
10.5 Evaluating the Past
Within the historical accumulation curve for large wars, the long peace is a visible
pattern, in which the arrival rate (the curve’s slope) is substantially flatter than in the
preceding great violence period (Fig. 10.4). However, under the stationary model,
this pattern is well within the envelope of simulated curves, and the observed
pattern is statistically indistinguishable from a typical excursion, given the
heavy-tailed nature of historical war sizes.
In fact, most simulated war sequences contain a period of ‘peace’ at least as long
in years and at least a peaceful in large-war counts as the long peace (Table 10.1).
Fifty years or more of relatively few large wars is thus entirely typical, given the
empirical distribution of war sizes, and observing a long period of peace is not
necessarily evidence of a changing likelihood for large wars (Cirillo & Taleb, 2015;
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Fig. 10.4 Historical and simulated accumulation curves of interstate wars. Empirical cumulative
counts of wars of different sizes (dark lines) over time, alongside ensembles of simulated counts
from a stationary model (light lines), in which empirical severities are replaced iid with a bootstrap
draw from the empirical severity distribution. Dashed lines mark the end of the Second World War
and the end of the Cold War. Originally published in Clauset (2018)
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Clauset, 2018). Even periods comparable to the great violence of the World Wars
are not statistically rare under Richardson’s model (Table 10.1).
Taking these findings at face value implies that the probability of a very large
war is constant. Under the model, the 100-year probability of at least one war with
16,634,907 or more battle deaths (the size of the Second World War) is
0.43 ± 0.01, implying about one such war per 161 years, on average.
10.6 Peering into the Future
We can also use Richardson’s model to simulate future sequences of interstate wars,
and thereby evaluate how long the long peace must last before it becomes com-
pelling evidence that the underlying processes did, indeed, change after the Second
World War. To extend the simulated war sequences beyond 2003, for each year, I
create a new war onset according to a simple Bernoulli process, with the historical
production rate (on average, a new war every 1.91 years). I then linearly extrapolate
the long peace pattern, in which a new large war occurs on average every
12.8 years, out into the future until 95% of the simulated accumulation curves
exceed the extrapolated pattern’s curve. At that moment in time, the long peace
pattern will have become statistically significant, by conventional standards, rela-
tive to the stationary model, and we could say with confidence that the time since
the Second World War was governed by a different, more peaceful underlying
process.
In this extrapolated future, the post-war pattern of relatively few large wars
becomes progressively more unlikely under a stationary hypothesis (Fig. 10.5).
However, it is not until 100 years into the future that the long peace becomes
statistically distinguishable from a large but random fluctuation in an otherwise
stationary process. Even if there were no large wars anywhere in the world after
2003, the year of significance would arrive only a few decades earlier.
Table 10.1 Stationary likelihood of empirical conflict patterns. Under a simple stationary model
of conflict generation (see text), the estimated likelihoods of observing two particular large-war
patterns over the period 1823–2003: a great violence, meaning 10 or more large war onsets
(x  x0.75) over a 27 year period (the empirical count of such onsets, 1914–39); or, a long peace,
meaning 5 or fewer large war onsets over a 64 year period (the empirical count of such onsets,
1940–2003). Probabilities estimated by Monte Carlo. Parenthetical values indicate the standard
error of the least significant digit. Originally published in Clauset (2018)
Empirical pattern Formalization Model
Great violence Pr(V  n  10 large wars over t  27 years) 0.107(1)
Long peace Pr(P  n  5 large wars over t  64 years) 0.622(2)
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The consistency of the historical record of interstate wars with Richardson’s
stationary model places an implicit upper bound on the magnitude of change in the
underlying conflict generating process since the end of the Second World War
(Cederman, 2001). This modeling effort cannot rule out the existence of a change in
the rules that generate interstate conflicts, but if it occurred, it cannot have been a
dramatic shift. The results here are entirely consistent with other evidence of
genuine changes in the international system, but they constrain the extent to which
such changes could have genuinely impacted the global production of interstate
wars.
10.7 Discussion
The agreement between the historical record of interstate wars and Richardson’s
simple model of their frequency and severity is truly remarkable, and it stands as a
testament to Richardson’s lasting contribution to the study of violent political
conflict.
There are, however, a number of caveats, insights, and questions that come out
of our analysis. For instance, Richardson’s Law – a power-law distribution in
conflict event sizes – appears to hold only for sufficiently large ‘deadly quarrels,’
Year

























Wars, x ≥ x0.25
Wars, x ≥ x0.50
Wars, x ≥ x0.75
Fig. 10.5 How long must the peace last? Simulated accumulation curves for wars of different
sizes under a simple stationary model, overlaid by the empirical curves up to 2003 (dark lines) and
linear extrapolations of the empirical post-war trends (the long peace) for the next 100 years
(dashed lines). Source Originally published in Clauset (2018)
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specifically those with 7061 or more battle deaths. The lower portion of the dis-
tribution is slightly more curved than expected for a simple power law, which
suggests potential differences in the processes that generate wars above and below
this threshold.
With only 95 conflicts and a heavy-tailed distribution of war sizes, there are
relatively few large wars to consider. This modest sample size surely lowers the
statistical power of any test and is likely partly to blame for needing nearly 100
more years to know whether the long peace pattern is more than a run of good luck
under a stationary process.
One could imagine increasing the sample size by including civil wars, which are
about three times more numerous than interstate wars over 1823–2003. Including
these, however, would confound the resulting interpretation, because civil wars
have different underlying causes (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006; Cederman et al.,
2013; Wucherpfennig et al., 2016), and because the distribution of civil war sizes is
shifted toward smaller conflicts and exhibits relatively fewer large ones (Lacina,
2006).
Putting aside these technical issues, the larger question our analysis presents is
this: how can it be possible that the frequency and severity of interstate wars are so
consistent with a stationary model, despite the enormous changes and obviously
non-stationary dynamics in human population, in the number of recognized states,
in commerce, communication, public health, and technology, and even in the
modes of war itself? The fact that the absolute number and sizes of wars are
plausibly stable in the face of these changes is a profound mystery for which we
have no explanation.
There is, of course, substantial evidence for a genuine post-war trend toward
peace, based on mechanisms that reduce the likelihood of war (Ray, 1998; Leeds,
2003; Jackson & Nei, 2015) and on statistical signatures of a broad and
centuries-long decline in general violence (Gurr, 2000; Payne, 2004; Goldstein,
2011; Pinker, 2012) or the improvement of other aspects of human welfare (Roser
et al., 2017).
But a full accounting of the likelihood that the long peace will endure must also
consider mechanisms that increase the likelihood of war (for example, see Bremer,
1992; Mansfield & Snyder, 1995; Barbieri, 1996). War-promoting mechanisms
certainly include the reverse of established peace-promoting mechanisms, e.g., the
unraveling of alliances, the slide of democracies into autocracy, and the fraying of
economic ties, but they may also include unknown mechanisms.
In the long run, processes that promote interstate war may be consequences of
those that reduce it over the shorter term, through feedback loops, tradeoffs, or
backlash effects. For example, the persistent appeal of nationalism, whose spread
can increase the risk of interstate war (Schrock-Jacobson, 2012), is not independent
of deepening economic ties via globalization (Smith, 1992). Investigating such
interactions is a vital direction of future research and will facilitate a more complete
understanding of the processes that govern the likelihood of patterns like the long
peace.
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More concretely, our results here indicate that the post-war efforts to reduce the
likelihood of large interstate wars have not yet changed the observed statistics
enough to tell if they are working. This fact does not lessen the face-value
achievement of the long peace, as a large war today between major powers could be
very large indeed, and there are real benefits beyond lives saved (Roser et al., 2017)
that have come from increased economic ties, peace-time alliances, and the spread
of democracy. However, it does highlight the continued relevance of Richardson’s
foundational ideas as the appropriate null hypothesis for patterns in interstate war.
One explanation for the apparent stationarity of wars since 1823 is the existence
of compensatory trends in related conflict variables that mask a genuine change in
the conflict generating processes. Patterns across multiple conflict variables do seem
to indicate a broad shift toward less violence (Gurr, 2000; Payne, 2004; Goldstein,
2011; Pinker, 2012). But, not all conflict variables support this conclusion, and
some, such as military disputes and the frequency of terrorism, seem to be
increasing, instead (Harrison & Wolf, 2012; Clauset & Woodard, 2013).
Untangling conflict variables’ interactions and characterizing their trends and dif-
ferences across groups of nations will be a valuable line of future work.
An alternative explanation is that the mechanisms that govern the likelihood of
war have unfolded heterogeneously across time and geographic regions over the
past 200 years, thereby creating an illusion of global stationary by coincidence. The
long peace pattern is sometimes described only in terms of peace among largely
European powers, who fell into a peaceful configuration after the great violence for
well understood reasons. In parallel, however, conflicts in other parts of the world,
most notably Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, have become more
common, and these may have statistically balanced the books globally against the
decrease in frequency in the West, and may even be causally dependent on the
drivers of European war and then peace.
Developing a more mechanistic understanding of how changes in the likelihood
of conflict in one part of the world may induce compensatory changes in the
likelihood of conflict in other parts would have enormous value if it could explain
how some regions can fall into more peaceful patterns as a group, while other
regions go the opposite direction. The evident stability of Richardson’s Law may, in
the end, be an artifact of these kinds of complex, ‘macro’ scale dynamics, playing
out across the global stage.
Finally, it is worth reiterating how remarkable and counter-intuitive it is that
Richardson’s original models of the frequency and severity of wars, first proposed
more than half a century ago, successfully hold up under modern, more rigorous
statistical methods of evaluation applied to far more comprehensive data.
A sobering implication of this success is that the probability of a large interstate
appears to have remained constant, despite profound collective efforts to lower it.
More importantly for the general study of conflict, Richardson’s work presents a
simple and enduring mystery: how can the frequency and severity of interstate wars
be so consistent with a stationary model, despite the dramatic changes and obvi-
ously non-stationary dynamics in so many other aspects of human civilization?
Answering this question will shed new light on the underlying causes of war, and
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greatly inform efforts to promote peace. Richardson, who was an avowed pacifist
and who worked as an ambulance driver during the First World War, would surely
be pleased if his work on the statistics of war ultimately helped devise better
policies to promote peace.
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Chapter 11
The Decline of War Since 1950:
New Evidence
Michael Spagat and Stijn van Weezel
Abstract For the past 70 years, there has been a downward trend in war sizes, but
the idea of an enduring ‘long peace’ remains controversial. Some recent contri-
butions suggest that observed war patterns, including the long peace, could have
resulted from a long-standing and unchanging war-generating process, an idea
rooted in Lewis F Richardson’s pioneering work on war. Focusing on the
hypothesis that the war sizes after the Second World War are generated by the same
mechanism that generated war sizes before the Second World War, recent work
failed to reject this ‘no-change’ hypothesis. In this chapter, we transform the
war-size data into units of battle deaths per 100,000 of world population rather than
absolute battle deaths – units appropriate for investigating the probability that a
random person will die in a war. This change tilts the evidence towards rejecting
no-change hypotheses. We also show that sliding the candidate break point slightly
forward in time, to 1950 rather than 1945, leads us further down the path toward
formal rejection of a large number of no-change hypotheses. We expand the range
of wars considered to include not just inter-state wars, as is commonly done, but
also intra-state wars. Now we do formally reject many versions of the no-change
hypothesis. Finally, we show that our results do not depend on the choice of war
dataset.
11.1 A Continuing Debate
The possibility that war might be in decline has long tantalized academics and the
general public. Ongoing debate has focused on whether there might be a secular
downward trend in war sizes which might herald the decline of war. For roughly
70 years there has not been a truly huge war or a direct confrontation between major
powers. Nevertheless, the idea of an enduring ‘long peace’, in the coinage of Gaddis
(1986), remains controversial. Some scholars have developed a decline-of-war thesis in
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some detail (Goldstein, 2011; Pinker, 2011; Hathaway & Shapiro, 2017) while others
reject it (Braumoeller, 2013; Cirillo & Taleb, 2016b; Clauset, 2018, 2020). Here we do
not attempt a broad survey of the existing literature. Rather, we focus on the recent
contributions of Cirillo & Taleb (2016b) & Clauset (2018, 2020 in this volume)
suggesting that observed war patterns, including the long peace, could have come from
a long-standing and unchanging war-generating process. In particular, we engage with
Clauset (2018) who tests the hypothesis that the war sizes after the Second World War
are generated by the same mechanism that generated war sizes before the Second
World War. He fails to reject what we will call a ‘no-change hypothesis’.
Here are the main contributions of our chapter. First, we give a simple exposition
of the central ideas behind the new critiques of the decline-of-war thesis made by
Cirillo & Taleb (2016b) and Clauset (2018, 2020). These ideas hinge centrally on
the original insight of Richardson (1948, 1960) into the fat-tailed size distribution of
modern wars. Second, we transform the war-size data into units of battle deaths per
100,000 of world population rather than absolute battle deaths and argue that these
units are appropriate for investigating the probability that a random person will die
in a war. We show that this change tilts the evidence towards rejecting a large
number of no-change hypotheses. Third, we show that sliding the candidate break
point slightly forward in time, to 1950 rather than 1945, leads us further down the
path toward formal rejection of a range of no-change hypotheses. Finally, we
expand the types of wars to include intra-state as well as inter-state. Now we almost
always formally reject our no-change hypotheses.1 Finally, we show that our results
do not depend on the choice between two widely used war datasets.
11.2 Richardson Provides Our Framework
Decades ago, Richardson (1948) introduced the idea that war sizes tend to follow
what is known as a power law distribution.2 Technically, this means that the fre-
quency of wars of size x is proportional to xa where a[ 1 is some constant. Thus,
bigger wars are less common than smaller ones with the value of a governing the
rate at which war frequencies decrease as war sizes increase. This remarkable
insight has fared well against more than half a century of new data and the
development of more rigorous statistical methods for estimating and testing power
laws (Cederman, 2003; Clauset, 2018; González-Val, 2016).
For our purpose, the important characteristic of power-law distributions is that
they have what are known as ‘fat upper tails’ governing the relationship between
1Our findings do not refute those of Clauset (2018). It can be true simultaneously that per capita
war sizes decrease while the absolute war size generation mechanism does not change.
2Spagat (2015) provides a non-technical introduction to power laws.
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war sizes and their frequencies. This property entails that, although bigger wars are
less common than smaller ones, the rate at which war frequencies decline with war
sizes is much slower than would be the case if war sizes followed a common
normal, or ‘Bell Curve’, distribution. Most people are conditioned to think in terms
of Bell Curves, so some mental effort is required to adjust to fat tails. Here is the
most salient point to bear in mind in the present context; huge wars are really rare
but not really really really, rare.
We illustrate the key fat-tail property with the following numerical example.
Suppose that every time the world experiences a new war, w, the probability that
the war size will grow to at least the size of the First World War, w – hereafter a
‘truly huge war’ – is 0.006.3 We now make the important assumption that war-size
realizations are statistically independent of each other, which implies that the size of
war w tells us nothing about the sizes of previous or future wars. Under these
conditions, the chance that there is at least one truly huge war after 200 war-size
realizations is roughly 2/3.4 If we lower the probability that each new war will turn
out to be a truly huge one down from 0.006 down to P w wð Þ ¼ 0:0001, then the
chance of at least one truly huge war in 200 draws drops to around 1 in 50.
Decreasing the probability of a truly huge war on each draw even further down to
P w wð Þ ¼ 107, decreases this chance all the way down to about 1 in 50,000.
Thus, it makes a big practical difference whether truly huge wars are really rare,
P w wð Þ ¼ 0:006; really really rare, P w wð Þ ¼ 0:0001; or really really really
rare, P w wð Þ ¼ 107.
This fat-tail property of the war-size distribution potentially places the world into
what we might call a ‘bad Goldilocks’ range. On the one hand, 0.006 is large
enough that we might expect to suffer a truly huge war once every few generations,
far too often for such a calamity. On the other hand, 0.006 is small enough that the
risk of a truly huge war can lurk below the surface for a long time without being
exposed as a major threat. This is evident within our example according to which
the world has about a 1/3 chance of experiencing 200 wars without suffering a truly
huge one. And if our luck holds out this long, we could easily last another 200 wars
without suffering a truly huge war.
Thus, we arrive at an important insight flowing from the pioneering work of
Richardson (1948) and developed further by Clauset (2018); the threat of a truly
huge future war can be quite serious while simultaneously remaining well-hidden
for a long time. In other words, we should not dismiss the possibility of a truly huge
future war just because such an event would be dramatically out of line with our
range of experience over the last 70 years. At the same time, we must not imprison
ourselves in our own ahistorical assumptions that rely on the artifice of independent
3This probability is not entirely fictitious. In the dataset compiled by Gleditsch (2004), the First
and Second World Wars are by far the biggest two out of 362 wars that occurred between the
beginning of the 19th century and 1945: 2=362  0:006.
41 1 0:006ð Þ200 0:7.
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draws with fixed and unchanging probabilities. These calculations are helpful to
understand important concepts and establish baseline expectations. But they do not
possess any special powers to describe the world we currently live in or to predict
its future. A finding that the war-size pattern of recent decades is consistent with an
unchanging war generation mechanism over the last two centuries does not prove
that that such a mechanism actually exists.
11.3 A New Debate on the Decline of War
There is diversity of opinion among proponents of the decline-of-war thesis. First, it
is standard to claim that the absolute level of war violence has declined over time,
albeit unevenly (Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005; Human Security Report Project, 2011).
Different scholars emphasize different time periods, although most view the Second
World War as an important turning point. Second, sometimes the main claim is
about per capita, rather than total, war violence (Pinker, 2011). A third tendency is
that no one we are aware of argues that truly huge wars have become impossible.
To be sure, a sense of optimism pervades this literature with proponents generally
providing reasons why war violence is decreasing and why this trend might rea-
sonably be expected to continue. Yet, invariably, there is also a note of caution
about the future.
The recent critique of the decline-of-war thesis was instigated by Cirillo & Taleb
(2016b), who collected data on 565 wars going all the way back to Boudicca’s
rebellion against the Romans in the first century common era (CE). Using extreme
value theory to fit the fat-tailed data, they find that they cannot reject their model
and conclude from this non-rejection that the data do not support a decline-of-war
thesis. In a companion paper they go further, writing that ‘there is no scientific basis
for narratives about change in risk’ (Cirillo & Taleb, 2016a).
Cirillo & Taleb (2016b) helped to prompt renewed focus on the importance of fat
tails in war sizes for the decline-of-war debate; however, they left several important
issues unresolved. First, although a main contribution of their work is the data
collection effort, their dataset is not publicly available, and they have refused to
allow other researchers to examine it (Spagat, 2017). This stance takes their work
outside the scientific universe, at least for now. Second, non-rejection of a model
fitting two thousand years of data does not rule out the possibility of scientifically
grounded discussions about possible changes in war risks during subsets of these
two thousand years. For example, there could be a big change after, e.g., war
number 500 but without the last 65 draws disturbing the fit of the first 500 draws
sufficiently to lead to rejection of the whole model. Imagine flipping a coin that has
a 0.5 probability of landing heads for the first 500 flips and a 0.3 probability of
landing heads for the last 65. You would probably not reject a hypothesis that all
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the flips had a chance pretty close to 0.5 of landing heads. More importantly, if you
confine your analysis to the 565 flips as a whole, then you will get no hint that there
was a dramatic change after flip number 500. It would have been more appropriate
to test for a break in the data at a potential change point, such as the end of the
Second World War; Cirillo & Taleb (2016b) do not provide such a test. Third, there
is an overarching assumption in this approach that the only evidence scientifically
admissible to our discussion is a list of war sizes and timings. Cirillo & Taleb
(2016b) seem to think that historical events such as peace treaties, formation of
international institutions or social trends such as improving human rights are,
simply, outside the bounds of a scientific discussion; this restrictive view makes
little sense.
Clauset (2018) addresses the first two of the unresolved issues. First, he uses the
open-source Correlates of War (COW) dataset that covers interstate wars from the
beginning of the 19th century to the present (2007). Second, his whole analysis
focuses on testing for a trend break starting at the end of the Second World War.
The essence of his approach on war sizes is to fit a power law to the data up through
the Second World War and then test the hypothesis that the data after 1945 was
generated by this distribution, i.e., he tests what we call a no-change hypothesis.
Clauset (2018) concludes that he cannot reject the no-change hypothesis. This
finding is intuitive in light the numerical examples provided above although there is
certainly tension between the no-change hypothesis and the last 70 years.
Clauset (2018) provides a useful contribution to our thinking but, at the same
time, we must be cautious about this result for several reasons. First, other infor-
mation besides the time series of war sizes is potentially relevant. Second, we
should not think exclusively in terms of any one particular hypothesis such as the
no-change one. There are other hypotheses, more in line with a decline-of-war
thesis, that would also not be rejected by the data. For example, suppose we modify
the no-change hypothesis by stipulating that wars with more than 5 million battle
deaths became very very rare after the Second World War. That is, we virtually
eliminate the fat tail from the hypothesized war generation mechanism. This
restriction is fully consistent with the post-1945 experience since no war during this
period comes close to such a size. Thus, this hypothesis is consistent with
decline-of-war ideas and will also not get rejected by the data. And there is no
reason to privilege the no-change hypothesis over this one. Third, we must not fall
into the trap of accepting the null hypothesis based on its non-rejection. Clauset
(2018) finds that we would finally reject his no-change hypothesis (p\0:05) after
about 100–140 more years without a truly huge war. Even then we still would not
be able to entirely rule out the no-change hypothesis. However, if the data became
extremely contrary to the no-change hypothesis after 100 sufficiently peaceful years
then the data would already be fairly contrary to this hypothesis after 50 sufficiently
peaceful years. Returning to our earlier calculations, recall that the Gleditsch (2004)
dataset contains 212 wars for the period after the Second World War. If a further
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212 wars occur without a truly huge one, perhaps over the next 70 years, we could
then reject this version of the no-change hypothesis at a 10% level, which would be
rather convincing evidence that there was a change for the better. In other words,
the 0.05 threshold is arbitrary and excessively binary; non-rejection of the
no-change hypothesis does not mean that the decline-of-war thesis is false until it
suddenly switches to true after 100 years without a truly huge war.
11.4 Measuring War
Our empirical analysis relies on two datasets that cover war sizes and dates; the
commonly used Correlates of War (COW) dataset (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010), which
was also used by Clauset (2018), and the dataset compiled by Gleditsch (2004). The
two datasets overlap substantially, and both cover the period 1816–2007. Indeed, the
Gleditsch (2004) dataset is based on the COW dataset. However, there are important
distinctions that are worth understanding even though it turns out that our results do not
depend materially on the choice of dataset. For COW there is a big change in the
inclusion criteria in 1920 with the founding of the League of Nations. The fundamental
test for COW is always membership in the international system for both states, in the
case of inter-state war, and for the state in the case of intra-state war. Between 1816 and
1920 this test breaks down into two parts; (i) a population greater than 500,000 and
(ii) being ‘sufficiently unencumbered by legal, military, economic, or political con-
straints to exercise a fair degree of sovereignty and independence’. After 1920, the
COW test switches to membership in the League of Nations (or United Nations) and
receiving diplomatic missions from any two major powers (Singer & Small, 1972).
Gleditsch & Ward (1999) note that, in practice, the pre-1920 test boils down to having
formal diplomatic relations with Britain and France. This rule excludes many countries
and their wars, including the three Anglo-Afghan wars that took place between 1839
and 1919 and some intrastate wars such as the 1831–45 civil war in Central America.
It would be unfair to label the COW dataset as simply incorrect, yet we believe
that its British-French emphasis excludes many wars that are relevant to the
decline-of-war debate. The revised data by Gleditsch (2004), which corrects these
systematic problems, contains 574 wars between 1816 and 2007, 136 of which are
interstate wars. During the same period COW contains only 474 wars, 95 of which
are interstate. Thus, the difference in war counts is substantial. Moreover, 1920 is
close enough to the Second World War so that the 1920 switch could potentially
affect the results of Clauset (2018). Thus, we prefer the Gleditsch data but run our
calculations on both datasets.5
5The Gleditsch (2004) dataset covers about two centuries of war yet contains roughly the same
number of wars as the Cirillo & Taleb (2016b) dataset which covers two millennia of wars. The
inclusion criteria for the two datasets seem to be similar.
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Our second departure from Clauset (2018) is that we divide all war sizes by
world population estimates. These are applied to the start year of each war and
taken from Fink-Jensen (2015), Klein Goldewijk et al. (2010), and UN (2013) with
some interpolations before 1950. The probability that an average person will be
killed in war is of particular interest to the decline-of-war discussion and population
adjustment is appropriate to assess this probability. In a similar vein, analysts
normally assess, for instance, violence progress by examining the number of
homicides per 100,000 of population or the quality of health services through the
number of maternal deaths per 1000 live births. At the same time, we recognize the
point of Braumoeller (2013) who argues that examination of unadjusted war sizes is
of great relevance to understanding human war-proneness.6
A third contrast with Clauset (2018) is that we include in our analysis all the
wars in each dataset, not just interstate wars.7 We think that there is no a priori
theoretical justification to separate out interstate wars and agree with Small &
Singer (1982) who argued that ‘an understanding of international war cannot rest on
interstate wars alone’. The common focus on wars involving major powers or other
interstate wars seems to be driven by data availability rather than theoretical con-
siderations (Cunningham & Lemke, 2013). Indeed, the third, fourth and sixth lar-
gest wars measured in per capita terms in the Gleditsch dataset are all intra-state
(Fig. 11.1). Thus, combining all wars is best practice in our view although we also
run our calculations on interstate wars alone.
War-size numbers are intended to include just battle deaths, but both of our
datasets work from available sources that sometimes mix in other kinds of deaths.
This issue creates two separate problems. First, ideally we would have data on the
full human cost of war but often we only have data on the battle-death component
of this cost. For example, both datasets record 910,084 deaths for the Korean War,
but a full figure would include famine deaths that could push the number up to 5 or
6 million (Lacina et al., 2006). Second, there is inconsistency across wars since
some figures hue close to a battle-deaths-only concept whereas other figures are
more comprehensive.
6A war that kills one million people is an unmitigated disaster both in a world of 5 billion people
and in a world of 9 billion people.
7For COW, all wars means inter-state, intra-state, extra-systemic and non-state. The Gleditsch
dataset does not have the last two of these categories, although its more inclusive definition of state
means that it codes some COW extra-systemic and non-state wars as either inter-state or intra-state
wars. Arguably, we should subtract the populations of ungoverned spaces that fall outside the
scope of the Gleditsch dataset from our world population figures. Such adjustments would enhance
our decline-of-war results because they would increase the per capita sizes of earlier wars relative
to later ones; governance spreads over time. However, these adjustments would be very hard to
perform with any degree of accuracy, so we do not attempt them here.
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11.5 Insights from the Data
A particular feature of our approach is the large number of no-change hypotheses
that we test. All our hypotheses are based on two separate cut-off points: one for
time periods and the other for per capita war sizes. Our time periods pivot around
either the Second World War or the Korean War, but future work should consider
more cut-off points. For war sizes we consider all possible cut-offs and examine the
fraction of all wars above each war-size cut-off for both the early period and the late
period. In short, we examine many right-hand tails and test whether the tails for the
later periods are thinner than the tails for the earlier periods.
Here are some sample calculations when the time cut-off point is 1945.
According to the Gleditsch (2004) data, there were 362 wars between 1816 and
1945 with the Second World War being by far the largest. Our first no-change
hypothesis for the post-1945 period is that the probability that a random war after
1945 will kill at least 781 people per 100,000 (Fig. 11.1) is given by the fraction of
all wars before 1945 that reached this violence level. This fraction is
p0 ¼ 1362  0:003.
Zero wars out of 212 in the Gleditsch (2004) data attained this size between
1946 and 2007. If war sizes are drawn randomly and independently of each other
and if the no-change hypothesis is true, then the probability of this happening is
ð1 1362Þ212 ¼ 0:56. This probability can be interpreted as a p-value on one
Fig. 11.1 The largest wars as measured by battle deaths per 100,000 on the right y axis. Based on
Gleditsch (2004)
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particular no-change hypothesis at the most extreme end of the distribution of war
sizes.8
Next we calculate exactly the same types of p-values but for lower and lower
war sizes. For war sizes beginning at 781 per 100,000 and moving down towards
499 per 100,000, the size of the First World War, the p-values stay constant. At 499
battle deaths per 100,000 the p-value drops to ð1 2362Þ212 ¼ 0:31. It then stays
constant all the way down to 52 battle deaths per 100,000, the size of the American
Civil War (1861–65), where the p-value drops down to 0.17 − ð359=362Þ212. In
short, the three biggest wars were all before World War II inclusive and together
they yield a preponderance of evidence against a no-change hypothesis but not a
formal rejection at the 0.05 level. The next largest war is the second phase of the
Chinese Civil War which pitted the communists under Mao Zedong against the
nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek and caused 51 battle deaths per 100,000 people.
The no-change hypothesis assigns probability 3362 to the probability that each war
size after World War II will exceed 51. This happens once in 212 draws so the
p-value on the no-change hypothesis adds together the probability of 0 wars above
size 51 and the probability of 1 war above size 51, leading to a p-value of 0.47.
We calculate p-values similarly as we move to smaller and smaller war sizes.
When, for example, there are 6 wars before 1945 of size s and above then the
no-change hypothesis fixes a probability of 6362 on the event that a new post-1945
war will be of size s or above. When, for example, three out of these 212 wars after
1945 are above size s then the p-value on the no-change hypothesis is the proba-
bility of three or fewer wars of size s or greater after 212 independent draws, each
with probability 6362 of reaching this size. We use the binomial formula to make this
calculation.9
Panel (a) in Fig. 11.2 displays the p-values for the tests of all no-change
hypotheses tests with cut-offs for war sizes below 50 battle deaths per 100,000 and
with a time break point of 1945. Reading from right to left the curve dips down
below 0.2 as we move through the Third Sino-Japanese War which began in
1937,10 the Russian Civil War (1918–20) following the Russian Revolution of
1917, and the 1864 Muslim revolt in Xinjiang, China. The p-values then rise back
above 0.8 because the next four largest wars all occurred after the Second World
War. These are the Korean War (1950–53), the second phase of the Vietnam War
which started in 1965, the Iran-Iraq war between 1980 and 1988, and finally the
Second South Sudan War (1983–2005). Next, continuing to read from right to left,
the next 9 wars all took place before the Second World War, bringing the p-values
back down to around 0.2.
8Braumoeller (2013) offers a similar calculation.
9For simplicity, we specify our no-change hypotheses as single probabilities rather than as
uncertain ranges of probabilities, although we plan to relax this assumption in future research.
10This war is often known as the Second Sino-Japanese War. The data counts three wars between
China and Japan: the first starting in 1894, the second in 1931, and the third in 1937.
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The evidence in Fig. 11.2 is unfavorable to the no-change hypothesis ðp\0:5Þ
except in a narrow range of tails for war sizes between about 25 and 28 per
100,000. At the same time, we never reject the no-change hypothesis at the standard
0.05 level. The evidence leans towards the decline of war idea but is far from
definitive.
When we use 1950, rather than 1945, as a break point the results are much more
favourable to the decline-of-war thesis. Now the eight largest wars in per capita
terms all occur before the break point. Panel (b) displays the new p-values.
No-change hypotheses are often rejected at 0.05, and even 0.01 levels for a wide
range of tails. Two of the very biggest wars (the Chinese Civil War and the Korean
War) broke out within the 1945–50 time window so the p-value curve now drops
much lower than it did when 1945 was break point.11
We have made four separate data changes compared to Clauset (2018): mea-
suring war sizes in per capita terms, using Gleditsch data rather than COW data,
considering 1950 as a break point and including intrastate as well as interstate wars.
To isolate the importance of each particular change we now consider them in turn.
We first note that adjusting for world population levels is essential to get anything
resembling the results in this chapter. This is so much true that we do not even
bother showing pictures unadjusted for population. Second, the choice of COW or
the Gleditsch war data does not matter much (Fig. 11.3). Third, both Figs. 11.2 and
11.3 show that the choice of break point does matter; evidence against the
no-change hypothesis is much stronger when the break is at 1950 than it is when the
Fig. 11.2 Tests of no-change hypotheses for all wars. Based on Gleditsch (2004), using 1945 (a)
and 1950 (b) as break points
11We date wars by when they start.
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break point is 1945. Finally, Figs. 11.4 and 11.5 show that our decision to include
intrastate wars also matters. We think this is simply due to sample size; excluding
intrastate wars decreases the number of wars, making it harder to reject the
no-change hypothesis.
Fig. 11.3 Tests of no-change hypotheses for all wars. Based on COW data, using 1945 (a) and
1950 (b) as break points
Fig. 11.4 Tests of no-change hypotheses for interstate wars only. Based on Gleditsch (2004),
using 1945 (a) and 1950 (b) as break points
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11.6 A More Peaceful World Since 1950
There will continue to be debate on the probability of another truly huge war. If we
limit our attention to the probability of a future war at least as large as the First
World War then, consistent with Clauset (2018), our analysis suggests that there is
presently not enough data to draw a strong conclusion. At the same time, our
analysis also suggests that the chances of drawing a truly huge war are probably
lower now than they were in the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century.
When we widen our scope to include smaller but still very large wars, e.g., wars
killing more than 40 per 100,000 of world population then there is substantial
evidence that the world has become more peaceful since the 1950s.
Until recently scholars have tended to assume that the Second World War is the
obvious candidate for a break point into a more peaceful world. However, recent
papers by Fagan et al. (2018) and Cunen et al. (2018) start from an agnostic position
on potential break points and use statistical methods to detect convincing ones.
Both papers find substantial evidence for a change at 1950 although they identify
other candidate break points including 1912 (Fagan et al., 2018) and 1965 (Cunen
et al., 2018). These results complement ours nicely.
There is certainly room to improve our analysis. First, we repeat our caution that
a full treatment of the issues should consider more than just the time series of war
sizes (and population numbers). Second, it would be helpful to go beyond battle
deaths to include more complete numbers on war deaths. Unfortunately, it is
unlikely that this second hope will ever be fully possible. Third, the new research
into defining change points is an important development that will, hopefully,
continue. Despite the potential for improvement, we believe that our chapter should
shift the debate in favour of the decline-of-war thesis.
Fig. 11.5 Tests of no-change hypotheses for interstate wars only. Based on COW data, using
1945 (a) and 1950 (b) as break points
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Richardson’s Life and Work
Nils Petter Gleditsch
Richardson’s life is described in a number of articles, some by people who knew him
personally. Oliver Ashford, a former student, close family friend, and fellow
meteorologist, provides the most extensive treatment in a book published some thirty
years after Richardson’s death (Ashford, 1985). His book also contains a complete
bibliography of Richardson’s published work as well as a list of ten unpublished
papers. Conflict scholars are mostly familiar with Richardson’s two posthumously
published books (Richardson, 1960a, b). These are also among his most frequently
cited works, as noted in Ch. 1. For those who want to study his intellectual devel-
opment as a peace researcher in greater detail, it will be of interest to follow his
writings over a 35-year period, from his brief proposal for a study of mental capacity
in adopted children (Richardson, 1913), his examination of voting power in an
international assembly (Richardson, 1918) and his first study of the mathematical
psychology of war (Richardson, 1919), dedicated to his comrades of the motor
ambulance convoy SS Anglaise, ‘in whose company this essay was mainly written’.
We no longer have to search for the rare original documents, since these and other
publications have been reprinted in three massive volumes (Ashford et al., 1993).
Box Appendix A Richardson timeline. Main sources of the timeline:
Ashford (1985) and Wikipedia.
1881, 11 October, Born in Newcastle upon Tyne
1893 Bootham School in York, a Quaker boarding school
1898 Durham College of Science
1900 King’s College, University of Cambridge; graduated with a first-class
degree
1903 Assistant, National Physical Laboratory
1905 Junior demonstrator, University College Aberystwyth
1906 Chemist, National Peat Industries
1907 Meteorologist, National Physical Laboratory
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1909 Married Dorothy Garnett (1885–1956)
1909 Head of the chemical and physical laboratory, Sunbeam Lamp
Company
1912 Lecturer in Physics, Manchester College of Technology
1913 Superintendent, Eskdalemuir Observatory, Meteorological Office
1916 Ambulance Driver, Friends Ambulance Unit in France
1919 Experimental research, Meteorological Office at Benson, Oxfordshire
1920 Head of the Physics Department, Westminster Training College
1925 BSc in Psychology, University of London, with pure and applied
mathematics
1926 DSc in Physics, University of London
1926 Fellow of the Royal Society
1929 MA, University of Cambridge
1929 Special BSc in Psychology, University of London
1929 Principal, Paisley Technical College
1940 Retired in order to devote himself to independent research
1943 Moved to his final home in Kilmun
1953, Summer, Applied for a Research Fellowship at King’s College,
University of Cambridge
1953, 30 September, Died in Kilmun, Argyll and Bute
1959 Richardson Peace Studies Centre (now Richardson Institute of Peace
Studies) founded at Lancaster University1
1960 The annual LF Richardson Prize for meritorious papers by young
authors in one of the journals of the society established by the Royal
Meteorological Society2
1997 The Lewis Fry Richardson Medal established by the European
Geosciences Union for ‘exceptional contributions to nonlinear geo-
physics in general’3
2001 The Lewis F Richardson Lifetime Achievement Award established in
order to honor a scholar who has spent most of his/her academic life in
Europe and who has made exemplary scholarly contributions to the scien-
tific study of militarized conflict4
2015 Lewis F Richardson lecture series inaugurated by Department of
Mathematics, University of York5
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